State v. Dalton
Decision Date | 07 June 1897 |
Citation | 20 R.I. 114,37 A. 673 |
Parties | STATE v. DALTON. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Martin Dalton was convicted of murder, and petitions for a new trial. Denied.
Edward C. Dubois, Atty. Gen., for the State.
John M. Brennan and Dennis J. Holland, for defendant.
The defendant, Martin Dalton, who, on the 2d day of January, 1896, was convicted of the crime of murder, petitions for a new trial on the grounds: (1) That the common pleas division had no jurisdiction to try him under the indictment in this case; (2) that the court erred in matters of law in its rulings; and (3) that the verdict is against the evidence, and the weight thereof. The indictment was found at the September term, 1892, of the court of commonpleas held in and for the county of Providence.
In support of the first ground above specified, the defendant's counsel says that at the time when the defendant was tried the court of common pleas was an inferior court, having jurisdiction only of such cases as had been expressly conferred upon it by statute, and that its successor, now known as the common pleas division of the supreme court, cannot have jurisdiction over an indictment found by the abolished court, unless such jurisdiction has been expressly conferred by statute. He further says that chapter 3 of the judiciary act defines the jurisdiction of the common pleas division, but omits all reference to old indictments then pending in the court of common pleas. While it is true that said chapter 3 of the judiciary act does not refer to indictments then pending in the court of common pleas, yet chapter 38 of the same act expressly provides the manner in which cases pending in the court of common pleas shall be disposed of. Section 21 of this chapter provides that the appellate division shall give directions to the clerks of the courts of common pleas in the several counties as to what disposition shall be made of all actions, suits, and proceedings, civil and criminal, pending in said courts, and to transmit the original papers and records as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the act. In pursuance of said section an order was duly made by the appellate division, and the indictment in question, together with all others then pending in the court of common pleas in this county, was transmitted to the common pleas division of the supreme court. And by virtue of section 22 of said chapter 38 the last-named court thereupon obtained full jurisdiction of the case. Said section is as follows: "The supreme court in its respective divisions and the district court to which the said original papers, exhibits and record shall have been transmitted as aforesaid, shall have jurisdiction of all actions, suits and proceedings so transmitted and shall proceed therein in all respects as if the same had been originally brought before such division or court under this act." The saving clause of the repealed statute is found in section 36, which is as follows: We therefore decide that the common pleas division had full jurisdiction to try and determine the indictment in question.
The rulings complained of are those relating to the admission of statements made by Anthony S. Haswell, the man who is alleged to have been murdered, as to the persons who injured him, and the manner in which the injury was inflicted. The attorney general contends that the statements were admissible on the ground that they were declarations made in extremity, when said Haswell was consciously at the point of death; while the defendant's counsel insists that the evidence fails to show that they were so made, and hence that they were improperly admitted. William E. Wilson, a witness called in behalf of the prosecution, testified: That shortly after 8 o'clock on the evening of the 19th of July, 1892, he saw a man staggering along in front of his house on the concrete walk. That the man looked as though he had tumbled in the dirt, and witness thought at first that he was intoxicated. That the man attracted his attention. That he showed evidence of being in great pain by stooping down when he walked, pressing his hands upon his abdomen, and groaning, and that he asked to be allowed to speak to witness, saying, "Let me tell you." Witness further testified that what the man said indicated that he was apprehensive of impending death from the injuries he had received. That while sitting on the step,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
President of the United States v. Kelly
...opinions of doctors or others stated to him, or other adequate circumstances. Williams v. State, 168 Ind. 87, 79 N.E. 1079; State v. Sullivan, 20 R.I. 114, 37 A. 673." In Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151, 13 S.Ct. 50, 53, 36 L.Ed. 917, it was held: "Dying declarations are admissib......
-
State v. Gazerro, 77-338-C
...the declarant to tell the truth, thus guaranteeing the reliability of the declaration. Id. § 282 at 680. In State v. Sullivan and Dalton, 20 R.I. 114, 37 A. 673 (1897) this court "(i)n order to render the statements of the deceased admissible as a dying declaration, it was only necessary to......
- State v. Roberts
-
State v. Bradshaw, 10762
...have been permitted over objection to describe the assailant and the assault. Such testimony, defendant argues relying on State v. Sullivan, 20 R.I. 114, 37 A. 673, did not qualify for admission under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule because there was no showing that Cril......