State v. Deck, No. 80821

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri
Writing for the CourtSTEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, Jr.
Citation994 S.W.2d 527
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Carmen L. DECK, Appellant.
Decision Date01 June 1999
Docket NumberNo. 80821

Page 527

994 S.W.2d 527
STATE of Missouri, Respondent,
v.
Carmen L. DECK, Appellant.
No. 80821.
Supreme Court of Missouri,
En Banc.
June 1, 1999.
Rehearing Denied June 29, 1999.

Page 531

Deborah B. Wafer, St. Louis, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. General, Catherine Chatman, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, for Respondent.

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, Jr., Judge.

A Jefferson County jury convicted Carmen L. Deck, Jr., of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of armed criminal action, one count of first degree robbery, and one count of first degree burglary. Deck was sentenced to death for each of the two murder counts and concurrent life sentences for the two counts of armed criminal action, as well as consecutive sentences of thirty years imprisonment for the robbery count and fifteen years imprisonment for the burglary count. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal because the death sentence was imposed. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3. The judgment is affirmed.

I. Facts

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 2387, 141 L.Ed.2d 753 (1998), the facts are as follows: In June 1996, Deck planned a burglary with his mother's boyfriend, Jim Boliek, to help Boliek obtain money for a trip to Oklahoma. Deck targeted James and Zelma Long, the victims in this case, because he had known the Longs' grandson and had accompanied him to the Longs' home in DeSoto, Missouri, where the grandson had stolen money from a safe. The original plan was to break into the Longs' home on a Sunday while the Longs were at church. In preparation for the burglary, Deck and Boliek drove to DeSoto several times to canvass the area.

On Monday, July 8, 1996, Boliek told Deck that he and Deck's mother wanted to leave for Oklahoma on Friday, and he gave Deck his .22 caliber High Standard automatic loading pistol. That Monday evening, Deck and his sister, Tonia Cummings, drove in her car to rural Jefferson County, near DeSoto, and parked on a back road, waiting for nightfall. Around nine o'clock, Deck and Cummings pulled into the Longs' driveway.

Deck and Cummings knocked on the door and Zelma Long answered. Deck asked for directions to Laguana Palma, whereupon Mrs. Long invited them into the house. As she explained the directions and as Mr. Long wrote them down, Deck walked toward the front door and pulled the pistol from his waistband. He then turned around and ordered the Longs to go lie face down on their bed, and they complied without a struggle.

Page 532

Next, Deck told Mr. Long to open the safe, but because he did not know the combination, Mrs. Long opened it instead. She gave Deck the papers and jewelry inside and then told Deck she had two hundred dollars in her purse in the kitchen. Deck sent her into the kitchen and she brought the money back to him. Mr. Long then told Deck that a canister on top of the television contained money, so Deck took the canister, as well. Hoping to avoid harm, Mr. Long even offered to write a check.

Deck again ordered the Longs to lie on their stomachs on the bed, with their faces to the side. For ten minutes or so, while the Longs begged for their lives, Deck stood at the foot of the bed trying to decide what to do. Cummings, who had been a lookout at the front door, decided time was running short and ran out the door to the car. Deck put the gun to Mr. Long's head and fired twice into his temple, just above his ear and just behind his forehead. Then Deck put the gun to Mrs. Long's head and shot her twice, once in the back of the head and once above the ear. Both of the Longs died from the gunshots.

After the shooting, Deck grabbed the money and left the house. While fleeing in the car, Cummings complained of stomach pains, so Deck took her to Jefferson Memorial Hospital, where she was admitted. Deck gave her about two hundred fifty dollars of the Long's money and then drove back to St. Louis County. Based on a tip from an informant earlier that same day, St. Louis County Police Officer Vince Wood was dispatched to the apartment complex where Deck and Cummings lived. Officer Wood confronted Deck late that night after he observed him driving the car into the apartment parking lot with the headlights turned off. During a search for weapons, Officer Wood found a pistol concealed under the front seat of the car and, then, placed Deck under arrest. Deck later gave a full account of the murders in oral, written and audiotaped statements.

II. Motion for Change of Venue

Deck first contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for change of venue filed under Rule 32.04. As grounds for the motion, he stated that "the case ha[d] received extensive publicity by way of newspaper and television coverage" and that "[t]he residents of Jefferson County [were] biased and prejudiced against defendant and defendant [could] not receive a fair trial." The trial court overruled the motion after an evidentiary hearing, finding that there was not "such overwhelming pre-trial publicity as is likely to render impossible the selection of an impartial jury." Deck now claims that the trial court's error violated his rights to due process of law, trial by fair and impartial jury, reliable sentencing, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 10, 18(a), and 21 of the Missouri Constitution.

A change of venue is required when it is necessary to assure the defendant a fair and impartial trial. State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 323 (Mo. banc 1996). The decision to grant or deny a request for change of venue for cause rests within the trial court's discretion, State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. banc 1991), and the trial court's ruling will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion and a real probability of injury to the complaining party. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion, however, when the record shows that the inhabitants of the county are so prejudiced against the defendant that a fair trial cannot occur there. Id.; Kinder, 942 S.W.2d at 323. In reviewing the trial court's ruling, it is understood that the trial court, rather than the appellate court, is in the better position to assess the effect of publicity on the members of the community. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 6. Finally, in assessing the impact of potentially prejudicial publicity on

Page 533

prospective jurors, the critical question is not whether they remember the case, but whether they have such fixed opinions regarding the case that they could not impartially determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Id.

