State v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 29 March 2022
• Docket Number: SC 20376
• Citation: 342 Conn. 538,271 A.3d 617
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Patricia DANIELS
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

342 Conn. 538

271 A.3d 617

STATE of Connecticut

v.Patricia DANIELS

SC 20376

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 20, 2021

Officially released March 29, 2022

Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino, state's attorney, John C. Smriga, former state's attorney, and Marc R. Durso, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Laila M. G. Haswell, senior assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Keller, Js.

ECKER, J.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Patricia Daniels, was found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1) (intentional manslaughter),¹ manslaughter in the first degree in violation of § 53a-55 (a) (3) (reckless manslaughter),² and misconduct with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 53a-57 (a) (criminally negligent operation), among other crimes.³ At the sentencing hearing, the trial court vacated the defendant's intentional manslaughter conviction pursuant to State v. Polanco , 308 Conn. 242, 245, 61 A.3d 1084 (2013), at the request of the state and rendered judgment on the remaining counts of conviction. The defendant appealed on the ground that the jury's verdict was legally inconsistent because each of these three charged crimes required mutually exclusive mental states. See State v. Daniels , 191 Conn. App. 33, 38, 213 A.3d 517 (2019). The Appellate Court agreed that the defendant's conviction of reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent operation was legally inconsistent; id., at 53, 213 A.3d 517 ; but also determined that neither reckless manslaughter nor criminally negligent operation was inconsistent with intentional manslaughter. Id., at 49, 51, 213 A.3d 517. Despite these latter holdings, the Appellate Court did not remand the case with direction to reinstate the intentional manslaughter conviction but, instead, reversed the defendant's conviction of all three crimes and remanded the case for a new trial on those three charges. Id., at 62–63, 213 A.3d 517. On appeal to this court, the state argues that the Appellate Court improperly ordered a new trial on all three charges rather than reinstating the defendant's intentional manslaughter conviction. We agree with the state and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The relevant underlying facts are set forth in the Appellate Court's opinion. "The victim, Evelyn Agyei, left her Bridgeport home at approximately 6 a.m. on December 4, 2014. Her eleven year old son accompanied her. Agyei and her son got into Agyei's Subaru Outback (Subaru), Agyei driving and her son in the back seat on the passenger's side. After traversing some back roads, they took Bond Street and arrived at the intersection of Bond Street and Boston Avenue. Agyei stopped at the red light and then proceeded to make a right turn onto Boston Avenue, staying in the right lane. As she was making the right turn, her son looked to the left and saw a white BMW sport utility vehicle (BMW) approximately two streets down, traveling at a high rate of speed in the left lane.

"After Agyei [turned] onto Boston Avenue, the driver of the BMW pulled alongside Agyei's vehicle. Agyei's son saw the BMW logo on the hood; however, he could not see the driver or the license plate. The driver of the BMW then moved into the right lane, hitting Agyei's Subaru once on the driver's side and causing her to begin to lose control of the vehicle. The driver of the BMW then moved behind the Subaru and ran into it from behind, causing the vehicle to cross the median, proceed under a fence, and hit a tree. Tragically, Agyei died from her injuries, and her son, who also was injured, continues to have vision problems as a result of the injuries he sustained. After an investigation ... the police, having concluded that the defendant was the driver of the BMW that hit the Subaru ... [and] cause[d] Agyei's death and the injuries to Agyei's son, arrested the defendant." Id., at 36–37, 213 A.3d 517.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of intentional manslaughter, reckless manslaughter, and criminally negligent operation. See footnote 3 of this opinion. At the sentencing hearing, the state moved to vacate the defendant's intentional manslaughter conviction, explaining: "I think that [disposition] goes along with the spirit of the state's intent during the beginning of this case. The state did have the belief, when we initially filed our long form information, that we [would proceed] on both a legal theory of intentional and reckless manslaughter based on the fact that the defendant's vehicle came into contact with [Agyei's] vehicle twice. But, in light of the convictions, we'd ask that she be sentenced solely on the reckless manslaughter [conviction] and that [the court] vacate the intentional manslaughter [conviction] for sentencing purposes." In support of its request, the state cited to our double jeopardy case law, namely, State v. Polanco, supra, 308 Conn. 242, 61 A.3d 1084, State v. Miranda , 317 Conn. 741, 120 A.3d 490 (2015), and State v. Wright , 320 Conn. 781, 135 A.3d 1 (2016).⁴ The trial court granted the state's request, vacated the defendant's conviction of intentional manslaughter, and sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty years of incarceration, execution suspended after sixteen years, and five years of probation.⁵

