State v. Dalton
Decision Date | 02 May 1900 |
Citation | 46 A. 234,22 R.I. 77 |
Parties | STATE v. DALTON. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Benjamin Dalton was charged with giving trading stamps in violation of statute, and the case was certified to the supreme court Defendant released.
Alexander L. Churchill, for the State. Tillinghast & Murdock, for defendant.
TILLINGHAST, J.On the 13th day of November, 1890, the defendant was arraigned before the district court of the Eighth judicial district upon a complaint and warrant charging "that on the 28th day of October, 1899, with force and arms, Benjamin Dalton, of Johnston, did sell to one Frederick W. Perkins certain articles of merchandise, to wit, three pieces of tobacco, and did then and there give and distribute to said Frederick W. Perkins three stamps, commonly called 'trading stamps,' which said stamps did then and there entitle the said Frederick W. Perkins to demand and receive certain articles of merchandise from Sperry & Hutchinson, at their store; said Sperry & Hutchinson being persons other than the vendor of said three pieces of tobacco." The defendant filed a motion that the complaint be quashed, for the following reasons: (1) Because chapter 652 of the Public Laws of the state of Rhode Island, and especially the first section thereof, on which said complaint is founded, is in conflict with the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, because it deprives the defendant of his liberty and property without due process of law. (2) Because said chapter further conflicts with the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, because it deprives the defendant of the equal protection of the laws, in this: That stamps or coupons redeemable in money and merchandise or property, given by the vendor as a bonus in addition to the article purchased, are not included within the prohibition of the chapter; and (3) because said act is in conflict with article 1, § 10, of the constitution of the state of Rhode Island. This motion was overruled by the court. The defendant thereupon pleaded. "Not guilty," but was adjudged probably guilty, whereupon the case was certified to this court upon the question of the constitutionality of the act under which said complaint was made. Said act reads as follows:
It is contended on the part of the state that the act in question is sustainable as a valid exercise of the police power of the state, and also that the constitution of the United States does not limit the state in the exercise of such power.
It would be presumptuous for any court to attempt to formulate an exact definition of the term "the police power of the state." Legal definitions do not sum themselves up in single sentences. They are, and of necessity must be, more or less general and elastic, in order that the courts may apply them to the infinite variety of circumstances which may arise in the relations and affairs of mankind in civilized society. But for all practical purposes the police power of the state may be shortly defined to be the power of the legislature to make such regulations relating to personal and property rights as appertain to the public health, the public safety, and the public morals. In Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923, it is referred to as the "power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity." Further and more elaborate definitions may be found in State v. Fitzpatrick. 16 R. I. 54, 11 Atl. 767; Harrington v. Board, 20 R. I. 233, 38 Atl. 1, 38 L. R. A. 305; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 136, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 818, 25 L. Ed. 1079; Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53. Under these general and comprehensive definitions, it is evident that the general assembly is clothed with very large powers, and may exercise a broad discretion in the passage of laws pertaining to the internal affairs of the state. But, while the power is large, it is not without limit, and, like all other powers of the general assembly, must be so exercised as not to violate the constitutional rights of the people. In People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343, the court, in referring to the police power, says that it "has never been fully described, nor its extent plainly limited, further, at least, than this: It is not above the constitution, but is bounded by its provisions; and, if any liberty or franchise is expressly protected by any constitutional provision, it cannot be destroyed by any valid exercise by the legislature or the executive of the police power." See, also, In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 107; Guthrie on the Fourteenth Amendment, 76-89, and note by Prof. Thayer; Stehmeyer v. City Council, 53 S. C. 259, 31 S. E. 322. Again, when the validity of a statute of this sort is under consideration, it is always open to the court to consider, among other things, whether the act bears any reasonable relatlon to the. public purpose sought to be accomplished, and a forced or strained relation is not enough. Thus, in Lawton v. Steele, supra, Mr. Justice Brown, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: See U. S. v. Ross, 5 App. D. C. 249. And then, after instancing various enactments which have been held not to be within the police power of the states, the court further says: "In all these cases the acts were held to be invalid, as involving an unnecessary invasion of the rights of property, and a practical inhibition of certain occupations, harmless in themselves, and which might be carried on without detriment to the public interests." See, also, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 2 N. E. 29. Of course, it is always to be presumed that all acts of the general assembly are passed in the utmost good faith, and also that they are conformable to the constitution. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678-685, 8 Sup. Ct. 992, 1257. And it is not until the unconstitutionality of a given act is plainly made to appear that the court is called upon to declare it void. State v. District of Narragansett, 16 R. I. 424, 16 Atl. 901; Carr v. Brown, 20 R. I. 215, 38 Atl. 9, 38 L. R. A. 294. But after indulging every possible presumption and intendment in favor of the validity of a statute, and being unable to find that it can be sustained as a constitutional exercise of the legislative power, it becomes the duty of the court to declare it void. Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324; Carr v. Brown, 20 R. I. 223, 38 Atl. 9, 38 L. R. A. 294; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 001, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313. 10 Sup. Ct 862, 34 L. Ed. 455.
We come, then, to the question whether the act before us is one which falls within the police power of the legislature; for, if it is not, it is clearly an unlawful interference with private right. We will endeavor to test this question by the simple process of elimination. First, then, does said act look to or in any manner concern the public health? No one claims that it does, and no one could for a moment claim, with any basis of reason, that it has, or was intended to have, even the remotest bearing thereon. Second, does the act look to or tend to promote the public safety?
Nothing of this sort, either, is claimed in its favor, and we fail to see that anything could be, for it bears no relation whatsoever thereto. Having thus eliminated two of the general grounds upon which said act must be supported as being a valid exercise of the police power, we come to the third and last one, which raises the question whether the act relates to or tends to promote the public morals. The counsel in behalf of the state vigorously contends that it does, on the ground that it prohibits schemes which are in the nature of a lottery or gift enterprise, and hence, whether technically a lottery or not, are open to the same objection. He argues, substantially, that it is the element of chance, the hope of getting something for nothing, and the appeal to the gambling instinct, that constitutes the evil of lottery transactions; that it is clear that the scheme contemplated by the act and prohibited therein is, in effect, a lottery; and that,...
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