State v. Dangler
| Decision Date | 05 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2017-1703,2017-1703 |
| Citation | 162 Ohio St.3d 1,164 N.E.3d 286 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. DANGLER, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
David T. Harold and Thomas A. Matuszak, Wood County Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, as special prosecuting attorneys, for appellant.
Karin L. Coble, Toledo, for appellee.
{¶ 1} Brad Dangler pleaded no contest to sexual battery and then sought to vacate his plea on appeal. He contends that his plea was invalid because the trial court failed to comply fully with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)'s requirement that the court explain the "maximum penalty" for the offense at the time it accepted the plea. Specifically, he maintains that even though the trial court told him that he would have to register as a Tier III sex offender for the rest of his life, it erred by not explaining more fully the obligations and restrictions that went with his status as a sex offender. He says this purported failure gives him an automatic right to withdraw his plea, without any need to demonstrate that he was prejudiced.
{¶ 2} We disagree. When a trial court has told a defendant that he is subject to the sex-offender-registration scheme, that defendant is entitled to have his conviction vacated for lack of a more complete explanation only if he demonstrates prejudice—that is, that he would not have entered the plea but for the incomplete explanation. Because Dangler has not demonstrated prejudice, he is not entitled to withdraw his plea.
{¶ 3} Dangler was indicted on one count of rape of a substantially impaired person in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), a felony of the first degree. He ultimately reached an agreement with the state to resolve the case with a plea and an agreed sentence. The state amended the count to sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(2), a felony of the third degree, and Dangler entered a plea of no contest "with a consent to a finding of guilt." The parties jointly recommended a sentence of three years in prison, with the state indicating that it would not object to judicial release after Dangler had served two years and four months.
{¶ 4} Before accepting the plea, the trial court engaged Dangler in a plea colloquy. The court instructed Dangler at the outset, "If I ask you a question that you do not understand, please stop me and I will rephrase it." The court told Dangler the maximum possible prison term and fine that could be imposed and further advised him, "You would also be obligated to register as a Tier III sex offender which means you would have an obligation to register for your lifetime." Dangler replied that he understood. After explaining the constitutional rights Dangler was waiving by entering a plea, the trial court accepted Dangler's plea and entered a finding of guilty.
{¶ 5} The trial court proceeded with sentencing a month later. At the hearing, the court designated Dangler a Tier III sex offender, detailed his obligations with respect to registration and in-person verification, and informed him of the possibility of criminal prosecution for noncompliance. Dangler clarified the date of his initial registration and indicated that he had no other questions about the terms of his sex-offender status. The court then imposed the agreed-upon 36-month prison term and a mandatory five-year period of postrelease control.
{¶ 6} Dangler appealed, raising two assignments of error. First, he sought to have his plea vacated on the grounds that the trial court had not complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)'s requirement that the court inform him of the maximum penalty for his crime. That provision requires the court to determine "that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved." Id. Dangler asserted that in order to adequately inform him of the maximum penalty, the trial court was required to explain to him (1) the registration requirements that went with his classification (verifying his address in-person every 90 days for the rest of his life with the sheriff of any county in which he resides, works, or attends school), (2) the residency restrictions applicable to his classification, and (3) the community-notification process by which members of the public would be made aware of his status as a sex offender. He contended that because the court did not provide that information, his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Dangler also challenged the trial court's order requiring him to pay appointed-counsel fees without a determination of his ability to pay.
{¶ 7} The state defended the plea, arguing that the trial court had substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) by informing Dangler that he would be classified as a Tier III sex offender and would be required to register for the rest of his life. The state further asserted that Dangler had not shown that he was prejudiced by any lack of notification by the trial court about other aspects of the sex-offender-classification scheme.