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming that the jury's verdict was legally inconsistent because the crimes of intentional manslaughter, reckless manslaughter, and criminally negligent operation each require proof of a mutually exclusive mental state.⁶ See State v. Daniels , supra, 191 Conn. App. at 38, 213 A.3d 517. The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant that the jury's verdict was partially inconsistent and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court. Id., at 53, 62–63, 213 A.3d 517. The Appellate Court determined that there was no legal inconsistency in either the defendant's conviction of intentional and reckless manslaughter or her conviction of intentional manslaughter and criminally negligent operation; id., at 49, 51, 213 A.3d 517 ; but it found that the defendant's conviction of reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent operation was legally inconsistent. Id., at 53, 213 A.3d 517. The Appellate Court reasoned that the crimes of reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent operation were "mutually exclusive when examined under the facts and theory of the state in the present case" because they each require proof of a different mental state as to the same result—the death of Agyei. Id. Specifically, the defendant could not have been reckless as to the risk of Agyei's death by "consciously disregard [ing ] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that her actions would cause ... death, while, simultaneously, [having been negligent as to the risk of Agyei's death by] failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that her actions would cause ... death."⁷ (Emphasis in original.) Id. Simply put, a person cannot consciously disregard a risk that she fails to perceive.

To remedy the legal inconsistency in the jury's verdict, the Appellate Court vacated the defendant's conviction of reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent operation and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial on all three charges related to Agyei's death: intentional manslaughter, reckless manslaughter, and criminally negligent operation. Id., at 63, 213 A.3d 517. In doing so, the Appellate Court rejected the state's claim that the legal inconsistency could be remedied by reinstating the defendant's intentional manslaughter conviction, pointing out that the state had "moved at sentencing to vacate the conviction on that charge partly because doing so went ‘along with the spirit of the state's intent during the beginning of this case’ " and, therefore, that "the most the state can ask for is what the defendant has requested—a retrial on all three of the charges related to Agyei's death." Id. We subsequently granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court improperly order a new trial rather than reinstate the defendant's conviction of intentional manslaughter in the first degree, which was vacated for sentencing purposes under State v. Polanco , [supra, 308 Conn. 242, 61 A.3d 1084 ]?" State v. Daniels, 333 Conn. 918, 216 A.3d 651 (2019).

On appeal, the state argues that the proper remedy for the legal inconsistency in the jury's verdict is to reinstate the defendant's intentional manslaughter conviction pursuant to Polanco and its progeny. According to the state, there is no substantive obstacle to resurrecting the defendant's intentional manslaughter conviction because "the reason for the state's request to vacate the intentional manslaughter conviction was to avoid a potential double jeopardy problem." The state also contends that the defendant's intentional manslaughter conviction was "not undermined by the Appellate Court's rationale for [vacating] her other two convictions" and that the record reflects that the jury necessarily found, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the essential elements necessary to convict the defendant of intentional manslaughter.

The defendant responds that the state waived its claim for reinstatement of the defendant's intentional manslaughter conviction because the state's posttrial motion to vacate was "not related to double jeopardy" but, rather, was prompted by "the state's theory that the crime was intentional or reckless, but not both." Furthermore, the defendant contends that her intentional manslaughter conviction is tainted by the legal inconsistency in the jury's verdict "because the convictions required the jury to find inconsistent...