State v. Davis

Decision Date07 April 1970
Docket NumberNo. 1962,1962
PartiesSTATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Richard Harold DAVIS, Appellant.
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Ross P. Lee, Public Defender, Vernon B. Croaff, Former Public Defender, Anne Kappes, Donald A. Francone, Louis L. Zussman, Deputy Public Defenders, for appellant.

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Carl Waag, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

McFARLAND, Justice:

Richard Harold Davis, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was charged in Count I with kidnapping, and Count II with the crime of robbery, with prior conviction. In both counts he entered pleas of guilty. From the judgment and sentence of the court he appeals.

Defendant was first charged in justice court in three counts--Count I, kidnapping; Count II, robbery, with prior conviction; and Count III, assault with intent to commit murder. On the date set for the preliminary hearing, he appeared with his attorney, Louis L. Zussman. His counsel, in open court, questioned the defendant of his understanding of the counts against him, also the result of waiving a preliminary hearing, after which the defendant waived his preliminary hearing as to Counts I and II, it being understood that Count III would be dismissed, which was done on the motion of the deputy county attorney.

The defendant was bound over to the Superior Court and an information filed charging him with the crime of kidnapping with prior conviction, Count I, and robbery with prior conviction, Count II--alleged to have occurred on the 22d day of January 1968.

The defendant appeared in court on the 1st day of July 1968, and was represented by Donald A. Francone, Deputy Public Defender for Maricopa County, at which time defendant's attorney announced that he had explained to defendant the penalties for each of the charges and that the county attorney had agreed to dismiss the prior-conviction charge, which was subsequently done, on a motion by the deputy county attorney at the time of the sentencing. The court then questioned defendant personally, and in detail, after which the plea of not guilty was permitted to be withdrawn, and defendant entered his plea of guilty to both Counts I and II.

The defendant, on the 3d day of September, appeared in court represented by Louis L. Zussman, Deputy Public Defender, and was sentenced as shown by the minute entry of the court for that date, as follows:

'It is the judgment of the Court that Richard Harold Davis is guilty of Count I, Kidnapping, a Felony; and therefore, It is Ordered that Richard Harold Davis be confined in the Arizona State Prison for not less than nine (9) nor more than ten (10) years, from January 22, 1968.

'It is the further judgment of the Court that Richard Harold Davis is guilty of count II, Robbery a Felony; and therefore, It is Ordered that Richard Harold Davis be confined in the Arizona State Prison for not less than fifty (50) nor more than sixty (60) years, from January 22, 1968; Deft. to be returned to the Maricopa County Hospital approximately one year from date hereof to have the surgical pin removed from his arm; sentence on Count II to run consecutively and not concurrently with sentence in Count II.

'Mr. Gerst moves the Court to dismiss the allegation of the prior conviction.

'It is Ordered granting the State's motion to dismiss Count II.'

On September 9, 1968, the court entered a subsequent minute entry, as follows:

'It is Ordered correcting minute entry of Sept. 3, 1968 to show that sentence run consecutively and not concurrently with sentence on Count I instead of Count II.

'It is further Ordered striking the order dismissing Count II, and entering the following order instead:

'It is Ordered granting the State's motion to dismiss the allegation of prior conviction.'

at which time the minute entry shows the presence of counsel for the State and the defendant but not that defendant was present. On the 11th day of September 1968 there was filed in the clerk's office of the court the signed judgment and commitment which stated that on the 3d day of September 1968 the thereafter-named defendant personally appeared before the court with his attorney, Louis L. Zussmann, Deputy Public Defender. The judgment and sentence, omitting the formal parts, read as follows:

'AS TO COUNT I--KIDNAPPING--a felony

IT IS ORDERED that Richard Harold Davis be confined in the Arizona State Prison for not less than Nine (9) nor more than Ten (10) years from January 22, 1968

'AS TO COUNT II--ROBBERY, A Felony:

'IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER that Richard Harold Davis be confined in the Arizona State Prison for not less than Fifty (50) nor more than SIXTY (60) years, from January 22, 1968; Defendant to be returned to the Maricopa County Hospital approximately One (1) year from date hereof to have the surgical pin removed from his arm; sentence on Count II to run consecutively and not concurrently with sentence on Count I.

'IT IS ORDERED granting the State's Motion to dismiss the allegations of prior conviction as to Count II.'

