State v. Darr
| Decision Date | 03 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | COA21-493 |
| Citation | 872 S.E.2d 608 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Stamey Jason DARR |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Massengale & Ozer, Chapel Hill, by Marilyn G. Ozer, for Defendant-Appellant.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph L. Hyde, for the State.
¶ 1 Stamey Jason Darr ("Defendant") was indicted on 1 October 2018 for statutory rape and forcible rape of the victim ("Victim"). On 19 February 2021, the trial court convicted Defendant of statutory rape, and he appealed. After careful review, we find no error.
¶ 2 Defendant was born on 20 May 1982, and Victim was born on 30 August 2001. Victim testified Defendant first had vaginal intercourse with her in 2016; Victim was fourteen years old, and Defendant was thirty-three years old. Victim testified sexual contact between her and Defendant was consistent and continued through 2018. The indictment listed 2017 as the date of the vaginal intercourse. In August 2018, Victim told her high school guidance counselor about her sexual contacts with Defendant, and the counselor notified law enforcement officers.
¶ 3 Randolph County Sheriff's Detective Sibbett requested Defendant come to the Sheriff's Office to discuss a "DSS referral," which concerned an unrelated shooting on Defendant's property, and Defendant did so. Defendant was not formally arrested or restrained when he arrived. Defendant was interrogated by Detectives Trogdon and Sibbett on the topic of the "DSS referral." During interrogation, Defendant was allowed to leave to use the restroom and make phone calls. After questioning regarding the shooting incident ceased, the interrogation shifted to Defendant's relationship with Victim.
¶ 4 Detective Trogdon assured Defendant he was not under arrest and told Defendant he could leave. The detectives questioned Defendant about Victim's allegations and played a recording of Defendant speaking with Victim. After hearing his recorded conversation with Victim, Defendant told the detectives he had engaged in vaginal intercourse with Victim multiple times in 2017 and 2018.
¶ 5 After Defendant's confession, the detectives left the room, and a Department of Social Services ("DSS") employee entered the room to speak with Defendant. After the DSS employee left the room, the detectives returned, and Detective Sibbett told Defendant he was under arrest and would be charged. Detective Sibbett read Defendant his Miranda Rights. Defendant stated, "I'll talk to you but I want a lawyer with it and I don't have the money for one."
¶ 6 After Defendant stated he wanted "a lawyer with it," the detectives asked several questions to clarify Defendant's wishes. Detective Trogdon told Defendant he did not see how talking with the detectives "could hurt [Defendant]," and "[he] want[ed] to make sure [Defendant was] willing to speak[.]" Detective Trogdon then asked Defendant if he wished to speak without a lawyer present, if he wished to speak with the detectives, and if he wanted a lawyer present for questioning.
¶ 7 Detective Trogdon asked Defendant to respond "yes or no" to whether Defendant would answer questions without an attorney present. Defendant answered in the affirmative and signed a waiver of his right to counsel. Defendant continued to speak with the detectives; however, Defendant did not expand on his earlier confession after his arrest. The video of the Defendant's interrogation by Detectives Sibbett and Trogdon records the following exchange, in relevant part:
¶ 8 Defendant moved to suppress any statements given in his interrogation and moved to dismiss his statutory rape charge. The trial court found Defendant's alleged request for counsel "equivocal" and "ambiguous," and the trial court found Detective Trogdon's statements to be "a poor choice of words in light of all the circumstances" but not an inducement to sign the waiver. Both of Defendant's motions were denied. Defendant was convicted by a jury of statutory rape of a child 15 year or younger, but was found not guilty of second degree forcible rape. Defendant was sentenced as a prior record level II to an active term of 240 to 348 months. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal.
¶ 9 This Court has jurisdiction to address Defendant's appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) (2021) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(a) (2021).
¶ 10 The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred in denying: (1) Defendant's motion to suppress, or (2) Defendant's motion to dismiss.
¶ 11 Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is "strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge's underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge's ultimate conclusions of law." State v. Cooke , 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982).
¶ 12 "This Court reviews the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. " State v. Smith , 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). "Upon a defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged ... and (2) of defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense." State v. Cox , 367 N.C. 147, 150, 749 S.E.2d 271, 274 (2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State v. Smith , 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). "The evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to ... every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom." Cox , 367 N.C. at 150, 749 S.E.2d at 274 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
¶ 13 Defendant first contends the evidence from his interrogation should be suppressed because he requested and did not receive counsel.
¶ 14 Under the Fifth Amendment, "an accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). A defendant has the right to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation "[i]f ... he indicates ... he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking." Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
¶ 15 A request for counsel must be unambiguous. State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 655, 566 S.E.2d 61, 70 (2002) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) ). A...
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