State v. Decher

• Decision Date: 13 June 1984
• Citation: 481 A.2d 848,196 N.J.Super. 157
• Parties: The STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff, v. Bruce DECHER, Defendant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 157

196 N.J.Super. 157

481 A.2d 848

The STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff, v. Bruce DECHER, Defendant.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Special Civil Part, Monmouth County.

Decided June 13, 1984.

Thomas J. Smith, Jr., West Long Branch, for defendant.

Toni A. Hendrickson, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff (Irwin I. Kimmelman, Atty. Gen. of N.J., attorney).

McGANN, Jr., J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).

This pending charge for driving while intoxicated was specially assigned to this court for disposition. ¹

Defendant moves, pretrial, for a decision determining whether he is before the court as a first or second offender for purposes of potential penalties under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. More specifically he wants to know, should he be found guilty of the pending charge, whether he will be sentenced as a second or third offender. The issue poses serious consequences for him ² and is ripe for resolution.

It is undisputed that on May 11, 1972 Decher pled guilty to driving while impaired on March 23, 1972 in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(b). ³ He did so without benefit of counsel. That charge was, apparently, based on a breathalyzer reading.

On April 7, 1980, with counsel, Decher pled guilty to driving while intoxicated on March 5, 1980 in violation of N.J.S.A 39:4-50. He was under the impression at that time that he was pleading as a first offender; that the impaired conviction did not count as a prior offense for sentencing purposes. It is apparent that his counsel, the local prosecutor and the municipal court judge were under the same misapprehension. He was, in fact, sentenced as a first offender; he was fined, his license was suspended for 60 days and he was required to attend a driver re-education program. He did so and his license privileges were restored at the end of the 60-day period.

That sentence was in error. The 1980 conviction represented a second offense and he should have been sentenced accordingly. State v. Culbertson, 156 N.J.Super. 167, 383 A.2d 729 (App.Div.1978).

It is, nonetheless, defendant's position that he is a first offender. He advances alternative grounds: 1) his 1972 guilty plea should be set aside because it was a) uncounselled or b) based upon a breathalyzer test which is prima facie suspect, or 2) the State is estopped from taking the position that, if guilty here, he should be sentenced as a third offender.

Defendant's argument that the State cannot now, in effect, correct an error made in 1980 by considering him as a third rather than a second offender (if convicted), is persuasive.

Due process of law as expressed in the concept of fundamental fairness mandates that a sentence once imposed and served not be added to or enhanced at a later date. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980); State v. Ryan, 86 N.J. 1, 429 A.2d 332 (1981); State v. Burke, 188 N.J.Super. 649, 458 A.2d 161 (Law Div.1983). In being sentenced in 1980 Decher knowingly accepted the following consequences: a fine, a suspension of license, mandatory re-education and first offender status. He served the sentence fully and knew that if convicted of the same offense in the future, he would be sentenced as a second offender. Those were his reasonable and justifiable expectations. Now, well after the fact, he is told that those expectations were incorrect, that as the result of the 1980 plea his sentence should be changed in a very significant aspect, namely, that he thereby became a second offender for future purposes (and will be a third offender if convicted now). None of that is of his creation....