State v. Davis
| Decision Date | 17 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | 115,895 |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
| Parties | State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Jeffrey L. Davis, Appellant. |
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appeal from Pawnee District Court; Bruce T. Gatterman, chief judge.
Gerald E. Wells, of Jerry E. Wells Attorney-at-Law, of Lawrence, for appellant.
Amanda G. Voth, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt attorney general, for appellee.
Before Malone, P.J., Leben, J., and Kevin P. Moriarty, District Judge,
Jeffrey L. Davis appeals the Pawnee County District Court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. His primary complaint is that the district court didn't fill in a blank of the sentencing journal entry for the "Sentence Begins Date."
In most cases, that date is easy to determine. Let's say that a defendant is sentenced on December 1 and had spent 30 days in custody before sentencing. In that case, the Sentence Begins Date would be November 1, assuming the days in custody were to be credited against the sentence. That's what happens in most cases; the Sentence Begins Date is simply the date that reflects the date of sentencing minus the number of days of jail credit.
Sometimes though, the days in custody before sentencing aren't credited against the sentence. That's because a person might be in custody based on existing convictions and sentences or on new charges in other cases. And ordinarily a person gets credit against a sentence only for time spent in custody solely as a result of the charges in that case. See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6615(a); State v. Denney, 278 Kan. 643, 648, 101 P.3d 1257 (2004) (); Campbell v State, 223 Kan. 528, Syl. ¶ 1, 575 P.2d 524 (1978) (same); State v. Storer, 53 Kan.App.2d 1, 5-6, 382 P.3d 467 (2016) ().
With that background, let's consider Davis' situation, which is a bit complicated.
The crimes for which he was sentenced in Pawnee County took place in 1999. Before that, he had been convicted and sent to prison for several serious crimes in Sedgwick County, with convictions in 1975, 1976, 1979, 1980, and 1981. On at least one of the convictions-for aggravated robbery with a firearm-he was given an indeterminate sentence of 20 years to life in prison.
It's called an indeterminate sentence because it had no fixed end date. For inmates with an indeterminate sentence, the only way out of prison is parole. See State v. Cash, 293 Kan. 326, 330, 263 P.3d 786 (2011); Cook v. Riggin, No. 109, 920, 2014 WL 2403131, at *3 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion). Indeed, Davis had gotten out of prison on parole-that's how he was able to commit the Pawnee County offenses in 1999.
Further complications affecting the calculation of Davis' Sentence Begins Date arise from how the Pawnee County case proceeded. Davis was initially found guilty on several charges in 2000-and sent to prison-but the Kansas Supreme Court overturned those convictions in 2006. State v. Davis, 281 Kan. 169, 130 P.3d 69 (2006). When the case came back to the district court, Davis and the State came to a plea agreement in 2008. Under that agreement, Davis pled no contest to amended charges of attempted kidnapping and aggravated sexual battery. Based on the plea, he was convicted and sentenced to a total of 150 months in prison.
The key complication that affects us is that before Davis' ultimate convictions in 2008 on the Pawnee County charges, his parole from the Sedgwick County convictions was rescinded. So when he was sentenced in Pawnee County, he was serving prison time on his Sedgwick County convictions-and at least one of those convictions had an indeterminate sentence.
When the Pawnee County District Court sentenced Davis, the court received a presentence-investigation report. The investigator who prepared that report noted a phone call with Jeff Smith, an official with the Department of Corrections, about the jail credit that Davis might be entitled to in the Pawnee County case. As we already know, Davis received an initial parole on the Sedgwick County convictions; while on that parole, he committed the Pawnee County crimes. In addition, Smith said that Davis had again been paroled in the Sedgwick County cases on February 1, 2005-at a time when he still was serving sentences from Pawnee County that later were set aside in our Supreme Court's 2006 decision. After that, Smith reported that Davis' parole had again been rescinded on September 4, 2007.
Smith reported that the Department of Corrections had been giving Davis credit on his Pawnee County case until our Supreme Court reversed the initial convictions and that credit for his time in prison was instead given against the Sedgwick County cases starting on September 4, 2007. Smith told the investigator that Davis had "981 days credit for time served in Pawnee County, unless the Court gives the entire Pawnee County jail time credit of 405 days[, ] which would give the defendant 1350 days['] credit for time served in the Pawnee County case."
Ultimately, the district court gave Davis 1, 379 days of jail-time credit. Davis does not contest that number.
What he does argue is that the court should have filled in a "Sentence Begins Date." He notes that a statute in effect when he was sentenced, K.S.A. 21-4614, provided that the sentencing judge "shall direct . . . that such sentence is to be computed from a date, to be specifically designated by the court in the sentencing order . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Given that directive, why didn't the district court fill in a date? Essentially, the court concluded at the time of sentencing that it didn't have enough information about the status of the Sedgwick County sentences to fill in that date. So the court left it to the Department of Corrections to determine when Davis had completed his Sedgwick County sentences so that he could begin receiving credit against the sentence from the Pawnee County case. Years later, when Davis filed his motion to correct an illegal sentence, the district court again declined to fill in a date because it still had insufficient information about the Sedgwick County sentences.
Before proceeding further, we must consider whether Davis can raise this issue on a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Such motions are provided for by statute, K.S.A. 22-3504, and the Kansas Supreme Court has noted the limited nature of what may be challenged on these motions: (1) a sentence imposed by a court that lacks jurisdiction; (2) a sentence that doesn't conform to statutory provisions, either in character or the authorized term of punishment; or (3) a sentence that's ambiguous about the time or manner in which it is to be served. See State v. Lee, 304 Kan 416, 417, 372 P.3d 415 (2016). Davis has raised the issue because he contends the remedy he seeks could change the date on which he is ultimately released from prison. We will assume for the purpose of...
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