State v. Dalrymple
Decision Date | 01 November 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 7857,7857 |
Citation | 407 P.2d 356,75 N.M. 514,1965 NMSC 124 |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Floyd Earl DALRYMPLE, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Hinkle, Bondurant & Christy, Michael R. Waller, Roswell, for appellant.
Boston E. Witt, Atty. Gen., Oliver E. Payne, Deputy Atty. Gen., Roy G. Hill, Frank Bachicha, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellee.
On November 27, 1964, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of robbery contrary to Sec. 40A-16-2, N.M.S.A.1953. On the same date, an information was filed charging him with being a habitual offender in that he had been convicted in 1958, 1960 and 1963 in Texas of crimes which if committed in New Mexico would have been felonies, and sentencing as provided in Sec. 40A-29-5, N.M.S.A.1953, was sought. A plea of not guilty to the charge was entered, and on January 7, 1965, appellant was tried before a jury on the issue of the prior convictions. Proof was made by introducing duly exemplified and authenticated copies of the proceedings in each case.
Appellant testified that although the records indicated in each of the Texas convictions that he had been represented by counsel, in fact he had only pro forma representation and that he had in effect received no assistance from the attorneys in preparing a defense.
Thereafter, on motion of the district attorney, the evidence of appellant was stricken by the trial court as a collateral attack on the Texas judgments. A second ground asserted for striking the evidence was to the effect that the proof would not permit reasonable minds to differ as to whether questions of the adequacy of counsel had been effectively waived in the Texas proceedings. The court, in ruling on the motion, stated that if a collateral attack were permissible, the issue of whether representation by counsel was effective or waived was one which would have to be presented to the jury. However, because the court was of the opinion that no collateral attack could be made on proceedings which appeared regular on their face, the motion to strike appellant's evidence was sustained. The jury was instructed that it was to determine only if appellant was the same person who had been convicted in each of the Texas proceedings, and that it was not to consider appellant's testimony concerning his lack of representation, the same being an improper collateral attack on a judgment of a court of another state, fair and proper on its face. The jury brought in a verdict finding appellant was the same person convicted in each of the Texas cases, whereupon he was sentenced to serve 'the rest of his natural life' as required by Sec. 40A-29-5(C), N.M.S.A.1953. From that judgment and sentence this appeal is prosecuted.
Appellant has been represented by counsel in all proceedings in this cause. His only contention here goes to the question of whether he had a right to show as a defense to the charge under the habitual criminal act that he had only had pro forma representation by counsel in the three Texas proceedings so that he was denied due process of law, and his convictions were accordingly void.
That absent competent and intelligent waiver, a person charged with crime in a state court who is a pauper and unable to employ counsel is entitled to have an attorney appointed to defend him, is not open to question. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733. It is beyond doubt that this decision is to be applied retroactively. United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee (C.A.2, 1964) 330 F.2d 303, cert. den. 377 U.S. 998, 84 S.Ct.1921, 12 L.Ed.2d 1048; Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 84 S.Ct. 80, 11 L.Ed.2d 41. It is equally clear that the representation to which a defendant is entitled is something more than a pro forma appearance. Avery v. State of Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S.Ct. 321, 84 L.Ed. 377; Brubaker v. Dickson (C.A.9, 1962) 310 F.2d 30, cert. den. 372 U.S. 978, 83 S.Ct. 1110, 10 L.Ed.2d 143; Turner v. State of Maryland (C.A.4, 1962) 303 F.2d 507; Pineda v. Bailey (C.A.5, 1965) 340 F.2d 162.
Recognizing the rules as thus stated, we come to the proposition of whether or not the question of the adequacy of representation so as to meet the requirements of due process in a prior trial and conviction in another state may be raised as an issue under our habitual criminal statute.
Section 40A-29-7, N.M.S.A.1953, reads as follows:
It would appear from the language quoted that the only issue to be determined is whether the defendant is the same person who was previously convicted of other crimes as charged. But if the convictions were in trials where there was a denial of due process, can they be considered as prior convictions?
The State would have us adopt the rule announced in New York in People v. McCullough, 300 N.Y. 107, 89 N.E.2d 335, decided in 1949, wherein it was held that when a felony conviction from another jurisdiction has been used as a base for an increased penalty under the New York multiple offender law, an allegation by the defendant that the foreign state conviction was void because he was not advised of his right to counsel, cannot be heard in New York either under a writ of error coram nobis or under habeas corpus.
In United States ex rel. Savini v. Jackson (C.A.2, 1957) 250 F.2d 349, 354, we find the court saying the following concerning the responsibility of New York under its multiple offender law:
Again in 1962, the U. S. Court of Appeals had occasion to pass on the situation in New York in the case of United States ex rel LaNear v. LaVallee (C.A.2, 1962) 306 F.2d 417, 420, wherein we find the following:
* * *'
Thereafter, in People v. Wilson, 13 N.Y.2d 277, 246 N.Y.S.2d 609, 196 N.E.2d 251, decided in 1963, the New...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Clark v. Gladden
...Coffey, Cal., 60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15 (1967); In re Woods, 64 Cal.2d 3, 48 Cal.Rptr. 689, 409 P.2d 913 (1966); State v. Dalrymple, 75 N.M. 514, 407 P.2d 356 (1965); United States ex rel. LaNear v. LaVallee, 306 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1962). See also cases noted in Norton, Gideon and the Ha......
-
State v. Miranda
...actual unfairness. Consequently, the State was not prohibited from using Count I in the habitual proceedings. Compare State v. Dalrymple, 75 N.M. 514, 407 P.2d 356 (1965) (defenses to habitual charges are such as provide grounds for collateral relief). This issue was resolved against defend......
-
State v. Hardy
...court, in effect, denied him his right to appeal from the sentence. Appellant urges that the rationale set forth in State v. Dalrymple, 75 N.M. 514, 407 P.2d 356, should be expanded to permit defendants in a Rule 93 or § 41--15--8 proceeding, to collaterally attack their prior out-of-state ......
-
State v. Duarte
...enhancement), overruled on other grounds by State v. Orona, 98 N.M. 668, 651 P.2d 1312 (Ct.App.1982); State v. Dalrymple, 75 N.M. 514, 521, 407 P.2d 356, 361 (1965) (despite practical difficulties that could arise as a result, defendant in habitual offender proceedings must be allowed to ch......