State v. Davis

• Decision Date: 15 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-KA-750,88-KA-750
• Citation: State v. Davis, 540 So.2d 600 (La. App. 1989)
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Stanley DAVIS. 540 So.2d 600
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana

Page 600

540 So.2d 600

STATE of Louisiana v. Stanley DAVIS.

No. 88-KA-750.

540 So.2d 600

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Fifth Circuit.

March 15, 1989.

Dale J. Petit, Hester, for defendant-appellant.

Anthony J. Nobile, Asst. Dist. Atty., Convent, for defendant-appellee.

Before GAUDIN, DUFRESNE and GOTHARD, JJ.

DUFRESNE, Judge.

Defendant Stanley Davis appeals his conviction of criminal trespassing, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:63.

On appeal defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the crime charged. In addition he contends the trial judge erred in proceeding to trial when the party filing the charges failed to appear at trial to testify after being subpoenaed by the State.

In the early morning hours of April 16, 1988, Mrs. Marion Scott was at home with several of her children. Her husband, Ferral Scott, was not at home. At approximately 2 a.m., she went to one of the doors of the house to let her son enter. According to her version of the subsequent events, she then went to the bathroom where she remained for awhile. When she returned to her bedroom she observed someone with black socks and shoes under the bed. Shocked she went running into the hall screaming that someone was in her bedroom. When she turned around, after awakening her children who were sleeping, she observed the defendant standing in the hall behind her. He was dressed all in black, including black socks and shoes. Defendant was known to the Scott family and Mrs. Scott asked him, apparently in a hysterical manner, what he was doing in her house. He said he wanted to tell her something, but then apparently left the premises. When her husband returned home, Mrs. Scott told him what had occurred and he brought charges against defendant.

In defendant's version of the events, he admitted being in the Scott home that morning, but claimed Mrs. Scott's son let him in the house. He stated further that the Scotts knew him well and that he in fact had dated one of the daughters. Defendant claimed he went to the Scott home to find out if Mr. Scott was unharmed since he heard two men talking in a bar about someone getting into an accident who he thought was Mr. Scott. He told the court that Mrs. Scott was sitting on her bed when he arrived at her bedroom door but she became upset when she discovered he was there. Since she would not respond to his query about Mr. Scott, he said he asked to speak to DeAnne Scott. When he informed DeAnne about what he had heard, he stated DeAnne kept asking if her father was dead. He responded he did not know and told her to check it out. He then left the house. Defendant stated he only went to the Scotts to verify or warn them that Mr. Scott may have been in an accident.

In his first assignment of error defendant contends the evidence does not justify the verdict. He points out Mrs. Scott never asked him if her son let him in the house. Secondly, defendant claims no one told him to leave or told him he could not come on the Scott's property. Citing State v. Johnson, 381 So.2d 498 (La.1980), defendant contends the failure on Mrs. Scott's part to request his departure prohibits a conviction under R.S. 14:63, criminal trespass.

R.S. 14:63 provides in pertinent part:

"A. No person shall without authorization intentionally enter any structure, watercraft, or movable.

"B. No person shall intentionally enter immovable property owned by another:

(1) when he knows his entry is unauthorized, or

(2) under circumstances where he reasonably should know his entry is unauthorized."

In assessing the sufficiency of evidence under the standards set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the reviewing court must determine whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821.; State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965 (La.1986); State v. Jackson, 527 So.2d 1039 (La.App. 5 Cir.1988).

State v. Johnson, supra, cited by defendant, involved a statute in which a key element is entry after having been forbidden to do so (R.S. 14:63.3, "Entry on or remaining in places or on land after being forbidden"). That case is inapposite here, as the criminal trespass statute does not require a party to orally or in writing forbid entry to the person entering the property in order for the violation to occur. Under this statute, the State need only prove an unauthorized intentional entry onto immovable property owned by another under circumstances where the person entering the property knows or reasonably should know the entry is unauthorized.

The evidence produced herein shows the testimony of the State's witnesses directly contradicted defendant's version of the incident. Both witnesses stated defendant was in...