State v. Davis

• Decision Date: 09 May 1901
• Citation: 30 So. 344,130 Ala. 148
• Parties: STATE v. DAVIS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

30 So. 344

130 Ala. 148

STATE v. DAVIS.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 9, 1901

Appeal from circuit court, Dallas county; John Moore, Judge.

Jim Davis was indicted for selling intoxicating liquors. Demurrer to the indictment sustained, and the state appeals. Reversed.

To the indictment the defendant demurred upon several grounds, which may be summarized as follows: (1) That it is not contrary to law to sell spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors in Dallas county outside of the corporate limits of Selma; (2) that the act of the general assembly approved December 12, 1884, which seeks to prohibit the selling, giving away, or otherwise disposing of spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors in Dallas county, Ala., outside of the corporate limits and police jurisdiction of the city of Selma, is unconstitutional and void, as violative of section 2, art. 4, of the constitution; (3) that the act approved February 17, 1885, amending the act of December 12, 1884, is unconstitutional and void, as violative of section 2, art. 4, of the constitution. Upon the hearing of this demurrer, the court sustained the demurrer and ordered the indictment quashed.

Chas G. Brown, Atty. Gen., for the State.

McCLELLAN C.J.

The title of an act being "to prohibit the sale of spirituous, vinous, and malt liquors in Dallas county outside the corporate limits and police jurisdiction of Selma" (Acts 1884-85, p. 239), the prohibition embodied in the act is this: "Any person who sells, gives away or otherwise disposes of vinous, spirituous or malt liquors, or intoxicating bitters, beverages or drinks, or fruit preserved in alcohol, or alcoholic liquors in Dallas county, outside the corporate limits and police jurisdiction of the city of Selma, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," etc. ( Id. § 1). It is plain that the subjects of giving away and of disposing of such liquors otherwise than by sale or gift are treated of in the body of the act, but are not expressed in its title. The act also deals with the subjects of intoxicating bitters beverages, and drinks, which are not necessarily either vinous, spirituous, or malt liquor, and with fruits preserved in alcohol, which is clearly not a liquor at all; and these subjects are not expressed in the title. So that it is obvious that the act, so far as it undertakes to prohibit the giving away or other disposition than by sale of any of the liquors mentioned, and so far as it undertakes to prohibit even the sale of those commodities which are neither vinous spirituous, nor malt liquors, comes under the ban of section 2, art. 4, of the constitution, requiring that "each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." But it does not follow that the whole statute is unconstitutional. To the contrary, if the elimination of the subjects treated of in the body of the enactment, and which are not expressed in its title, would leave a law "complete within itself, sensible, capable of being executed and wholly independent of that which is rejected," the statute will stand and be enforced as to the subject which is both expressed in the title and dealt with in the body of the act. That such elimination would leave such an act is, we think, clear. The act without those provisions in its text which are not expressed in the title would be a complete statute, "sensible, capable of being executed, and wholly independent of the" rejected provision, for the prohibition of the sale of vinous, spirituous, and malt liquors in Dallas county outside of Selma and its police jurisdiction. Not only can all the matters not embraced in the title be struck down, leaving a complete and independent statute, which can be executed in respect of the subject expressed in the title as fully, in the same way, and to the same effect as if these subjects which are alien to the title had been therein expressed, but there is no ground for saying that the legislature should not have undertaken to prohibit the sale of vinous, spirituous, and malt liquors had they been aware that the provisions as to gifts and other dispositions and as to commodities not embraced in those terms would be abortive; for the interdiction of the sale of the liquors specified in the title is, of course, the primary, main, and leading object of all laws of this sort, and really the other provisions we have here in the text are thrown in more to prevent evasions of the main provision than upon any notion that anybody is going to give away or dispose of otherwise than by sale of enough of such liquors to foster the evil intended to be remedied, or that the policy and purpose of the law will be thwarted by sales, gifts, or other dispositions of such beverages or bitters or drinks as do not contain vinous, spirituous, or malt liquor, or of fruit preserved in alcohol. And so our conclusion is, upon every consideration pertinent to the inquiry, that the statute under consideration is a constitutional and valid enactment, in so far as it proposed to prohibit the sale of vinous, spirituous, and malt liquors. Yerby v. Cochrane, 101 Ala....