State v. Dehler

• Decision Date: 08 April 1960
• Docket Number: No. 37897,37897
• Citation: 102 N.W.2d 696,89 A.L.R.2d 496,257 Minn. 549
• Parties: , 89 A.L.R.2d 496 STATE of Minnesota, Plaintiff, v. Richard Edward DEHLER, Defendant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 696

102 N.W.2d 696

257 Minn. 549, 89 A.L.R.2d 496

STATE of Minnesota, Plaintiff, v. Richard Edward DEHLER, Defendant.

No. 37897.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 8, 1960.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where an accused is convicted and sentenced and subsequently discharged upon the ground that the court which tried him lacked jurisdiction, he may subsequently be tried before a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid charge, without being subject to double jeopardy.

2. Under M.S.A. § 260.22, where an offense was committed prior to the time the accused reached 18 years, but his arraignment in municipal court or before a justice of the peace was not held until after he became 18, it was not necessary that the case be transferred to the juvenile court but it could be tried by the district court without porceedings being conducted in juvenile court. Also, under L.1959, c. 685, § 2, subd. 9, and § 14, subd. 1, where a person is accused of violating a state or local law or ordinance, which violation occurred while under 18 years of age, but does not appear before a court for the offense until after he reaches 21 years, he may likewise be prosecuted in district court. Held, in the instant case the district court has jurisdiction to try the accused under a 1941 indictment since upon his arraignment on May 20, 1959, he was over 18 years of age and no longer had the status of a juvenile, and the previous proceeding against him thereon does not constitute former jeopardy because the court which tried him lacked jurisdiction.

3. Whether an accused is denied his rights to a speedy trial is for the courts to decide and the right may be waived by the accused. Held, where the accused did not assert until 1959 any right arising out of an irregularity in the proceeding prior to his trial in 1942, and where the delay was not occasioned by a deliberate choice by the prosecuting authority in not proceeding to trial, the accused has waived his right.

4. Publicity, by itself, does not preclude an impartial jury anywhere in the state.

5. The right of confrontation as guaranteed by Minn.Const. art. 1, § 6, extends only to witnesses against the accused, and where depositions are available to the accused under M.S.A. § 611.08, he is not deprived of his right under Minn.Const. art. 1, § 6, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.

6. It is the duty of the defendant, in the first instance, to minimize the difficulty of proving his mental state at the time of the commission of the crime.

7. M.S.A. § 631.49 provides, under certain circumstances, for the crediting of time served on a vacated sentence and, in computing the time served, the person convicted shall be credited with the time earned in diminution of sentence under § 640.53. The intent of § 631.49 is to credit one who is convicted in the second trial with the time served for the purpose of computing eligibility for parole under § 637.06 even though the first sentence be for life.

8. Under the facts and circumstances here where the accused is now subject to trial for the alleged offense committed in 1941, he is not thereby deprived of his rights guaranteed under U.S.Const. Amend. XIV.

Miles Lord, Atty. Gen., Henry H. Feikema, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Attell P. Felix, County Atty., Little Falls, for plaintiff.

T. Eugene Thompson, St. Paul, for defendant.

FRANK T. GALLAGHER, Justice.

This is a certification to this court by the district court, pursuant to M.S.A. § 632.10, on the grounds that certain questions raised by the appellant, Richard Edward Dehler, on motions to set aside and quash certain indictments and to dismiss certain proceedings were so important and doubtful as to require a decision of this court.

Dehler was indicted on December 30, 1941, for the crime of murder in the first degree of his mother, father, brother, and sister. He was tried and convicted on January 23, 1942, on the indictment charging him with the murder of his mother and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was born on April 2, 1925. At the times of the commission of the offenses, the indictment, and the trial, Dehler was 16 years of age and is now 34 years old.

On February 7, 1942, he moved the court for immediate trial or dismissal of the remaining three indictments. Two of them arising out of the killing of his brother and sister were dismissed on February 13, and the third involving the death of his father was dismissed on December 7, 1942.

