State v. Davis
| Court | Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US) |
| Writing for the Court | Before McKUSICK; WERNICK; DELAHANTY |
| Citation | 398 A.2d 1218 |
| Decision Date | 16 March 1979 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Donald P. DAVIS. |
Page 1218
v.
Donald P. DAVIS.
David W. Crook (orally), Deputy Dist. Atty., Skowhegan, for plaintiff.
Butler & Bilodeau by Wm. Thomas Hyde (orally), Skowhegan, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ.
Page 1219
WERNICK, Justice.
Following a bench trial in the Superior Court (Somerset County) the presiding Justice found defendant Donald P. Davis guilty of having committed, on January 27, 1978, the offense of "driving to endanger", in violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1314. In his appeal from the judgment of conviction defendant makes two contentions: (1) the conviction is a nullity because the statute establishing the crime charged against defendant is void, as unconstitutionally vague; (2) in any event, the evidence fails to support the conviction.
We reject defendant's constitutional claim.
Were the words contained in 29 M.R.S.A. § 1314 1 the only language defining the crime of "driving to endanger", defendant would have a strong argument that the words
"drive any vehicle . . . in such a manner as to endanger any person or property"
fail to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the conduct that is prohibited and, therefore, do not meet the requirements of constitutional due process of law. Courts of other jurisdictions have held essentially similar "driving to endanger" void for vagueness. State v. Adams, 180 Neb. 542, 143 N.W.2d 920 (1966); State v. Pigge, 79 Idaho 529, 322 P.2d 703 (1957); People v. Firth, 5 Misc.2d 439, 159 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1957).
We conclude, however, that in this jurisdiction the new criminal code has produced an effective amendment of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1314, as of May 1, 1976, by requiring that additional language be inserted in the text. The provisions of 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 6 and 11(5) 2 establish in combination that some "culpable mental state", of those defined in Section 10 of the code, is required as an essential of any crime, whether defined in the code itself or in a criminal statute outside the code, unless a contrary legislative intent plainly appears. We are satisfied that the Legislature has not manifested a plain intent that one whose operation of a motor vehicle happens to endanger a person or property shall be criminally liable even though such operation does not involve a "culpable mental state." Accordingly, we decide that 29 M.R.S.A. § 1314 must be read to include as an essential element "criminal negligence" 3 which is the lowest level of the "culpable states of mind" described in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(4), more particularly because 29 M.R.S.A. § 1311 establishes a Separate crime which it defines Expressly to include as an essential element...
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Nelson v. McDaniel, 3:09-cv-00742-RCJ-VPC
...which is defined as the lowest culpable state of mind, the statute withstands constitutional scrutiny. [Footnote 11: State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218, 1219 (Me. 1979)]. Finally, when addressing this issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that "'[w]here the legislative regulatory object......
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Nelson v. McDaniel, 3:09-cv-00742-RCJ-VPC
...which is defined as the lowest culpable state of mind, the statute withstands constitutional scrutiny. [Footnote 11: State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218, 1219 (Me. 1979)]. Finally, when addressing this issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that "'[w]here the legislative regulatory object......
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Nelson v. State, No. 46353.
...many jury instructions). 9. 674 P.2d at 82 (quoting Or.Rev.Stat. § 487.235(1) (1977) (repealed 1983)). 10. Id. at 83. 11. State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218, 1219 12. Joas, 168 A.2d at 31 (quoting State v. New York Central Railroad Company, 37 N.J.Super. 42, 116 A.2d 800, 803 (App.Div.1955)); se......
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State v. Carisio
...435 A.2d 58, 65-67 (Me.1981) (explaining difference between "ordinary" civil negligence and criminal negligence); State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218, 1219 (Me.1979) (criminal negligence); State v. Dodge, 397 A.2d 588, 593-94 (Me.1979) (recklessness). See also State v. Longley, 483 A.2d 725, 732 ......
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Nelson v. McDaniel, 3:09-cv-00742-RCJ-VPC
...which is defined as the lowest culpable state of mind, the statute withstands constitutional scrutiny. [Footnote 11: State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218, 1219 (Me. 1979)]. Finally, when addressing this issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that "'[w]here the legislative regulatory object......
-
Nelson v. McDaniel, 3:09-cv-00742-RCJ-VPC
...which is defined as the lowest culpable state of mind, the statute withstands constitutional scrutiny. [Footnote 11: State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218, 1219 (Me. 1979)]. Finally, when addressing this issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that "'[w]here the legislative regulatory object......
-
Nelson v. State, No. 46353.
...many jury instructions). 9. 674 P.2d at 82 (quoting Or.Rev.Stat. § 487.235(1) (1977) (repealed 1983)). 10. Id. at 83. 11. State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218, 1219 12. Joas, 168 A.2d at 31 (quoting State v. New York Central Railroad Company, 37 N.J.Super. 42, 116 A.2d 800, 803 (App.Div.1955)); se......
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State v. Carisio
...435 A.2d 58, 65-67 (Me.1981) (explaining difference between "ordinary" civil negligence and criminal negligence); State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218, 1219 (Me.1979) (criminal negligence); State v. Dodge, 397 A.2d 588, 593-94 (Me.1979) (recklessness). See also State v. Longley, 483 A.2d 725, 732 ......