State v. Davis
| Citation | 398 A.2d 1218 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Donald P. DAVIS. |
| Decision Date | 16 March 1979 |
| Court | Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US) |
David W. Crook (orally), Deputy Dist. Atty., Skowhegan, for plaintiff.
Butler & Bilodeau by Wm. Thomas Hyde (orally), Skowhegan, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ.
Following a bench trial in the Superior Court (Somerset County) the presiding Justice found defendant Donald P. Davis guilty of having committed, on January 27, 1978, the offense of "driving to endanger", in violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1314. In his appeal from the judgment of conviction defendant makes two contentions: (1) the conviction is a nullity because the statute establishing the crime charged against defendant is void, as unconstitutionally vague; (2) in any event, the evidence fails to support the conviction.
We reject defendant's constitutional claim.
fail to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the conduct that is prohibited and, therefore, do not meet the requirements of constitutional due process of law. Courts of other jurisdictions have held essentially similar "driving to endanger" void for vagueness. State v. Adams, 180 Neb. 542, 143 N.W.2d 920 (1966); State v. Pigge, 79 Idaho 529, 322 P.2d 703 (1957); People v. Firth, 5 Misc.2d 439, 159 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1957).
We conclude, however, that in this jurisdiction the new criminal code has produced an effective amendment of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1314, as of May 1, 1976, by requiring that additional language be inserted in the text. The provisions of 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 6 and 11(5) 2 establish in combination that some "culpable mental state", of those defined in Section 10 of the code, is required as an essential of any crime, whether defined in the code itself or in a criminal statute outside the code, unless a contrary legislative intent plainly appears. We are satisfied that the Legislature has not manifested a plain intent that one whose operation of a motor vehicle happens to endanger a person or property shall be criminally liable even though such operation does not involve a "culpable mental state." Accordingly, we decide that 29 M.R.S.A. § 1314 must be read to include as an essential element "criminal negligence" 3 which is the lowest level of the "culpable states of mind" described in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(4), more particularly because 29 M.R.S.A. § 1311 establishes a Separate crime which it defines Expressly to include as an essential element the next more culpable mental state, "recklessness."
Interpreted as including "criminal negligence", 29 M.R.S.A. § 1314 withstands defendant's void for vagueness attack since a standard is provided sufficient to allow a person of ordinary intelligence to assess whether his conduct in operating a motor vehicle violates the statute. State v. Houde, 150 Me. 469, 114 A.2d 366 (1955).
Our holding that "criminal negligence" is an essential element of the crime of "driving to endanger" here charged against defendant creates a problem regarding the second issue raised on appeal, whether on the record before us the conviction can be sustained.
The rationale of the State's case against defendant was that he "endangered" lives or property solely because he drove his Toyota automobile upon a bridge which was a Dangerous place for the automobile to be operated. To support this theory the State produced witnesses who testified that the bridge crossed over an area of a river characterized by "swift rapids" and "white water." While they differed as to the height of the bridge above the river, the witnesses made plain that it was enough to be very dangerous for an automobile that might go over the side of the bridge. Although a wire mesh fence three to four feet high traversed the entire length of the bridge on each side, the witnesses testified that these sidings were not strong enough to withstand the force of an errant automobile. The bridge had been constructed to serve as a railroad bridge across the Kennebec River in Skowhegan Village (which would make it strong enough to support an automobile), but, according to the testimony of the State's witnesses, it was customarily used as a footbridge for pedestrians, even though not posted as restricted for pedestrian use. The entrance to the bridge was constricted by obstructions deliberately placed so that it was...
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Nelson v. McDaniel, 3:09-cv-00742-RCJ-VPC
...which is defined as the lowest culpable state of mind, the statute withstands constitutional scrutiny. [Footnote 11: State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218, 1219 (Me. 1979)]. Finally, when addressing this issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that "'[w]here the legislative regulatory object......
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Nelson v. McDaniel
...negligence, which is defined as the lowest culpable state of mind, the statute withstands constitutional scrutiny. [Footnote 11: State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218, 1219 (Me. 1979)]. Finally, when addressing this issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that "'[w]here the legislative regul......
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Nelson v. State
...many jury instructions). 9. 674 P.2d at 82 (quoting Or.Rev.Stat. § 487.235(1) (1977) (repealed 1983)). 10. Id. at 83. 11. State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218, 1219 (Me.1979). 12. Joas, 168 A.2d at 31 (quoting State v. New York Central Railroad Company, 37 N.J.Super. 42, 116 A.2d 800, 803 (App.Div......
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State v. Carisio
...435 A.2d 58, 65-67 (Me.1981) (explaining difference between "ordinary" civil negligence and criminal negligence); State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218, 1219 (Me.1979) (criminal negligence); State v. Dodge, 397 A.2d 588, 593-94 (Me.1979) (recklessness). See also State v. Longley, 483 A.2d 725, 732 ......