State v. Davis, 90-282
| Decision Date | 30 November 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-282,90-282 |
| Parties | STATE of Vermont v. William DAVIS. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
William Sorrell, Chittenden County State's Atty., and Cindy J. Maguire, Deputy State's Atty., Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee.
Robert Andres, Burlington, for defendant-appellant.
Before ALLEN, C.J., and PECK, GIBSON, DOOLEY and MORSE, JJ.
Defendant appeals from a denial of his motion for sentence reconsideration. We are called upon to review the propriety of the trial judge engaging in plea bargain discussions with the parties, suggesting a specific plea bargain, which included a set sentence in exchange for a guilty plea, and imposing a larger sentence after defendant rejected the proposed agreement and was found guilty by a jury. Under the facts of this case, we find no error and affirm.
The State has moved to dismiss the appeal because defendant did not appeal the judgment of conviction. We deny the motion because V.R.Cr.P. 35(a) permits a challenge that a sentence was "imposed in an illegal manner."
During trial on a charge of DUI, death resulting, 23 V.S.A. §§ 1201(a)(2), 1210(e) (), the trial judge initiated a discussion about a plea agreement. This discussion lasted about five minutes and occurred off the record, but its substance was placed on the record immediately after it concluded. The on-record description of the off-record discussion went as follows:
The defense decided to take its chances with the jury and did not pursue the plea agreement. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and, after a presentencing investigation, defendant was sentenced to one to three years to serve.
Analogizing this case to one where a greater sentence after retrial--all other factors being relatively equal--is presumed vindictive, defendant maintains this case warrants a reversal and resentencing by another judge. See State v. Percy, 1 Vt.L.W. 371, 375-76 (Oct. 5, 1990) (). We conclude, however, that the analogy is inapt and that the presumption of vindictiveness does not arise when the sentencing judge has participated in plea bargain discussions that did not lead to an agreement.
A plea-bargained sentence is based on a variety of factors in addition to those usually considered after an adjudication of guilt. For instance, the following factors are relevant to acceptance of a plea agreement:
(i) the defendant is genuinely contrite and has shown a willingness to assume responsibility for his or her conduct;
(ii) the concessions [as to charge or sentence] will make possible alternative correctional measures which are better adapted to achieving protective, deterrent, or other purposes of correctional treatment, or will prevent undue harm to the defendant from the form of conviction;
(iii) the defendant, by making public trial unnecessary, has demonstrated genuine consideration for the victims of his or her criminal activity, by desiring either to make restitution or to prevent unseemly public scrutiny or embarrassment to them; or
(iv) the defendant has given or offered cooperation when such cooperation has resulted or may result in the successful prosecution of other offenders engaged in equally serious or more serious criminal conduct.
Standards for Criminal Justice § 14-1.8 (2d ed. 1980). In most plea agreements, one or more of these factors will apply, with the result that plea-bargaining defendants as a class will receive more favorable treatment than those convicted at trial. Id., commentary at 49. The commentary drafters conclude this result is not unfair because, by making these concessions, plea-bargaining defendants contribute to goals of criminal justice, id., and thereby become more deserving of leniency from the system.
We cannot make a meaningful comparison between a plea-bargained sentence, based on complex practical and policy considerations, and the sentence the same judge would find acceptable after a fully litigated trial, including a presentence investigation and sentencing hearing. The two scenarios are too dissimilar.
In addition, as a practical matter, barring a court from giving a greater sentence after trial than one it merely suggested as part of a plea bargain would invite abuse of the plea-bargaining system: defendants could bargain for the best deal, then refuse to enter into the deal but still retain the benefit. Once a judge "committed" to a sentence, a defendant could take his or her chances with the jury knowing that no matter what information came out at trial, the defendant would risk no greater sentence. See United States v. Carter, 804 F.2d 508, 513-14 (9th Cir.1986) ( ...
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State v. Gutierrez
...in the plea negotiations and the defendant subsequently receives a harsher sentence after a trial or hearing”); State v. Davis , 155 Vt. 417, 584 A.2d 1146, 1147 (1990) (“presumption of vindictiveness does not arise when the sentencing judge has participated in plea bargain discussions that......
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State v. D'ANTONIO
...that [the defendant's] trial comported with due process standards and, as a result, a just sentence was imposed."); State v. Davis, 155 Vt. 417, 420-21, 584 A.2d 1146 (1990) (noting that Vermont judges may participate in plea bargaining and that "the mere disparity between pleabargained and......
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Fisher, In re
...be equated with impermissible punishment as long as our cases sustaining plea bargaining remain undisturbed"); State v. Davis, 155 Vt. 417, ----, 584 A.2d 1146, 1147-48 (1990) (presumption of vindictiveness held not to arise where defendant rejected a judicially proposed plea-agreement sent......
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State v. Hance, 90-242
...states and the federal courts in allowing the trial judge to participate in the plea negotiation process. See State v. Davis, 155 Vt. 417, ----, 584 A.2d 1146, 1148 (1990). It is important to the integrity of the system that plea bargains be honored by both the defendant and the State. We n......