In May 1959 Dehler petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus which resulted in an order of that court determining that he was unlawfully confined and directing that he be discharged. The order was issued on the grounds that the proper proceeding in juvenile court had not been followed when he was indicted in 1941 and that by reason thereof the district court did not have jurisdiction to try the offense in January 1942. See, State ex rel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d 234; State ex rel. Pett v. Jackson, 252 Minn. 418, 90 N.W.2d 219.

Upon his discharge Dehler was re-arrested by the sheriff of Morrison County and on May 20, 1959, was arraigned on the 1941 indictment charging him with the murder of his mother. At that arraignment Dehler entered a plea of not guilty. He also claimed former jeopardy as a defense because of the fact that on January 23, 1942, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the 1941 indictment and he was then sentenced by the court. At the May 1959 arraignment he also moved the court to set aside, quash, and dismiss the 1941 indictment, which motion raised the questions presently certified to this court.

On June 8, 1959, the grand jury returned four separate indictments charging him with murder in the first degree of his mother, father, brother and sister all committed on December 19, 1941. He was arraigned on these four separate indictments on June 10, 1959, at which time the same 'not guilty' plea was entered as under the May 20, 1959, arraignment, and another motion to quash and dismiss the indictments was made. This motion was also included in the certification to this court.

Based on the holding in State v. Artz, 154 Minn. 290, 191 N.W. 605, the state, on oral argument, correctly withdrew from consideration the three indictments in connection with the death of Dehler's father, brother, and sister, since he had moved the court for either a dismissal or immediate trial under those indictments, which motions resulted in dismissal of the indictments by the district court in 1942. Therefore, we shall consider only the issues raised under the 1941 indictment arising out of the death of his mother.

The indictment of June 8, 1959, involving the death of Dehler's mother, may be disposed of on the basis of State ex rel. Dahlgren v. Riley, 109 Minn. 437, 438, 124 N.W. 13, where this court held as follows:

'* * * It is clear that the state could not prosecute relator twice for the same offense, and, pending legally instituted proceeding for the purpose of his indictment and trial, could not arrest and restrain him of his liberty upon identically the same charge; and, though the pendency of another indictment upon the same charge is not a good plea in abatement (12 Cyc. 360), the fact that a previous warrant and preliminary hearing thereon had resulted in the holding of defendant to the grand jury, the warrant and proceedings thereon being in all things regular and valid, must necessarily bar a second proceeding upon the same charge and for the same purpose, until at least the first proceeding is determined and defendant has been discharged therefrom.'

We believe the same principle is applicable to a situation where a valid and subsisting indictment is pending, as in the instant case. The December 1941 indictment in connection with his mother's death invalidates the June 1959 indictment charging the same offense for the same acts. As a result the validity of any future proceedings must be determined with reference to the 1941 indictment.

Dehler raises nine points as to why that indictment should be dismissed, which points were accepted by the district court as the questions to be certified to this court. Some of those questions are lengthy and repetitious and we believe they are summarized and incorporated in the following four basic questions:

(1) Does the district court have jurisdiction to presently arraign and try Dehler for the offense charged under the indictment returned December 31, 1941, arising out of the death of his mother and does the 1942 trial constitute former jeopardy?

(2) If the district court does have jurisdiction to now try him for that offense, is he thereby deprived of his right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury and his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, which rights are guaranteed by Minn.Const. art. 1, § 6 (M.S.A.)?

(3) Would any sentence rendered subsequent to this trial constitute cruel or unusual punishment, prohibited by Minn.Const. art. 1, § 5, in view of the fact that he has been tried for the offense by a court which lacked jurisdiction and pursuant thereto has been imprisoned approximately 18 years?

(4) Would he thereby be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denied equal protection of the law in violation of U.S.Const. Amend. XIV?

1. Dehler asserts that a new trial under that indictment would place him in double jeopardy in view of the fact that he was tried and sentenced for that same offense in January 1942.

In State ex rel. Knutson v. Jackson, supra, we held that the requirement of M.S.A. § 260.08 concerning a hearing in juvenile court is jurisdictional and, where notice required by that section was not given, the juvenile court order for prosecution in district court was invalid; also that where the discharge is upon the ground that the court which tried the accused lacked jurisdiction, then the accused may subsequently be tried before a court of...