State v. Decoteau
Decision Date | 23 April 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 90-605,90-605 |
Citation | 137 N.H. 106,623 A.2d 1338 |
Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. David DECOTEAU. |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
John P. Arnold, Atty. Gen. (Jeffrey W. Spencer, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief and orally), for the State.
James E. Duggan, Chief Appellate Defender, of Concord, by brief and orally, for defendant.
The defendant, David Decoteau, was charged with the crimes of arson, RSA 634:1, II (1986), and attempted theft of insurance, RSA 629:1 (1986), RSA 637:3 (1986). He filed two motions to suppress evidence seized when investigators, acting pursuant to a warrant, searched the charred remains of his residence. Although the Superior Court (Groff, J.) denied his first motion, it granted the second motion, finding that the investigators exceeded the scope of the search authorized by the warrant. The State filed the present appeal pursuant to RSA 606:10, II (1986). We reverse and remand.
On March 16, 1989, an explosion and fire destroyed the defendant's single family residence on Route 31 in Lyndeborough. The residence had consisted of a house and garage, with a breezeway connecting the two structures. After firefighters extinguished the blaze, J. William Degnan, an investigator with the New Hampshire Department of Safety's Office of the Fire Marshall, arrived to investigate the cause of the fire. Degnan examined the scene and interviewed the defendant, his wife, and their daughter.
On April 3, 1989, Degnan applied for a warrant to conduct a further search of the remains of the defendant's residence. In the warrant application, Degnan stated that he was seeking a "Gas regulator, Flexable [sic ] gas line, signs of chemicals used to ignite the fire, or liquid flamable [sic ] material, as well as any and all other items that may show the cause of the fire." In an affidavit submitted in support of the application, Degnan stated that he had eliminated several possible accidental causes of the explosion and fire, and he noted that "it is not common to have this type of structure to be destroyed in this period of time without some type of accelerant being used." Degnan also described evidence suggesting that the fire had been caused by an explosion. A sliding glass door had been found twenty-five feet from its origin, the chimney was twisted and had collapsed, and the floor joists had been torn from the foundation. Degnan noted also that the defendant had been convicted of arson in 1975, and, according to bank records, was about to lose his residence through foreclosure. In the affidavit's final two paragraphs, Degnan asserted:
Degnan and a detective from the State police met with Judge Colin Lizotte of the Milford District Court for approximately one hour and, pursuant to RSA 595-A:4 (1986), provided oral testimony in support of the warrant. The judge took three pages of notes which apparently summarize the essence of the discussion.
Judge Lizotte issued a warrant authorizing a search consistent with that for which Degnan had applied. Specifically, the warrant authorized an immediate search of the defendant's Lyndeborough residence for "[e]vidence pertaining to the cause and origin of the fire, such as gas tank regulator, [f]lexable [sic ] gas lines, signs of chemicals used to ignite the fire or liquid flamable [sic ] material, as well a[s] any and all other items that may show the cause of the fire."
Thereafter, investigators carried out the search of the burned remains of the defendant's residence. The investigators first searched the house. In what had been the rear corner of the house, located furthest from the breezeway and garage, the investigators discovered what appeared to be the charred remains of a propane gas regulator and flexible hose. The investigators next searched the garage and breezeway. After using a bulldozer to remove layers of debris from the area, the investigators located the remains of a drop light, along with evidence that a flammable liquid had been used to accelerate the fire. Based on this evidence, the defendant was charged with arson and attempted theft of insurance.
The defendant filed two motions to suppress evidence seized during the search. In the first motion, the defendant argued that the affidavit accompanying the warrant application was insufficient on its face to support a finding of probable cause, and contained intentional and reckless misrepresentations of material facts. The superior court denied the motion. It found that probable cause existed "to search the premises for the gas regulator and flexible gas line used with the propane tank and hot water heater." The court also found that the defendant had not established that the supporting affidavit contained material misrepresentations of fact. The court specifically reserved judgment on whether "any other items were discovered during the search and whether those items were in the scope of the authorized search, and whether such items were in 'plain view' in that their evidentiary value was immediately apparent."
In a second motion, the defendant sought to suppress evidence seized during the search of the garage and breezeway; namely, physical evidence pertaining to the use of fire accelerants. The defendant based his motion on two grounds: first, that the showing of probable cause to Judge Lizotte was limited to ignition at the propane tank located in the rear of the house, and would not support a warrant for a search with a geographical scope beyond this area; and second, that the scope of items sought should have been limited to those specifically listed, the gas tank and flexible gas lines, the balance of the requested scope being overbroad. Following a hearing, the superior court granted the defendant's motion. The court found:
On appeal, the State contends that the superior court should not have granted the defendant's second motion to suppress. The State first argues that probable cause existed to search not only the house for the propane tank and gas line regulator, but also the entire premises for physical evidence relating to the use of accelerants. The State further argues that even if the warrant was invalid, the evidence derived from the search should not have been suppressed because the investigators reasonably relied upon the warrant.
In response, the defendant argues that the superior court was correct in ruling that the supporting affidavit established probable cause solely to confirm the theory that the propane tank was the source of the fire, and did not justify a search of the garage and breezeway. Further, he maintains that the warrant's "catchall" provision--authorizing a search for "any and all other items that may show the cause of the fire"--must be interpreted in light of the specific theory that the propane tank was the origin of the fire. Finally, the defendant argues against adoption of a good faith exception to permit searches on less than the probable cause mandated by part I, article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Moreover, the defendant contends that the...
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