State v. Darlington

• Decision Date: 23 May 1899
• Citation: 53 N.E. 925,153 Ind. 1
• Parties: STATE v. DARLINGTON.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

153 Ind. 1

53 N.E. 925

STATE

v.DARLINGTON.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 23, 1899.

Appeal from circuit court, Marion county; Frank McCray, Judge.

Frank G. Darlington was indicted for the coercion of an employé, and from an order quashing the indictment the state appeals. Affirmed.

Chas. S. Wittsie, Pros. Atty., and Wm. A. Ketcham, for the State. Chambers, Pickens & Moores, for appellee.

DOWLING, J.

Indictment for an alleged violation of an act to protect employés, and to guaranty their right to belong to labor organizations. Acts 1893, p. 146 (Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 2302). On the motion of the defendant, the Marion criminal court quashed the indictment, and this ruling presents the only question to be determined on this appeal. The indictment, omitting its title and formal parts, was as follows: “The grand jurors for the county of Marion, and state of Indiana, upon their oaths present that Frank G. Darlington, on the 29th day of June, A. D. 1894, at and in the county of Marion, and state aforesaid, being then and there the agent, officer, and superintendent of a corporation, to wit, the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company, did then and there unlawfully coerce, and attempt to coerce one William Carroll by then and there discharging him, the said William Carroll, from the employ of said railway company, because he, the said William Carroll, was then and there a member of a lawful labor organization, to wit, the American Railway Union; contrary,” etc. The grounds of the motion to quash were (1) that the facts stated in the indictment did not constitute a public offense, and (2) that the statute under which said indictment was found was unconstitutional. It is generally true, as a rule of criminal pleading, that where the particular act or acts constituting the offense are clearly definedby the statute, it is sufficient to charge the offense in the language of the statute. But, as was said in State v. Aydelott, 7 Blackf. 157, “This mode of setting out an offense is not always attended with the requisite certainty.” There should be such a specific description of the offense as will apprise the defendant with certainty of the crime with which he is charged, and enable him to plead the verdict and judgment in any future prosecution for the same offense. The indictment charges that the defendant did unlawfully coerce and attempt to coerce the prosecuting witness by discharging him. The signification of the word “coerce” is “to impel to, or restrain from, action by physical or moral force; to constrain to do, or forbear, by force or fear; to compel.” Stand. Dict. “To restrain by force, especially by law or authority; to repress. (2) To compel or constrain to any action. * * * Coerce had at first only the negative sense of checking or restraining by force; as, to coerce a bad man by punishments, or a prisoner with fetters. It has now gained a positive sense, viz. that of driving a person into the performance of some act which is required of him by another; as to coerce a man to sign a contract; to coerce obedience. In this sense (which is now the prevailing one), ‘coerce’ differs but little from ‘compel,’ and yet there is a distinction between them. Coercion is usually accomplished by indirect means, as threats or intimidation, physical...