State v. Dean, No. 83-305

• Docket Nº: No. 83-305
• Citation: 148 Vt. 510, 536 A.2d 909
• Case Date: October 09, 1987
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Vermont

Page 909

536 A.2d 909 148 Vt. 510 STATE of Vermont
v.
Ray Edward DEAN. No. 83-305. Supreme Court of Vermont. Oct. 9, 1987.

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Philip H. White, Orleans County State's Atty., Newport, for plaintiff-appellee.

David W. Curtis, Defender Gen., and William A. Nelson, Appellate Defender, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant.

Before ALLEN, C.J., PECK and DOOLEY, JJ., and BARNEY, C.J. (Ret.) and KEYSER, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.

DOOLEY, Justice.

The defendant in this case, Ray Edward Dean, was charged with two counts of attempted murder, arson and violation of a domestic abuse order. Following his conviction on a guilty plea and sentence, he moved for a sentence modification which was denied. In this appeal, he contests the denial of sentence reduction. We affirm.

The charges against defendant all arose out of the same incident. Defendant set fire to a house during the night while it was [148 Vt. 511] occupied by his estranged wife, his son and his wife's mother. The fire was started by two Molotov cocktails. A human tragedy was averted when a passerby saw the smoke and flames and went into the house and woke up the occupants. The fire totally destroyed the house, which was owned by the wife's parents, along with almost all of the personal property contained within it.

The State alleged that the defendant started the fire with the intent to murder his wife and his mother-in-law. The State's theory was that the defendant had become enraged over the fact that his wife had taken his child and moved out of their domicile. There was a history of defendant physically abusing his wife. Defendant did not realize that his child was in the house at the time of the fire.

The case never came to trial because the defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement under which the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to arson and one count of attempted murder. After a judgment of conviction was entered on the plea and a presentence report ordered and received, an extensive sentencing hearing was held by the trial court which included testimony from numerous witnesses. The State recommended lengthy consecutive sentences. The defense objected to consecutive sentences for the two charges, sought a lesser sentence and sought credit for time served since defendant's arrest.

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On March 24, 1983, the court sentenced the defendant to eighteen to twenty years for attempted murder and a probationary sentence of eight to ten years for arson with a condition of probation that the defendant make a full restitution to the wife's parents for the uninsured loss from the fire. The court gave credit for time served.

On May 3, 1983, defendant filed a timely notice for reconsideration of the sentences pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7042 and V.R.Cr.P. 35. Defendant argued that the sentences were not in the best interest of justice and constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the length was not consistent with the length of sentences that had been given in other cases for more severe offenses. The defendant argued that he had no prior criminal record, and the offense was committed under circumstances that showed a need for psychiatric treatment rather than incarceration. The court heard the motion for reconsideration of sentence on May 17, 1983. In addition to the arguments of counsel, the court took testimony from a probation and parole officer and [148 Vt. 512] from the estranged wife of the defendant. The court denied the motion for reconsideration of sentence in a lengthy opinion and order filed January 7, 1985. This appeal followed.

Defendant raises two issues. First, defendant argues that the lower court failed to make legally acceptable findings in its opinion and order. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court's "findings" were "mere recitals of the testimony given," and therefore not actually findings of fact as this Court held in Krupp v. Krupp, 126 Vt. 511, 236 A.2d 653 (1967). Second, the defendant argues that the twenty month delay between the motion for reconsideration of sentence and the order and opinion on that motion denied defendant a speedy trial, due process of law under the federal constitution and prompt justice under the Vermont Constitution. ¹

We begin by analyzing defendant's delay claim and the specific allegations that his rights under the United States Constitution have been violated. Here defendant has two different theories: (1) the delay in ruling on the sentence reconsideration motion denied him a speedy trial; and (2) the delay denied him due process of law. The second theory is an alternative, available only if the speedy trial theory fails because the sentence reconsideration motion is not part of the "trial."

Defendant uses a two step argument to reach the conclusion that the speedy trial right covers the sentence reconsideration decision. He argues that sentencing is part of the trial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Then, he argues that sentence reconsideration is part of the sentencing[148 Vt. 513] process so that it comes under the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial.

The initial step of defendant's argument was explicitly left undecided in Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361, 77 S.Ct. 481, 485-86, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957). The Supreme Court in Pollard assumed that the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right covered sentencing but found there was no constitutional violation under the circumstances in the case. Most decisions after Pollard have used a similar approach. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 423

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F.2d 1149 (8th Cir.1970); Brady v. Superintendent, 443 F.2d 1307 (4th Cir.1971). Others have analyzed the issue and found that sentencing is part of the "trial" for Sixth Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Juarez-Casares v. United States, 496 F.2d 190 (5th Cir.1974); State ex rel. McLellan v. Cavanaugh, 127 N.H. 33, 498 A.2d 735 (1985); Gonzales v. State, 582 P.2d 630 (Alaska 1978). We concur with those decisions that find that the speedy trial guarantee applies to sentencing. Most of the considerations behind the speedy trial guarantee are applicable to sentencing. See Gonzales v. State, 582 P.2d at 633. ²

The second step of defendant's argument raises a question of first impression. The authority of the court to reconsider and modify a sentence was...