At the hearing on the motion, Deck introduced into evidence nine newspaper articles and several videotapes of television news broadcasts, all of which appeared within a few weeks of the July 8 murders. In addition, Deck offered the testimony of Dr. Kenneth Warren, a professor of political science at Saint Louis University, who was commissioned to conduct an opinion poll to determine the extent to which residents of Jefferson County had heard of the case. Dr. Warren's poll, which was taken between November 13, 1996 and December 9, 1996, more than a year before trial, consisted of a survey of five hundred eighteen residents of Jefferson County. The results showed that sixty-nine percent of the people polled were aware of the case and twenty-seven percent held an opinion regarding Deck's guilt. These circumstances, Deck maintains, demonstrate that the Jefferson County community was saturated with publicity about the case that was prejudicial to him, and thus the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his motion for change of venue.

To reinforce his position, Deck also notes that during jury selection, fifty of the prospective jurors indicated that they had heard about or read about the case. Thirteen of the fifty stated that they had formed opinions regarding Deck's guilt based on the publicity and that it would be difficult or impossible for them to render a fair and impartial verdict. Deck renewed his motion for change of venue at that point, and the trial court again overruled the motion.

The fact that so many residents of Jefferson County were aware of the case does not alone mandate a change of venue. Although Dr. Warren testified that sixty-nine percent of the residents polled were aware of the case, he conceded on cross-examination that with the passage of time, fewer people would remember what they had heard. Further, although twenty-seven percent said that they held an opinion regarding Deck's guilt, Dr. Warren did not inquire whether those opinions would keep them from following the law and making a determination based on the evidence adduced at trial. As to the prospective jurors, the key concern, as noted, is whether those jurors who had heard about the case held such fixed opinions that they could not make an impartial determination regarding the defendant's guilt. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 6. During voir dire, only thirteen of the fifty prospective jurors who had heard about the case stated that their opinions would keep them from being fair and impartial jurors, and of those thirteen, twelve were stricken for cause or otherwise excused. Defense counsel declined to strike the remaining person who apparently changed her response by stating that she had not formed an opinion and could indeed follow the instructions and consider only the evidence at trial. Given the limited inferences that can be made from the polling data and the trial court's effective handling of the voir dire process, there is no indication that Deck was denied a fair and impartial jury.

Citing Ainsworth v. Calderon, 138 F.3d 787, 795 (9 th Cir.1998), Deck further claims that the pretrial publicity in Jefferson County should be considered presumptively prejudicial....

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60 practice notes
  • State v. Brown, No. WD 73142.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • November 20, 2012
    ...the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Mosby, 94 S.W.3d at 415 (quoting State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc 1999)). But the “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ... upon whether the person who claims the protec......
  • State v. Grayson, No. SC 90971.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • March 29, 2011
    ...is “based on reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that the person stopped is engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc 1999). In evaluating reasonable suspicion, courts must “determine if the content of the information possessed by the police......
  • State v. Williams
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • April 11, 2000
    ...L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994), Batson was extended to prohibit peremptory strikes on the basis of gender. Brown, 998 S.W.2d at 541; State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 536 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 120 S. Ct. 508, 145 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1999). In Missouri, the supreme court has set out a three-par......
  • State v. Tisius, No. SC 91209.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • May 1, 2012
    ...defendant should not be granted mercy.” [362 S.W.3d 410] State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 228 (Mo. banc 2006) (quoting State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 543 (Mo. banc 1999)). The State may not argue that the jury is prohibited from lawfully granting a defendant mercy by imposing a life senten......
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90 cases
  • State v. Brown, No. WD 73142.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • November 20, 2012
    ...the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Mosby, 94 S.W.3d at 415 (quoting State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc 1999)). But the “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ... upon whether the person who claims the protec......
  • State v. Grayson, No. SC 90971.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • March 29, 2011
    ...is “based on reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that the person stopped is engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc 1999). In evaluating reasonable suspicion, courts must “determine if the content of the information possessed by the police......
  • Middleton v. Roper, No. 06-2907.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • August 17, 2007
    ...based on Dr. Wiener's studies. Middleton II, 103 S.W.3d at 743 (citing Lyons v. State, 39 S.W.3d 32, 43-44 (Mo.2001); State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 542-43 (Mo.1999); State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 181 (Mo.1998)). In Deck, for example, the state supreme court rejected Dr. Wiener's conclusi......
  • State v. Manning, No. 14–207.
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    • Vermont United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
    • October 2, 2015
    ...suspicion where defendant, who was parked in high-crime area, made furtive movements consistent with concealing firearm); State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 535 (Mo.1999) (finding reasonable suspicion where defendant's reaction to encounter with officer was to turn away and reach down toward pa......
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