State v. Darst

• Decision Date: 04 March 1965
• Docket Number: 37238,Nos. 37216,s. 37216
• Citation: 65 Wn.2d 808,399 P.2d 618
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Robert Thomas DARST, Appellant.

Page 808

65 Wn.2d 808

399 P.2d 618

The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Robert Thomas DARST, Appellant.

Nos. 37216, 37238.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 1.

March 4, 1965.

James A. Henry, Seattle, for appellant.

Charles O. Carroll, Pros. Atty., Thomas A. Stang, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.

HALE, Judge.

The prosecuting attorney for King County, by information, accused Patricia Ann Hudson and Robert Thomas Darst jointly in two counts with unlawfully uttering false or forged prescriptions on April 7 and 8, 1963, for a narcotic drug known as dilaudid. Miss Hudson entered a plea of guilty to count 1 on July 5, 1963, and, pursuant to a deferred sentence granted July 26, 1963, served a jail term and was placed on probation. Thereupon, the court dismissed count 2 against her on motion by the state. Robert Thomas Darst, after Miss Hudson entered a plea of guilty, but prior to the order deferring imposition of sentence, went to trial July 10, 1963, before a jury which returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. From a judgment and sentence of imprisonment for 20 years to run concurrently on each count, he brings this appeal urging 10 separate assignments of error. We have considered each assignment of error and find that they raise three questions requiring discussion.

The first question arises from defendant Darst's timely motion in advance of trial to suppress all evidence obtained from the persons of the two defendants and the automobile used by them, and including all statements made by either of them during the search. He contends that the search, being made without the authority of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest, was also without probable cause and, therefore, unlawful and that all things seized, observed or heard pursuant thereto were inadmissible against him. We think that facts leading to the arrest, search and seizure will bring the applicable law into focus on this question.

At the hearing in advance of trial, the court had before it Darst's affidavit, the affidavit of Miss Hudson adopting Darst's affidavit, and the affidavit of Seattle Police Detective Karl Meyer. It also heard evidence given by Detective Chester G. Sprinkle on direct and cross examination. Detective Sprinkle, whose testimony found substantial corroboration in Detective Meyer's affidavit, said that he had served on the Seattle police department's narcotics detail for about 15 years and earlier as federal treasury agent for three years assigned to investigate narcotics violations. He testified that he and Detective Karl Meyer worked together closely as partners investigating violations of the narcotics laws.

Detective Sprinkle testified he had received information from several persons, particularly from an informant named Willie Arnold, that the defendants had been violating the narcotics laws. He said that he had known Arnold 9 or 10 years and was aware that he was a narcotics user; he stated further that Arnold had given him information concerning narcotics violations numerous times and on the great majority of these occasions such information had proven reliable. About two weeks before the arrest and search, Willie Arnold had voluntarily called the officer to tell him that Darst from time to time had drugstore narcotics in his possession and the officer had asked Arnold to keep them informed. Sprinkle said that, at about 8 p.m. on the night preceding the early morning arrest, he and his partner received a telephone call at police headquarters from Willie Arnold, which call the officer described as follows:

'* * * It was related that Mr. Darst and Miss Hudson were in the Savoy Hotel and that Mr. Darst had a quantity of drugstore narcotics, the kind that a citizen couldn't get from a drugstore, they had drugstore labels, and that they were in possession of some forged narcotic prescriptions for Dilaudid, which is a narcotic, and that they would be leaving about 10 o'clock; that actually Mr. Darst was going down to pick up Miss Hudson somewheres around 10 o'clock at her place at the Corona Hotel, and that they would proceed out to some drugstores and pass these forged prescriptions for narcotics, and that they would return back to the Savoy Hotel.'

Detective Sprinkle, describing a sequence of events in Seattle, went on to testify that, acting on this information and having earlier obtained a description of Darst's automobile from Willie Arnold, he, Detective Meyer and two federal narcotics agents went to the Corona Hotel at 9 p.m. and observed the car parked at the hotel. About 10 p.m., they saw Darst and Miss Hudson enter the car, drive south on Second Avenue, turn down to First Avenue and then drive to the vicinity of First and Virginia where the officers lost the Darst car in the traffic.

