State v. Davis
Decision Date | 05 October 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 10-79-11533,10-79-11533 |
Citation | 54 Or.App. 133,634 P.2d 279 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Billy Eugene DAVIS, Appellant. ; CA 18362. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
David E. Groom, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
Richard David Wasserman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., John R. McCulloch, Jr., Sol. Gen., and William F. Gary, Deputy Sol. Gen., Salem.
Before BUTTLER, P. J., and WARDEN and WARREN, JJ.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree rape, ORS 163.375. The alleged victim was his daughter's 13-year-old friend. Defendant assigns as errors the admission of testimony concerning prior sexual contact between defendant and young girls other than the alleged victim and the admission of a photograph taken by defendant of his daughter posing in the nude. We reverse.
The state concedes error in the admission of the photograph of defendant's daughter, but argues that the error was harmless. Because on retrial that error is not likely to recur, we do not discuss that contention.
In State v. Manrique, 271 Or. 201, 531 P.2d 239 (1975), the Supreme Court summarized the reasons for the general rule excluding evidence of other crimes or bad acts:
See also State v. Hockings, 29 Or.App. 139, 145, 562 P.2d 587, rev. den. 279 Or. 301 (1977).
While evidence of other crimes or sexual acts with others than the victim may tend to prove that defendant has a lustful disposition and is, therefore, more likely to have committed the crime in question, such evidence is, with limited exceptions, inadmissible. State v. Pace, 187 Or. 498, 502, 212 P.2d 755 (1949); State v. Urlacher, 42 Or.App. 141, 144, 600 P.2d 445 (1979). In cases involving sex crimes, the inflammatory nature of the crime itself renders the potential for prejudice high, and the exclusionary rule is strictly applied. Youngblood v. Sullivan, 52 Or.App. 173, 176-177, 628 P.2d 400, rev. den. 291 Or. 368 (1981); State v. Sicks, 33 Or.App. 435, 438, 576 P.2d 834 (1978).
Exceptions to the general rule excluding evidence of prior sexual acts between defendant and others have been recognized in two circumstances: when the prior acts and those of which the defendant stands accused are so similar as to indicate a modus operandi which identifies the defendant as the probable perpetrator of the crime charged, or to rebut a contention by the defendant that admitted sexual acts were consented to by the victim. State v. Johann, 34 Or.App. 363, 366, 578 P.2d 810, rev. den. 283 Or. 235 (1978); Youngblood v. Sullivan, supra, 52 Or.App. at 177, 628 P.2d 400. In the present case, defendant denied sexual intercourse with the victim, and neither identity nor consent were in issue.
The state, however, contends defendant opened the door to admission of the disputed testimony by placing his character in issue by giving testimony on direct examination regarding his skills as a father, 1 by his testimony on cross-examination that when he told several girls that he wanted them to be his girlfriends he was "joking around," 2 and by offering testimony of two defense witnesses to the effect that they had never seen inappropriate sexual contact between defendant and other girls the same age as the victim. The trial court concluded on the state's urging that that evidence provided an adequate basis for the admission of rebuttal testimony concerning defendant's character. The state then offered over defendant's objection the testimony of six young girls, including his daughter, concerning particular prior acts of sexual misconduct by him.
In State v. Ewing, 174 Or. 487, 503, 149 P.2d 765 (1944), the Supreme Court noted that when defendant puts his character clearly and expressly in issue, evidence of bad character is admissible. In Ewing, the defendant, charged with sodomy, denied all charges. On direct examination he testified: "I don't know any reason why I should be doing such a thing," and later, during cross-examination, he said: " * * * (M)y makeup is such a nature that I would not attempt such a thing or think about doing such a thing." The prosecution was permitted over objection to offer in rebuttal testimony of four witnesses concerning specific acts of sexual misconduct with others. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's testimony did not put his character in issue, but, even if it had, the prosecution was not entitled to prove specific acts of sexual misconduct with others. The court stated:
174 Or. at 503-504, 149 P.2d 765.
Here, defendant's direct testimony that he had a good relationship with his daughter and was a good father did not "clearly and expressly" put his character in issue in any way relevant to his possible guilt or innocence of the crime charged. It did not "open the door" to impeachment evidence of bad character. Similarly, his testimony on cross-examination that he was joking when he asked the victim and others to be his girlfriends did not place his character in issue, but if it did, it did not open the door for impeachment evidence of bad character by evidence of specific acts of sexual misconduct. ORS 45.600; 3 State v. Ewing, supra, 174 Or. at 504, 149 P.2d 765. While the state may introduce evidence of a defendant's bad character if the defendant in his case-in-chief opens the door by offering evidence of his good character, as we stated in State v. Jackson, 31 Or.App. 645, 649, 571 P.2d 523 (1977), rev. den. 281 Or. 323 (1978), the state " * * * may not open its own door."
Finally, the state contends that by eliciting from two defense witnesses testimony that they had observed defendant playing or wrestling with his daughter, the victim and other young girls, but had seen no inappropriate contact between them, defendant had clearly and expressly placed his character in issue. The testimony elicited from these witnesses is like that in State v. Henley, 27 Or.App. 607,...
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