State v. Davis

• Decision Date: 15 March 2017
• Docket Number: No. 2015–K–1949,2015–K–1949
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Andre J. DAVIS
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

221 So.3d 28

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Andre J. DAVIS

No. 2015–K–1949

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 15, 2017

ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Hon. Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, Donna R. Andrieu, Christopher James Ponoroff, for Applicant.

Brad Scott, for Respondent.

WEIMER, Justice.

We granted a writ to determine whether the appellate court erroneously applied the domestic abuse battery statute, La. R.S. 14:35.3. The appellate court determined there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction under the statutory provision requiring that an offender and victim be past or present members of the same household. As interpreted by the appellate court, La. R.S. 14:35.3 requires the state to show the offender and victim engaged in a relationship comparable to the civil law concept of "open concubinage."

We find that the appellate court's requirement that the state prove "open concubinage" between the victim and offender is not grounded in the statute. Moreover, the appellate court's requirement of proof of "open concubinage" thwarts the broader

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inquiry into the circumstances of the relationship intended by the legislature. For reasons that follow, we reverse the ruling of the appellate court and reinstate the trial court's ruling that the totality of evidence was sufficient to find the victim and offender were part of the same household and, therefore, was sufficient to support the conviction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The defendant was charged by bill of information with one count of domestic abuse battery involving strangulation, in violation of La. R.S. 14:35.3. The defendant pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to a bench trial.

At trial, the state presented the testimony of Eugenia Leonard, who testified that on January 18, 2012, she was in an apartment she rented, and was caring for her six-week-old daughter. Also present in the apartment that day was the defendant, who is the father of Ms. Leonard's daughter. The defendant was partially clothed and reclining in the bedroom when Ms. Leonard approached him and asked him to watch the child while Ms. Leonard took a shower.

According to Ms. Leonard, the defendant refused to help, so she told him to leave the apartment. The defendant got out of bed and dressed. As the defendant left the bedroom and walked down the hallway, he pushed Ms. Leonard against the wall. Ms. Leonard was holding the child in her arms, and ran into the hallway bathroom. The defendant followed, grabbed Ms. Leonard by the neck and began choking her until she closed her eyes and fell to the floor, still holding her baby in her arms. When she opened her eyes, the defendant was standing in the bathroom doorway, but left the apartment soon afterwards.

Ms. Leonard explained that she and defendant had been involved in an intimate relationship for three or four years and had been to counseling to try to find a way to raise their daughter together. She stated that the defendant was a student at a local university at the time and had moved out of his dormitory to stay with her. However, when the defendant refused to help take care of their daughter, she told him to leave because he did not pay any of the bills or contribute to the household.

The defendant took the stand and testified that at the time of the incident he did not want to have an intimate relationship with Ms. Leonard, but he did want to be present for his daughter. He stated that he was seeing other women at the time and Ms. Leonard was aware of this. The defendant claimed that when he tried to leave the bedroom, Ms. Leonard blocked him and pushed him back with her left arm as they argued about caring for the child. As he walked past her they continued to argue. Ms. Leonard then entered the bathroom while screaming at him. As he tried to enter the bathroom, Ms. Leonard pushed him and fell backwards onto the floor.

The defendant denied that he choked Ms. Leonard or put his hands on her neck. He further denied pushing Ms. Leonard and claimed he would never do anything to hurt her when she had his daughter in her arms. Defendant also disputed Ms. Leonard's testimony concerning their living arrangements. He claimed that at the time of the incident he had returned to living in a university dorm room. The defendant also testified that while he was not ordered to do so, he provided child support in the form of a Wal–Mart money card.

The district court found defendant guilty of domestic abuse battery involving strangulation and sentenced him to two years

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imprisonment at hard labor, suspended, and two years active probation.

When the appellate court vacated the defendant's conviction for domestic abuse battery, the court found there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. According to the appellate court, the state failed to prove that defendant and Ms. Leonard were household members as required under La. R.S. 14:35.3. The appellate court noted that domestic abuse battery is defined as "the intentional use of force or violence committed by one household member upon the person of another household member." La. R.S. 14:35.3. At the time this crime was committed in 2012, household member was defined as "any person of the opposite sex presently living in the same residence or living in the same residence within five years of the occurrence of the domestic abuse battery with the defendant as a spouse, whether married or not." La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2).¹

The appellate court analogized the statutory definition of "household member" to the civil law concept of "open concubinage," which the court in Petty v. Petty, 560 So.2d 629 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1990), noted has been historically defined as "a relationship of sexual content in which man and woman live together as husband and wife in a state of affairs approximating marriage," although they are not legally married. Petty, 560 So.2d at 631 (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 440 So.2d 879, 881 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1983) ). Applying that definition of "open concubinage," the appellate court concluded that to prove defendant and the victim were living as unmarried "spouses," the state must prove:

[S]ome of the indices of a marriage: for example, both parties had substantially all of their clothing at the same abode, both parties were receiving regular mail at the same address, both parties acted like they were actually married or held themselves out to the world as a married couple, et cetera.

State v. Davis, 15-0456, pp. 18-19 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/23/15), 176 So.3d 580, 592.

The appellate court acknowledged there was an intimate relationship between the defendant and victim; however, the court found that the defendant was not living with the victim at the time of the incident. Applying its "open concubinage" standard, the appellate court further found no evidence that the victim and defendant had lived together as spouses. The court noted that there was no evidence that defendant kept personal items in the apartment, or had kept them there at any point in the relationship. The court further noted that the defendant did not contribute to household expenses. In the appellate court's view, "the evidence at trial does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims [sic] were living in open concubinage." Davis, 15–0456 at 18; 176 So.3d at 592.²

DISCUSSION

The state contends the appellate court erred by vacating the defendant's domestic

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abuse battery conviction. According to the state, the appellate court misapplied the Jackson v. Virginia³ standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the trial evidence and substituted its judgment for that of the trier of fact. The state argues that, based on the evidence adduced at trial, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant was a "household member" as defined by La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). Central to the state's argument is that the appellate court equated "household member" with the civil law concept of "open concubinage," but "open concubinage" is an outdated concept and is not grounded in the statute.

For his part, the defendant also points to the element of the crime requiring an offender to be a "household member." La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). While not directly arguing in favor of the appellate court's "open concubinage" interpretation of the statute, the defendant nevertheless argues the appellate court reached the correct result. Emphasizing the statute's use of the phrase "living in the same residence," the defendant points to repeated instances in the trial record where the victim and the defendant each testified that the defendant had been "staying in" the victim's residence. In essence, the defendant argues "staying in" is different from "living in" the residence, and evidence of "staying in" the victim's residence is insufficient to meet the requirement that the offender has attained the status of "household member" under La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2).

Although the state and defendant take different approaches, common to both litigants is that their arguments hinge on the definition of "household member" in La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). We turn, therefore, to the issue of how the term "household member"...