Thereupon the officers separated into teams and took up surveillance at the Corona and Savoy Hotels. At 1 a.m., about 3 hours after losing them in traffic, Sprinkle and Meyer saw Darst and Miss Hudson drive up to the Savoy Hotel and park their car. The detectives drove up right behind the Darst vehicle, alighted, and stepped to the front doors of Darst's car, Detective Meyer on Darst's side and Sprinkle alongside Miss Hudson. Sprinkle says that, as he opened the door for Miss Hudson, he saw an open sack of drugs at her feet. He asked Miss Hudson to step out, told her that she was under arrest without at the time specifying the charges, and proceeded to assist Detective Meyer in searching the automobile.

Behind the front seat panel, they found a forged prescription for dilaudid similar to the other forged prescriptions they had been investigating. They took two bottles of the drug from Darst's trouser pockets and some from Miss Hudson's makeup case, and observed that the sack picked up by Sprinkle when he opened the door of the car contained amphetamines and barbiturates in drugstore containers. Later, at the jail, a search of Miss Hudson's person by the matron revealed a quantity of dilaudid. In denying appellant's motion to suppress all of this evidence, the trial court chose to believe the evidence supplied by Officer Meyer in his affidavit and the testimony of Detective Sprinkle on direct and cross examination.

Every crime punishable by death or imprisonment in the state penitentiary is a felony. RCW 9.01.020. Violations of RCW 69.33.380 are felonies, declared so by the provisions of RCW 69.33.410. Possession of forged narcotic prescriptions and of narcotic drugs obtained by uttering them are each felonies. State v. Boggs, 57 Wash.2d 484, 358 P.2d 124; as to a second conviction, see In re Chapin v. Rhay, 59 Wash.2d 459, 367 P.2d 832. If an officer believes And has good reason to believe that a person has committed, or is about to commit a felony, he may arrest without a warrant. This is but another way of saying that an officer must have probable cause to believe that a felony has been or is about to be committed and that the person arrested committed or is about to commit it. State v. Jack, 63 Wash.2d 632, 388 P.2d 566; State v. Maxie, 61 Wash.2d 126, 377 P.2d 435; State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 214 P. 841, similarly as to a citizen's arrest. Even a strong belief held in good faith if unsupported by the circumstances will be insufficient to make a search valid. Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142. The probable cause essential to support an arrest without a warrant is a belief based upon facts within the knowledge of the arresting officer, persuasive enough to convince a judge that a cautious but disinterested man would also believe the arrested person guilty. State v. Smith, 56 Wash.2d 368, 353 P.2d 155; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790.

If the arrest was lawful, i.e., upon probable cause, then a search of the person, the immediate area and the nearby automobile became lawful. State v. Jackovick, 56 Wash.2d 915, 355 P.2d 976; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964). Such a search incident to a lawful arrest is permitted to protect the arresting officer from assault by accomplices or hidden weapons and to prevent the destruction of evidence Preston v. United States, supra.

In reviewing the facts derived from the affidavits of Patricia Ann Hudson, Robert Thomas Darst, Detective Karl Meyer and the testimony of Detective Chester Sprinkle upon which the trial court found the arrest and search based upon probable cause, i.e., upon reasonable grounds to instill the belief in a cautious man that Darst and Miss Hudson either had possession illegally of narcotics, or forged prescriptions, or both, or had been uttering forged prescriptions therefor, we note a number of telling circumstances affecting the officers' judgment. (1) The officers had been in process of investigating the uttering of forged narcotic prescriptions in the city of Seattle for a period of time. (2) The officers had specialized experience in investigating narcotics violations. (3) Two weeks before the arrest they received information from an informant--hitherto deemed reliable--that Darst had in his possession the kind of drugstore narcotics that had been stolen or otherwise illegally obtained from various...