State v. Davis

• Decision Date: 21 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. 14715,14715
• Citation: 229 Conn. 285,641 A.2d 370
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Wayde DAVIS.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 370

641 A.2d 370

229 Conn. 285

STATE of Connecticut v. Wayde DAVIS.

No. 14715.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 12, 1994.

Decided March 21, 1994 ^*.

Dennis F. O'Toole, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Leah Hawley, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, State's Atty., and Alfred Baldwin, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.

BERDON, Associate Justice.

The sole issue in this appeal is the determination of the burden of proof ¹ that the state must meet to establish a violation of a condition of probation. In a probation revocation hearing, the trial court found that the defendant had violated a condition of his probation, and revoked the defendant's probation. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, with one judge, Freedman, J., dissenting. State v. Davis, 29 Conn.App. 801, 813, 618 A.2d 557 (1993). We granted the defendant's petition for certification, ² and we now reverse.

In June, 1990, the defendant, Wayde Davis, pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the offense of failure to appear in the first degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-172. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years, execution suspended, and was placed on two years probation. At the time of sentencing, the defendant agreed to the standard terms of probation established by the office of adult probation, including the condition that he not violate any criminal law. ³

In September, 1990, while on probation, the defendant was arrested and charged with burglary in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-102, criminal mischief in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-117, and possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279. He was subsequently arrested on a warrant for violation of probation under General Statutes § 53a-32. ⁴ The trial court held a probation revocation hearing pursuant to § 53a-32. At the hearing, Hartford police officer Thomas Sutton testified that he had been dispatched to an apartment complex on a report of burglary, and had entered an apartment building through a rear door "reported to have been broken." He testified that the door and the lock on the door appeared to have been damaged. He then entered the basement of the building through another door, which also appeared to have been damaged, and discovered in the basement the defendant and another man, Robert Graves. The defendant was holding a spoon containing white powder. Smith determined that Graves lived in the apartment building. Sutton arrested both men for burglary, criminal mischief for the damage to the door, and possession of drugs.

The trial court found that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation by committing the crimes of burglary in the second degree and criminal mischief in the third degree. ⁵ The trial court revoked the defendant's probation and ordered the defendant to serve his two year sentence.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of revocation of his probation to the Appellate Court, claiming that there was insufficient evidence presented to the trial court to find that he had violated a condition of his probation. State v. Davis, supra, 29 Conn.App. at 802, 618 A.2d 557. In its review of this claim, the Appellate Court decided that the applicable standard of proof for probation revocation proceedings under § 53a-32 was that of reasonable satisfaction, which it characterized as a lesser standard than the fair preponderance standard. Id. at 810, 618 A.2d 557. The Appellate Court then reviewed the evidence presented to the trial court and held that it met the reasonable satisfaction standard as defined by that court. Id. at 812-13, 618 A.2d 557.

We agree with the Appellate Court that, under § 53a-32, a probation revocation hearing has two distinct components. Id. at 805, 618 A.2d 557. The trial court must first conduct an adversarial evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant has in fact violated a condition of probation. "At such hearing the defendant shall be informed of the manner in which he is alleged to have violated the conditions of his probation or conditional discharge, shall be advised by the court that he has the right to retain counsel and, if indigent, shall be entitled to the services of the public defender, and shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence in his own behalf." General Statutes § 53a-32(a). If the trial court determines that the evidence has established a violation of a condition of probation, then it proceeds to the second component of probation revocation, the determination of whether the defendant's probationary status should be revoked. On the basis of its consideration of "the whole record," the trial court "may continue or revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge or modify or enlarge the conditions, and, if such sentence is revoked, require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence." General Statutes § 53a-32(b). In making this second determination, the trial court is vested with broad discretion. State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 167, 540 A.2d 679 (1988) ("[a] defendant who seeks to reverse the exercise of judicial discretion, assumes a heavy burden").

In this appeal, we are not concerned with the trial court's discretionary determination of whether probation was properly revoked under all the circumstances. We are concerned only with the first component; that is, the determination of whether there has been a violation of a condition of probation. Specifically, we must decide what standard of proof the trial court must apply to the evidence presented at the revocation hearing in order to determine whether a violation of probation has occurred. The defendant argues that, as a matter of statutory interpretation of § 53a-32, the state must meet the burden of establishing a violation of probation by the fair preponderance of the evidence presented at the revocation hearing. ⁶ The fair preponderance standard requires that the "evidence induc[e] in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that it is more probable than otherwise that the fact in issue is true." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopinto v. Haines, 185 Conn. 527, 533, 441 A.2d 151 (1981). On the other hand, the state argues that only "a minimum level of certainty" is required to find a violation, and that we should adopt the reasonable satisfaction standard. As defined by the Appellate Court, this standard is met by evidence producing "a rational belief of a trial court that the evidence is adequate or sufficient to prove a violation." ⁷ State v. Davis, supra, 29 Conn.App. at 811, 618 A.2d 557.

This court has provided little guidance in the past as to the burden of proof governing probation violation determinations, other than the statement that the applicable standard is "substantially lower than that for conviction." State v. Roberson, 165 Conn. 73, 80, 327 A.2d 556 (1973). While we have stated in the past that the trial court must be "reasonably satisfied" that a violation has occurred; id.; State v. Smith, supra, 207 Conn. at 167, 540 A.2d 679; we have never specifically addressed the qualitative nature of the burden of persuasion required of the state in a revocation proceeding. Our reference to the reasonable satisfaction standard in Smith was not only dictum, but the standard was never defined, because the defendant Smith admitted to the trial court that he had violated his probation. State v. Smith, supra at 156-57, 540 A.2d 679. Similarly, in State v. Roberson, supra, 165 Conn. at 74, 327 A.2d 556, we were not required to set out a standard of proof for weighing conflicting evidence at a probation revocation hearing, but instead addressed the narrow issue of whether proof of a criminal conviction in a prior proceeding while on probation, standing alone, is sufficient evidence of a violation of probation. Finally, although the Appellate Court applied the reasonable satisfaction standard in State v. Johnson, 11 Conn.App. 251, 258, 527 A.2d 250 (1987), and Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn.App. 395, 403, 523 A.2d 917 (1987), aff'd, 207 Conn. 565, 541 A.2d 504, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898, 109 S.Ct. 242, 102 L.Ed.2d 230 (1988), it did not define reasonable satisfaction in qualitative terms in those cases. Accordingly, we decide this case with a clean slate.

The only language of the statute bearing on the state's burden of proving a violation of probation is that the trial court must find that "such violation is established by reliable and probative evidence." General Statutes § 53a-32(b). We agree with the Appellate Court that § 53a-32 is silent with regard to the applicable standard of proof, as the "reliable and probative" language "concerns the nature of the evidence to be considered but is unrelated to the standard of proof that the court should apply in deciding the factual question of whether a violation of probation has occurred." State v. Davis, supra, 29 Conn.App. at 807, 618 A.2d 557. Although we look to legislative history for guidance when a statute is silent as to a matter clearly encompassed in the purview of that statute; In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 512-13, 613 A.2d 748 (1992); the state correctly points out that there is no legislative history indicating an intention to establish any particular standard of proof with respect to probation revocation hearings.

The function of the burden of proof employed by the court is to "allocat[e] the risk of error between the litigants and indicat[e] the relative importance of the ultimate decision. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cookson v. Cookson, 201 Conn. 229, 234, 514 A.2d 323 (1986). "For example, the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard implies that ...