{¶ 8} Relying on this court's decision in State v. Williams , 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, the Sixth District Court of Appeals concluded that the registration and in-person-verification requirements, community-notification provisions, and residency restrictions are punitive sanctions. Under the Sixth District's view, each of these requirements constitutes a separate penalty and therefore a trial court must go over each requirement in order to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)'s maximum-penalty advisement. Because the trial court did not review the community-notification provisions and the residency restrictions, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court had completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and vacated Dangler's conviction and sentence without requiring him to show prejudice. The court determined that its resolution of the plea issue rendered the appointed-counsel-fee question moot.
{¶ 9} The Sixth District certified that its decision was in conflict with decisions from the Second District Court of Appeals in State v. Young , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013-CA-22, 2014-Ohio-2213, 2014 WL 2170048, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals in State v. Creed , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97317, 2012-Ohio-2627, 2012 WL 2150349. We determined that a conflict exists and ordered briefing on the following question:
During a plea hearing, does the failure of the sentencing court to inform a defendant of all of the penalties associated with a sex offender classification imposed by R.C. Chapter 2950 constitute a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11 and render the plea void without the need to show prejudice resulted?
{¶ 10} Because a no-contest or guilty plea involves a waiver of constitutional rights, a defendant's decision to enter a plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Parke v. Raley , 506 U.S. 20, 28-29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ; State v. Clark , 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 25 ; see State v. Engle , 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). If the plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is unconstitutional. Id.
{¶ 11} Ohio's Crim.R. 11 outlines the procedures that trial courts are to follow when accepting pleas. We have explained that the rule "ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made." State v. Stone , 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168, 331 N.E.2d 411 (1975) ; see also State v. Nero , 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 107, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).
{¶ 12} Ever since the rule's adoption in 1973, we have been grappling with how best to review a trial court's colloquy to ensure that a defendant's plea is knowing and voluntary. See State v. Ballard , 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). In keeping with that objective, our focus in reviewing pleas has not been on whether the trial judge has "[incanted] the precise verbiage" of the rule, State v. Stewart , 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977), but on whether the dialogue between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his plea, State v. Veney , 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 15-16 ; Clark at ¶ 26 ; State v. Miller , 159 Ohio St.3d 447, 2020-Ohio-1420, 151 N.E.3d 617, ¶ 19.
{¶ 13} When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the trial-court proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error. See State v. Perry , 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 14-15 ; Stewart at 93, 364 N.E.2d 1163 ; Crim.R. 52.
{¶ 14} We have made a limited exception to the prejudice component of that rule in the criminal-plea context. When a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, we presume that the plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is required. Clark , 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, at ¶ 31 ; Veney at syllabus. We have identified these constitutional rights as those set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) : the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, and the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ¶ 19. But when a trial court fails to fully cover other "nonconstitutional" aspects of the plea colloquy, a defendant must affirmatively show prejudice to invalidate a plea. Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶ 15} We have created one additional exception to the prejudice requirement: a trial court's complete failure to comply...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Daniel
... ... unconstitutional." Id ... at ¶ 21. In other ... words, the court concluded that "when the various parts ... of the scheme were considered together, there was enough of a ... punitive aspect that the scheme could not be applied ... retroactively." State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio ... St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 20 ... (construing Williams) ... {¶ ... 24} Daniel contends that the arson-offender-registration ... scheme is punitive under the analysis in Williams. And if the ... scheme is punitive, he presumes, the ... ...
-
State v. Shingleton
...N.E.3d 516, ¶ 42 (O'Donnell, J., concurring in judgment only). However, the court has not chosen to revisit Williams . See State v. Dangler , 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ ...
-
State v. Mize
...court fully complied with the relevant provisions in Crim.R. 11(C), and the analysis of the plea ends there. State v. Dangler , 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 17. The trial court was not required to do anything more than what it did here, which was to fully comply with ......
-
State v. Hall
...in regard to the violent offender specification, Hall relies on a recent opinion from the Ohio Supreme Court, State v. Dangler , 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286. In Dangler , the Supreme Court held that the trial court's failure to separately go over the sex offender regist......