State v. Davis
Decision Date | 22 September 2011 |
Docket Number | (CC 02C45953,SC S058641).,CA A134216 |
Citation | 261 P.3d 1197,351 Or. 35 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review,v.Terry Dean DAVIS, Respondent on Review. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
On review from the Court of Appeals.*Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review. Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, filed the briefs. With him on the briefs were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.George W. Kelly, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.WALTERS, J.
In this criminal case, the state argues that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing one of the trial court's rulings excluding certain evidence. Defendant, in response, challenges two of the trial court's other evidentiary rulings excluding evidence, which the Court of Appeals had affirmed.1 Defendant was charged with murder and manslaughter based on allegations that he shook the victim, his 15–month–old daughter, and inflicted fatal abdominal and brain injuries on the night that she died. Defendant contended that the victim's autopsy revealed that the victim had been injured at least several days before the night of her death and that nothing that he intentionally did to the victim on that evening caused the catastrophic brain hemorrhage that killed her. As relevant to this case, defendant attempted to introduce evidence that the victim had been subjected to physical abuse throughout her short life; that a friend of the victim's mother saw the victim four days before her death and concluded that the victim looked like the friend's own daughter, who had suffered a brain injury as a baby; and that that friend relayed that conclusion to the victim's mother. In each instance, the trial court excluded the evidence. Defendant was convicted of one count of murder and one count of manslaughter.
Defendant appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals and that court reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the trial court erred in excluding testimony that, four days before the child's death, a friend told the victim's mother that the victim resembled the friend's child, who had suffered a brain injury. State v. Davis, 235 Or.App. 327, 230 P.3d 987 (2010). However, the Court of Appeals affirmed without discussion the trial court's rulings as to the evidence of the victim's prior physical abuse and the statement of the mother's friend that, four days before she died, the victim resembled the friend's own child, who had suffered a brain injury. Id. We granted the state's petition for review and, for the reasons that follow, now affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Except where noted, the following facts are undisputed. Defendant's daughter, the victim in this case, was 15 months old when she died on June 30, 2002. The victim lived with her mother, Ecklund, and several of Ecklund's other children. Ecklund and defendant were not married and lived apart. The victim stayed with defendant overnight at his home from time to time.
The Court of Appeals described the events of the days preceding the child's death as follows:
2
Davis, 235 Or.App. at 330–31, 230 P.3d 987.
Defendant and Ecklund followed the ambulance in a car to Salem Hospital. At Salem Hospital, doctors questioned Ecklund and defendant. Defendant told the emergency room physician that the child had not suffered any trauma or injury that evening, and had not experienced any vomiting or other illness. Ecklund did not mention her discussion with Payne, the victim's visit to the hospital four days earlier, or the victim's treatment for dehydration. Testing revealed that the victim had a subdural hematoma 3 and needed surgery to relieve the resulting pressure on the brain. Because Salem Hospital does not have pediatric neurosurgeons on staff, the treating physicians decided to transport the victim to Oregon Health Sciences University Hospital (OHSU) in Portland. At OHSU, doctors performed surgery to relieve the pressure on the victim's brain. Subsequent testing showed that the victim's brain was no longer functioning, and she was taken off life support on June 30, 2002.
A medical examiner performed an autopsy the next day. The autopsy revealed, among other things, that the victim had about a quart and a half of blood in her abdomen, which was due to tear in the mesentery, the lining of the abdominal cavity that connects to parts of the small intestine. In addition, the victim's brain was swollen, the subdural hematoma on the right side of the victim's head had been removed by the surgeons who had tried to save her, and the victim had retinal hemorrhaging and bleeding at the base of the optic nerve. The medical examiner later testified that the retinal hemorrhage and brain injury were caused by acceleration and deceleration of the victim's head, which would have been caused either by violent shaking, a violent shake followed by a slam, or a single slam. The medical examiner also stated that the injuries were “acute” and had to have occurred within 24 to 36 hours of the victim's death; according to him, the microscopic evidence was not consistent with an older abdominal injury. Finally, he concluded that the cause of the victim's death was homicide.
In addition to those findings related to the cause of death, the autopsy and a radiology test revealed that the victim had suffered other injuries in the weeks and months before her death. Among other things, the victim had healing fractures to three ribs and a healing fracture on the femur, as well as possible old fractures on her tibia and fibula.
Defendant was initially charged in 2002 with various crimes arising out of the victim's death, including murder by abuse and manslaughter. To support the murder-by-abuse charge, the state relied on, among other things, the healing leg and rib fractures and an expert's opinion that the victim had suffered child abuse. The case went to trial in 2003. At that trial, the victim's entire medical history was admitted into evidence. The jury found defendant guilty of manslaughter but could...
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