State v. DeCoteau, 980265

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
• Writing for the Court: SANDSTROM
• Citation: 1999 ND 77,592 N.W.2d 579
• Parties: STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Randy E. DeCOTEAU, Defendant and Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 980265,980265
• Decision Date: 27 April 1999

Page 579

592 N.W.2d 579 1999 ND 77 STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Randy E. DeCOTEAU, Defendant and Appellant. No. 980265. Supreme Court of North Dakota. April 27, 1999.

Page 581

Ladd R. Erickson, Assistant State's Attorney, Mandan, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee.

Chad R. McCabe, Vinje Law Firm, Bismarck, N.D., for defendant and appellant.

SANDSTROM, Justice.

¶1 Randy DeCoteau appeals from his criminal judgment for possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. DeCoteau entered a conditional plea of guilty with right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of entry into his home. Because the entry by officers into DeCoteau's home violated the Fourth Amendment, the evidence should have been suppressed, and we reverse.

I

¶2 On May 3, 1998, four Mandan police officers investigated an anonymous report of a domestic disturbance in southwest Mandan at the residence of DeCoteau and Kim Engel. Upon arrival, the officers saw a group of children standing in the street and pointing to the couple's trailer. One of the children told the officers he had heard the sound of breaking glass coming from inside the residence. Engel and DeCoteau were outside the trailer, unloading their car.

¶3 The officers were unsure whether there had been a disturbance, and when they arrived, there was none. Engel did not want anything to do with the officers; she told them there was nothing wrong and she wanted them to leave. The officers also talked with DeCoteau, and he wondered why they had come. The officers then noticed a broken window, and Engel told them it had been broken for awhile. According to testimony of the officers, they never checked on the window to verify whether it was a fresh break.

¶4 One officer told Engel that because the sound of breaking glass had been reported, he would like to see whether the children were all right. Engel entered the house, and the officers followed her. Engel never affirmatively consented to the officers entering the house; they merely followed her in. Once inside, one of the officers noticed a marijuana pipe. Finding marijuana residue in it, he proceeded to secure a search warrant. DeCoteau was arrested. After his motion to suppress was denied, he entered a conditional plea. He now appeals.

Page 582

¶5 The district court had jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. DeCoteau's appeal is timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 6, and N.D.C.C. § 28-27-01.

II

¶6 DeCoteau argues the evidence seized in the trailer should have been suppressed because there was no consent or exigent circumstance to avoid the warrant requirement. We give deference to the district court's findings of fact when reviewing a motion to suppress evidence. City of Fargo v. Lee, 1998 ND 126, p 7, 580 N.W.2d 580; State v. Kitchen, 1997 ND 241, p 11, 572 N.W.2d 106. The district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence, and conflicts are resolved in favor of affirmance. Lee, at p 7. A district court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress will not be reversed if there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the court's findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. (citing State v. Sabinash, 1998 ND 32, p 8, 574 N.W.2d 827 (relying on State v. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d 315, 317 (N.D.1995))); City of Fargo v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 578, 581 (N.D.1994). Matters of law are fully reviewable by this Court on appeal. E.g., Fahlsing v. Teters, 552 N.W.2d 87, 89 (N.D.1996).

A

¶7 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8, of the North Dakota Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures in their homes. Lee, 1998 ND 126, p 8, 580 N.W.2d 580; Kitchen, 1997 ND 241, p 9, 572 N.W.2d 106; see State v. Herrick, 1997 ND 155, p 17, 567 N.W.2d 336; see also State v. Winkler, 552 N.W.2d 347 (N.D.1996). Subject to a few well-delineated exceptions, searches and seizures without a warrant are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

¶8 In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), the United States Supreme Court recognized a physical entry into a home is the chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment is directed, and held the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making a nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to make a warrantless felony arrest. Under Payton, nonconsensual, warrantless searches and seizures in a home are presumptively unreasonable, absent a government showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) (the Fourth Amendment provides great protection to persons inside their home). The trailer home of Kim Engel and Randy DeCoteau is afforded the same protections as any other home.

B

¶9 There are, however, exceptions to the search warrant requirement. A consent search is one exception to both the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Lee, 1998 ND 126, p 9, 580 N.W.2d 580 (citing State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, p 16, 566 N.W.2d 410). A consent search "must be conducted according to the limitations placed upon an officer's right to search by the consent or the search loses its validity." State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778, 782 (N.D.1990).

The trial court needs to determine whether the consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 116 (N.D.1979). To be voluntary, the consent must not be coerced by explicit or implicit means or by implied threat or covert force. State v. Larson, 343 N.W.2d 361, 364 (N.D.1984). Although the existence or absence of certain factors concerning the characteristics and condition of the person at the time of consent and the details of the setting in which the consent was obtained are significant in deciding

Page 583

voluntariness, no one factor in and of itself is determinative. State v. Discoe, 334 N.W.2d 466, 468 (N.D.1983).

Avila, 1997 ND 142, p 16, 566 N.W.2d 410. The question whether a search exceeds the scope of consent is a factual one. In a preliminary proceeding, a district court's findings of fact of a criminal case will not be set aside if, "after conflicts in the testimony are resolved in favor of affirmance, there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's findings, and the decision is not...