On appeal, opening and reply briefs were filed by the Public Defender's Office. Thereafter the defendant requested and was granted permission to file a supplemental brief in propria persona, and, subsequently, an amended supplemental brief. In addition to the questions presented in the public defender's brief, the defendant raises questions in regard to the sufficiency of the complaint, as to probable cause, as to whether he was denied the right to a preliminary examination through deceit and coercion, as to the voluntariness of his plea, and also as to the effective representation by counsel. After the briefs were filed and the case submitted, defendant filed a motion to suspend his appeal and grant him leave to file a motion to vacate judgment on the grounds that his 'plea of guilty was the product of deceit, coercion, duress and ineffective assistance of counsel; pursuant to a falsely charged criminal complaint, a biased and malicious warrant of arrest, denial of preliminary examination (through a coerced waiver),' and an 'incorrect and falsely sworn commitment (sic) * * *; also (b) * * * plea of guilty was given through ignorance' of the waiver of some of his rights. All of these were matters which he had argued in his propria persona briefs.

The record clearly shows that these contentions are not substantiated. At the preliminary hearing the deputy public defender was careful to explain to him in open court the results of waiving a preliminary hearing. The record also shows that he was 31 years of age at the time, with an educational background of three years in high school and two years of bookkeeping and accounting. Rule 17, Rules Crim.Proc., 17 A.R.S., provides that a defendant may waive a preliminary examination. State v. Graninger,96 Ariz. 172, 393 P.2d 266; State v. Smith, 62 Ariz. 145, 155 P.2d 622.

The instant case falls within 'plea bargaining' which we have approved where a proper determination is made by the court that the plea was made voluntarily at the time the plea was changed. The record in the instant case shows that the court followed the procedure which we held is required for the protection of a defendant's rights in changing a plea. State v. Jennings, 104 Ariz. 3, 448 P.2d 59. The procedure followed by the trial judge also meets the requirements as set forth in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418, and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. The record shows that at the time the pleas of guilty were made the defendant appeared in court represented by counsel who stated that he had talked with the defendant, and that it was the defendant's desire to change his plea and enter a plea of guilty to both counts (I and II), and then counsel asked the defendant the question in open court if that were correct, to which defendant answered in the affirmative. The court then asked defendant if he were acquainted with the length of sentence that could be imposed upon him on his pleas of guilty, first, on the kidnapping charge. Defendant replied that he was. The court then asked him how many years, to which defendant replied 'between one and ten years.' The court then asked him the same questions in regard to the robbery charges-Count II-and defendant replied 'five years to life.' The court then further asked defendant in regard to the voluntariness of his plea as follows:

'THE COURT: Has anyone offered or promised you any leniency or anything of that nature by reason of your entry of the plea of guilty?

'MR. DAVIS: No, sir.

'THE COURT: Do you have other charges pending against you by any chance?

'MR. DAVIS: In this County?

'THE COURT: Yes.

'MR. DAVIS: No, sir. I have charges pending elsewhere, but not in this County.

'THE COURT: In another State, is that correct?

'MR. DAVIS: In Gila County and Illinois and Wisconsin and various Federal jurisdictions, also.

'THE COURT: Have there been any promises as to the disposition of these other changes if you would enter a plea of guilty to these charges?

'MR. DAVIS: No, sir. I know nothing whatsoever about the other charges.

'THE COURT: What is your educational background?

'MR. DAVIS: Eleven years and two years bookkeeping and accounting.

'THE COURT: What is your age at the present time?

'MR. DAVIS: Thirty-one.

'THE COURT: Then you are aware that on acceptance of your plea, your matter will be investigated by the adult Probation Officer, he will make his report to the Court and, based upon that report, the way the Court views the offenses charged, then you might be sentenced to the penitentiary for the remainder or your life. You understand that?

'MR. DAVIS: Yes, Sir, I understand that.

'THE COURT: Knowing all these things, it is still your desire to enter a plea of guilty, is that correct?

'MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir.

'THE COURT: Then the Court finds the withdrawal of the not guilty pleas and entry of the guilty pleas to...

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  • State v. Forte
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    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • August 31, 2009
    ...the judge to personally question and observe the defendant." Fettis, 136 Ariz. at 59, 664 P.2d at 209; see also State v. Davis, 105 Ariz. 498, 502, 467 P.2d 743, 747 (1970) (defendant must be given opportunity to express why sentence "should not be pronounced against him and why he should h......
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    ...consecutive sentences. ¶42 A criminal defendant has the right to be present at a resentencing hearing. See State v. Davis, 105 Ariz. 498, 502, 467 P.2d 743, 747 (1970) ("'Where a person convicted of a criminal offense or offenses is to be resentenced, as was the case here, the presence of t......
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