State v. Davis
| Decision Date | 30 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 48,2009.,48 |
| Citation | 997 A.2d 780,415 Md. 22 |
| Parties | STATE of Marylandv.Maurice DAVIS. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Daniel J. Jawor, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for petitioner.
Michael R. Steer, Assigned Public Defender (Elizabeth L. Julian, Acting Public Defender, and Bradford C. Peabody, Asst. Public Defender, of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.
In this case we are called upon to determine whether a defense attorney's pretrial statements to an administrative judge were sufficient to trigger a Maryland Rule 4-215(e) inquiry into the merits of the defendant's request to discharge counsel. Maurice Davis was arrested and charged with the burglary of a McDonald's restaurant and the robbery of two of its employees in Baltimore County. On the morning of trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, defense counsel told the court that, in his earlier conversation with Davis, the defendant had expressed unhappiness with his attorney's evaluation of the case, and that Davis “[w]anted a jury trial and new counsel.” Despite this information, the court ordered the case to proceed to trial without investigating Davis's reasons for seeking different representation.
A jury later convicted Davis of two counts each of simple robbery and robbery with a dangerous weapon, as well as one count of second-degree burglary, 1 and he appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals (“CSA”), arguing that defense counsel's pretrial announcement served as a Rule 4-215(e) request to discharge counsel and that the Circuit Court's failure to ascertain Davis's rationale for the request constituted a reversible error. The CSA agreed with Davis's assessment of the pretrial dialogue, leading it to vacate his convictions and remand the case for a new trial. We agree with the intermediate appellate court and affirm its judgment.
On April 24, 2006, at around 3:30 in the morning, a man wearing a blue bandana and a hooded sweatshirt pried open the rear drive-through window of a White Marsh McDonald's and climbed inside. An hour later, the restaurant manager and another employee entered the building to open the restaurant for the day. The burglar confronted both employees, robbing them at gunpoint before fleeing in the manager's vehicle. Shortly after, in the vicinity of the crime scene, a Baltimore County officer spotted the manager's vehicle and began pursuit. Following a minor traffic accident, the driver exited the vehicle through a window and a foot chase ensued. The officer was able to capture and arrest the driver, and identified him as Maurice Davis.
Davis was later charged with, among other things, armed robbery and second-degree burglary. He was appointed counsel. On the morning of trial, in front of the Baltimore County Administrative Judge, the following colloquy occurred:
The administrative judge then ascertained from counsel the anticipated length of trial and called around to determine whether a judge was immediately available to begin proceedings.
Soon after, the case went to trial in front of another judge, where the following colloquy took place:
Davis was then tried and convicted by a jury of robbery and burglary.
Davis timely appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals. He argued, among other things, that the Circuit Court administrative judge failed to investigate his reasons for wanting new counsel after his attorney expressed Davis's desire for a change, as required by Maryland Rule 4-215(e). The State, on the other hand, asserted that the words used by Davis's attorney did not constitute an express request for a change of counsel, and “thus the judge could have interpreted the exchange as relating to a prior conversation between [Davis] and his lawyer[,]” meaning that no further discussion on the matter was required. In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court held that Davis's statement was “sufficient to trigger the Maryland Rule 4-215(e) mandatory inquiry.” The court reversed Davis's convictions and remanded for a new trial.
We granted the State's Petition for Certiorari to consider whether the Circuit Court administrative judge was obligated to conduct a Rule 4-215(e) inquiry in response to defense counsel's comment that Davis had requested a new attorney.4 We hold that such an inquiry was required.
In reviewing a possible violation of a constitutional right, this Court conducts its own independent constitutional analysis. See Crosby v. State, 366 Md. 518, 526, 784 A.2d 1102, 1106 (2001) (). “We perform a de novo constitutional appraisal in light of the particular facts of the case at hand; in so doing, we accept a lower court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.” Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 221, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (2002).
A criminal defendant's right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See Brye v. State, 410 Md. 623, 634, 980 A.2d 435, 441 (2009). “The right to counsel seeks to protect a defendant from the complexities of the legal system and his or her lack of understanding of the law.” Id. Running in tandem with this right to counsel is the equally important constitutional right to defend oneself: Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 123, 406 A.2d 98, 99 (1979) (citations omitted). The freedom to release counsel exists because:
[a]n unwanted counsel “represents” the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not for his defense.
Id. at 128, 406 A.2d at 101 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Maryland Rule 4-215(e) governs court procedure when a defendant expresses a desire to discharge his or her current counsel. Rule 4-215(e) provides:
Discharge of counsel-Waiver. If a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant's request, the court shall permit the discharge of counsel; continue the action if necessary; and advise the defendant that if new counsel does not enter an appearance by the next scheduled trial date, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant's request, the court may not permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the defendant that the trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel. If the court permits the defendant to discharge counsel, it shall comply with subsections (a)(1)-(4) of this Rule if the docket or file does not reflect prior compliance.
Under the Rule, upon a defendant's request to discharge counsel, the court must provide the defendant an opportunity to explain his or her reasons for seeking the change. See
Gonzales v. State, 408 Md. 515, 531, 970 A.2d 908, 917 (2009). “Next, the trial court must make a determination about whether the defendant's desire to discharge counsel is meritorious.” Gonzales, 408 Md. at 531, 970 A.2d at 917; see also
Moore v. State, 331 Md. 179, 186-87, 626 A.2d 968, 971-72 (199...
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