State v. Daniel, No. 101,622.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
• Writing for the Court: JOHNSON
• Citation: 291 Kan. 490,242 P.3d 1186
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Candy S. DANIEL, Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 101,622.
• Decision Date: 19 November 2010

242 P.3d 1186
291 Kan. 490

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,
v.
Candy S. DANIEL, Appellant.

No. 101,622.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Nov. 19, 2010.

242 P.3d 1187, 291 Kan. 490

Syllabus by the Court

1. On a motion to suppress evidence, this court reviews the factual findings underlying the trial court's suppression decision using a substantial competent evidence standard and the legal conclusion drawn from those factual findings using a de novo standard. The court does not reweigh evidence.

2. Warrantless searches are considered unreasonable and invalid unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. It is the State's burden to demonstrate a challenged search was lawful.

3. Neither the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. Instead a judicially created remedy exists to prevent the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search.

4. The exclusionary rule operates to protect Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than serving as a personal constitutional right of the victim. The linchpin is its deterrent effect upon law enforcement.

5. We interpret § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights to provide the same protection from unlawful government searches and seizures as the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution.

6. This court has recognized that while it could extend state constitutional protections under § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights beyond the federal guarantees provided by the Fourth Amendment, it has declined to do so.

7. Our case law tying the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights § 15 provisions

291 Kan. 491

to United States Supreme Court precedent compels our recognition of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule articulated in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), for objectively reasonable reliance by law enforcement on a statute.

8. Under the exclusionary rule exception recognized in Krull, a statute cannot support objectively reasonable reliance if: (a) in its enactment, the legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility to pass constitutional laws; or (b) the statutory provisions are such that a reasonable law enforcement officer should have known the statute was unconstitutional.

9. The exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by police who acted in objectively reasonable reliance upon K.S.A. 22-2501(c) prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009).

Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

James R. Watts, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Steve Six, attorney

242 P.3d 1188

general, was with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BILES, J.:

Candy Starlene Daniel appeals her conviction of possession of methadone, which was found during a warrantless search of her vehicle following her arrest for driving with a suspended license. The district court determined the search lawful under K.S.A. 22-2501(c), which at the time authorized certain searches incident to an arrest for the limited purpose of "discovering the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime."

A unique issue arises because K.S.A. 22-2501(c) was declared unconstitutional while Daniel was appealing her conviction based on the warrantless search of her vehicle. See State v. Henning, 289 Kan. 136, 148-49, 209 P.3d 711 (2009), which applied Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009)

291 Kan. 492

(vehicle search without warrant prohibited unless arrestee is within reaching distance of passenger compartment at time of search or there is reasonable belief the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of the arrest).

The State concedes that under Gant and Henning the search was illegal, so the usual rule would require exclusion of the illegally seized evidence. But the State asks us to salvage Daniel's conviction by applying a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The United States Supreme Court has recognized some good-faith exceptions when it was determined an officer acted in objectively reasonable reliance of certain circumstances outside of the officer's control. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S.Ct. 695, 701-04, 172 L.Ed.2d 496, 504-09 (2009) (officer relied on negligently maintained police records); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) (officer relied on statute); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, reh. denied 468 U.S. 1250, 105 S.Ct. 52, 82 L.Ed.2d 942 (1984) (officer relied on facially valid warrant). To date, this court has applied a good-faith exception only when the officer relied on a warrant subsequently determined to be unsupported by probable cause. State v. Hoeck, 284 Kan. 441, 163 P.3d 252 (2007) (applying Leon ). The State argues the officer who searched Daniel's vehicle reasonably relied on both the facial validity of K.S.A. 22-2501(c) and then-existing case law authorizing the search.

This court has not previously considered whether to apply a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule based upon an officer's good faith reliance on a statute. Even when we struck down K.S.A. 22-2501(c) in Henning, we did not address whether a good-faith exception saved the illegally seized evidence from exclusion. We simply affirmed the district court's suppression of that evidence. 289 Kan. at 148-49, 209 P.3d 711. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court in Gant did not address whether a good-faith exception was applicable when it affirmed suppression of the challenged evidence at issue in that case. See 129 S.Ct. at ----, 173 L.Ed.2d at 497-501. Daniel understandably argues that Gant and Henning support suppressing the evidence in her case, and that point carries with it a quantum of fairness, as well as support from some other jurisdictions.

291 Kan. 493

United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir.2009) (holding good-faith exception inapplicable when officers relied on circuit's erroneous pre- Gant jurisprudence), reh. and reh. en banc denied 598 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir.2010); United States v. Debruhl, 993 A.2d 571, 589 (D.C.App.2010) (same); People v. McCarty, 229 P.3d 1041, 1045-46 (Colo.2010) (same); Valesquez v. Com., 2010 WL 567325, at *3 (Ky.App.2010) (same).

But our Court of Appeals has taken a different view and recently applied the good-faith exception under facts similar to this case. See State v. Karson, 44 Kan.App.2d 306, 306-07, 235 P.3d 1260 (2010) (affirming conviction on drug charges based on evidence discovered during warrantless search of a parked truck after arresting the owner for outstanding traffic violations); State v. Carlton, No. 103,086, 2010 WL 2817048, unpublished opinion filed July 9, 2010, pet. for rev. filed August 5, 2010 (pending) (reversing district court's suppression of drugs and paraphernalia discovered in warrantless vehicle

242 P.3d 1189

search incident to arrest for driving with suspended license). Many other jurisdictions also have followed this approach. See, e.g., United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1041-45 (10th Cir.2009), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 2142, 176 L.Ed.2d 759 (2010) (good-faith exception applies when officers relied on circuit's then-prevailing pre- Gant jurisprudence); see also United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th Cir.2010) (same); United States v. Lopez, 655 F.Supp.2d 720, 725 (E.D.Ky.2009) (same); United States v. Gray, 2009 WL 4739740, at *4 (D.Neb.2009) (unpublished opinion) (same); State v. Baker, 229 P.3d 650, 663-64 (Utah 2010) (same); State v. Dearborn, 327 Wis.2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97, 107-10 (2010) (same).

As explained below, we hold prior precedent compels recognizing a good-faith exception when it can be determined the officer conducting the search incident to arrest was acting in objectively reasonable reliance on K.S.A. 22-2501(c). This exception is applicable for searches occurring before Gant was decided on April 21, 2009. Accordingly, we affirm Daniel's conviction.

Factual and Procedural Background

The facts are stipulated by the parties and not in dispute. Augusta Police Officer Matthew Meckel saw Daniel driving and knew

291 Kan. 494

her driver's license was suspended. By the time Meckel pulled his patrol vehicle behind Daniel's car, she had parked in a private driveway and was walking away. After confirming Daniel's license was suspended during his initial contact with her, Meckel handcuffed Daniel and patted her down. Nothing illegal was found. Meckel placed her in the back of his patrol car, where she was secured and monitored by a second officer who had subsequently arrived at the scene. Meckel then searched Daniel's vehicle without her consent and found her purse.

Meckel testified he could not properly inspect the purse's contents at the scene because of inclement weather, so he took the purse to the police station, where he discovered the drugs. The record does not reflect how much time elapsed between the arrest and the officer's search of the purse, but it is fair to assume the passenger compartment search was much closer in time to Daniel's arrest than the search of the purse at the police station.

The State charged Daniel with possession of methadone and driving with a suspended license. Prior to trial, Daniel filed a motion to suppress the methadone, claiming the search of her vehicle and purse violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, K.S.A. 22-2501, and K.S.A. 22-2509. See K.S.A. 22-3216(1) ( "[A]defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move ... to...