State v. Davis, AC 35751
| Decision Date | 08 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | AC 35751 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KMEL KELLY DAVIS |
Alvord, Sheldon and Norcott, Js.
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, B. Fischer, J.)
Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Lisa A. Riggione, senior assistant state's attorney,with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Eugene R. Calistro, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The defendant, Kmel Kelly Davis, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55, and one count of carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a). The defendant claims on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of first degree manslaughter because the state failed to disprove his claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial court improperly rejected his proposed jury instructions on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof that replaced the word "innocent" with the words "not guilty" in each. We reject both of these claims and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On or about September 30, 2011, in the vicinity of 161 Clay Street, New Haven, Melvin Galloway was shot and killed, and Demetrius Wilkes was also shot, although he survived. That afternoon, before venturing into the neighborhood where the shooting took place, the defendant went to Norton Street and Whalley Avenue in New Haven to retrieve a .22 caliber revolver from his friend. The defendant, who had been selling drugs to supplement his income, had bought some crack cocaine from the same friend about two weeks beforehand.
The defendant then got a ride with another individual in a gold colored Toyota truck to the Clay Street neighborhood, purportedly to visit a friend. On arriving at 161 Clay Street, the defendant got out of the passenger side of the truck near a tree in front of the three family house at that address. Around that time, a crack cocaine addict approached the defendant and requested drugs. The defendant sold him two bags of crack cocaine. The addict then left the area.
After this transaction, the defendant walked up onto the front porch of 161 Clay Street, where Aaliyah Jones and Laquanna McNatt were sitting. McNatt was dating Galloway and resided, at the time, with her children on the second floor of the house at 161 Clay Street. Jones was Galloway's cousin and, at the time, resided nearby at 165 Clay Street. Jones had gone to McNatt's house to babysit one of McNatt's children, as McNatt had made plans to go out that evening with Jones's mother.
Almost immediately after the defendant joined McNatt and Jones on the porch, Galloway came onto the porch and asked the defendant "did he make a sale over there . . . ." The defendant answered that he had. Galloway then punched the defendant in the face, and the two began to fight. McNatt briefly tried to stop the combatants by getting in between them, but her effortswere to no avail. At this point, both men were still standing as they fought.
About forty seconds into the fight, Galloway called out to his cousin, Wilkes, who was across the street. Wilkes ran to the porch and began to punch the defendant. Wilkes also pulled the hood of the defendant's sweatshirt over his face. Jones testified that "both [Galloway and Wilkes were] on the defendant, just had him by his head, they all was running around punching each other."
Galloway and Wilkes then wrestled the defendant to the ground. Wilkes punched the defendant a couple of times, and the defendant struck back. McNatt then broke up the fight, and the defendant pulled out a gun and started shooting. He fired two or three shots, then paused, then fired three more shots. Wilkes was shot first as he was leaving the porch; he sustained two nonfatal bullet wounds. Galloway, who was shot second, also attempted to run away and sustained multiple gunshot wounds as he fled. At least one of these wounds caused his death. The defendant then fled the scene.
The defendant was arrested ten days later, on October 10, 2011, after learning that the police were looking for him and going to the police station with his attorney to turn himself in. The state charged the defendant with one count of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), one count of assault in the first degree by means of the discharge of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5), and one count of carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in violation of § 29-35 (a). After a trial, the jury found the defendant not guilty of the charge of murder and instead convicted him of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of § 53a-55, and of carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in violation of § 29-35. The jury acquitted him on the count of assault in the first degree. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the state failed to disprove his claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the defendant argues that the circumstances of the altercation between him and the victims justified the defendant's belief that he was about to suffer serious bodily harm and that his use of deadly force was, therefore, objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The defendant's arguments rest, however, upon a competing interpretation of the evidence that the jury rejected. Because the jury's rejection of the defendant's interpretation was reasonable, the defendant's claim fails.
"Whether the defense of the justified use of force,properly raised at trial, has been disproved by the state is a question of fact for the jury, to be determined from all the evidence in the case and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pauling, 102 Conn. App. 556, 571-72, 925 A.2d 1200, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 924, 933 A.2d 727 (2007). "[I]n viewing evidence which could yield contrary inferences, the jury is not barred from drawing those inferences consistent with guilt and is not required to draw only those inferences consistent with innocence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 71 Conn. App. 272, 281, 801 A.2d 890, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 939, 808 A.2d 1133 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1207, 123 S. Ct. 1286, 154 L. Ed. 2d 1052 (2003). Accordingly, the "standard for reviewing sufficiency claims in conjunction with a justification offered by the defense is the same standard used when examining claims of insufficiency of the evidence. . . . In reviewing [a] sufficiency [of evidence] claim, we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wortham, 80 Conn. App. 635, 640-41, 836 A.2d 1231 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 901, 845 A.2d 406 (2004).
General Statutes § 53a-19 governs the use of physical force in defense of person, or self-defense.1 "Our Supreme Court has interpreted § 53a-19 (a) to require that a person may justifiably use deadly physical force in self-defense only if he reasonably believes both that (1) his attacker is using or about to use deadly physical force against him, or is inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm, and (2) that deadly physical force is necessary to repel such an attack." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pranckus, 75 Conn. App. 80, 88, 815 A.2d 678, cert. denied, 263Conn. 905, 819 A.2d 840 (2003).
"First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wortham, supra, 80 Conn. App. 640. Among other evidence, the jury had before it the testimony of several eyewitnesses. These witnesses uniformly testified to a version of events that was at odds with the defendant's and that, if the witness' version was believed, would have disproved the defendant's claim of self-defense. Jones, McNatt, and Wilkes, who was the assault victim, all testified that Wilkes was not armed with a gun. This testimony conflicted with the account of the defendant, who claimed to have seen Wilkes try, but fail, to pull out a black pistol lodged between his belt and waistband. Furthermore, all of the eyewitnesses testified that the defendant shot the victims as they were running away from the porch. This testimony, too, conflicted with that of the defendant, who claimed that he...
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