State v. Delafose

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ARMENTANO
• Citation: State v. Delafose, 441 A.2d 158, 185 Conn. 517 (Conn. 1981)
• Decision Date: 08 December 1981
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Lawrence DELAFOSE.

Page 158

441 A.2d 158

185 Conn. 517

STATE of Connecticut v. Lawrence DELAFOSE.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 13, 1981.

Decided Dec. 8, 1981.

Richard R. Brown, Hartford, with whom, on brief, were Igor I. Sikorsky, Jr., Kenneth L. Shluger and David F. Waters, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Ernest J. Diette, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on brief, was John T. Redway, State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before SPEZIALE C. J., and PETERS, HEALEY, PARSKEY and ARMENTANO, JJ.

ARMENTANO, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment finding the defendant guilty of first degree escape from a state mental institution where he had been previously committed pursuant to a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

The following facts are undisputed. The defendant was acquitted of a criminal charge by reason of insanity. Pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-47, ¹ the trial court ordered the defendant committed to the Connecticut Valley Hospital for a psychiatric examination to determine whether he constituted a danger to himself or society. After a hearing in May, 1977, the trial court ordered that the defendant be committed to the Connecticut Valley Hospital for a term not to exceed ten years or until such time as he did not constitute a danger to himself or to society. For the period from June, 1977, through January, 1979, the defendant was committed to the Whiting Forensic Institute of the Connecticut Valley Hospital in Middletown. In January, 1979, he was transferred to a locked ward at the Connecticut Valley Hospital.

Sometime during the night of June 27-28, 1979, the defendant left the premises of the Connecticut Valley Hospital without permission. He remained at large until his apprehension on September 19, 1979. On October 17, 1979, the defendant was charged with the crime of escape in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-169 on the basis of his having left the mental institution in June. After a trial to the court with jury waived, the defendant was found guilty of escape in the first degree on January 31, 1980. He was sentenced to a term of not less than four years nor more than eight years at the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers, said sentence to run concurrently with his commitment to the Connecticut Valley Hospital.

In his appeal from the judgment rendered, the defendant claims two errors.

The defendant's first claim of error is that the escape statute in effect at the time of the alleged escape did not apply to an individual who escaped from a mental institution where he had been committed after a judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity. Consequently, the defendant argues that the state had failed to prove its case against him. The defendant advanced this claim for the first time on appeal. This court need not consider a claim that was not distinctly raised at the trial and did not arise subsequent thereto. Practice Book § 3063; see, e.g., State v. Cuvelier, 175 Conn. 100, 111, 394 A.2d 185 (1978); Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. §§ 304-306. When plain error is not brought to the attention of the trial court, however, this court may consider the error in the interests of justice. Practice Book § 3063; see, e.g., Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557, 61 S.Ct. 719, 721, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941); Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 607, ---, 436 A.2d 1259 (42 Conn.L.J., No. 5, pp. 20, 21) (1980); State v. Rodriquez, 180 Conn. 382, 399 n.10, 429 A.2d 919 (1980). See also 10 Moore's Federal Practice (2d Ed. 1981) § 103.41. In criminal cases, this court has considered issues first raised on appeal principally in two situations: (1) when a "new constitutional right not readily foreseeable has arisen," or (2) when a "litigant has clearly been deprived of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial." State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973); see, e.g., State v. Arroyo, 180 Conn. 171, 173, 429 A.2d 457 (1980); State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328, 332, 426 A.2d 298 (1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912, 100 S.Ct. 3000, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). Moreover, the record must be sufficiently complete for this court to consider the claim on the merits. See State v. Baker, 182 Conn. 52, ---, 437 A.2d 843 (42 Conn.L.J., No. 7, pp. 20, 21) (1980); State v. Anderson, 178 Conn. 287, 290, 422 A.2d 323 (1979); State v. Evans, supra, 165 Conn. 71, 327 A.2d 576.

If the state introduced no evidence to establish a necessary element of the crime charged it failed to meet its burden of proof and the defendant was thereby deprived of due process and a fair trial. State v. Rogers, 177 Conn. 379, 381, 418 A.2d 50 (1979); see, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2324, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). Because the defendant claims he has been deprived of a fundamental right and a fair trial, and the record is sufficiently complete for this court to consider the claim on the merits, we will respond to the defendant's claim.

We must construe the escape statute in effect on the date of the alleged escape. The objective of statutory construction is to give effect to the intended purpose of the legislature. E.g., Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650, 94 S.Ct. 2431, 2436, 41 L.Ed.2d 374, reh. denied, 419 U.S. 886, 95 S.Ct. 160, 42 L.Ed.2d 131 (1974); Sillman v. Sillman, 168 Conn. 144, 147, 358 A.2d 150 (1975). When statutory language is unambiguous in meaning, it is assumed to convey legislative intent. E.g., Brittany Farms Health Center, Inc. v. Administrator, 177 Conn. 384, 388, 418 A.2d 52 (1979); Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations v. Board of Education, 177 Conn. 68, 73, 411 A.2d 28 (1979). When a common sense interpretation leads to an ambiguous or unreasonable result, however, this court must ascertain legislative intent from the circumstances surrounding the enactment, the legislative history, and the general purpose of the statute. E.g., Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Conn. 545, 552, 400 A.2d 712 (1978); Winchester v. Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, 175 Conn. 349, 356, 402 A.2d 332 (1978). "The words of a statute should be interpreted in their natural and usual meaning unless such reading would defeat a legislative intent which becomes evident when the statute is read in the light of its history and purpose ... even though such construction may seem contrary to the letter of the statute." Royce v. Heneage, 170 Conn. 387, 392, 365 A.2d 1109 (1976); see City Savings Bank of Bridgeport v. Lawler, 163 Conn. 149, 157, 302 A.2d 252 (1972).

The version of General Statutes § 53a-169 in effect between October 1, 1978, and October 1, 1980, provided that "(a) person is guilty of escape in the first degree (1) if he escapes from a correctional institution, any public or private, nonprofit half-way house, group home or mental health facility ...." ² The plain language of the statute would impose liability for a felony regardless of the nature of commitment to the facility from which an accused left without permission. Therefore, a person who had voluntarily committed himself to a mental institution would be guilty of a class C felony if he left the institution without permission or authorization. This is the bizarre result of a literal construction of the statute not contemplated by the legislature. Assuming the legislature intended to accomplish a reasonable and rational result; Stoni v. Wasicki, 179 Conn. 372, 376-77, 426 A.2d 774 (1979); Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638, 643, 410 A.2d 475 (1979); we will examine the legislative history of the statute to ascertain its intended purpose.

Prior to an amendment effective on October 1, 1978, General Statutes § 53a-169 provided that "(a) person is guilty of escape in the first degree (1) if he escapes from a correctional institution ...." ³ Section 2 of Public Acts 1978, No. 78-92, entitled "An Act Concerning Work-Release and Education-Release Programs," added liability for escape from "any public or private nonprofit half-way house, group home or mental health facility." Section 1 of [185 Conn. 524] Public Acts 1978, No. 78-92 authorized the commissioner of corrections to transfer persons from correctional institutions into these facilities. ⁴ Statements at House hearings on Substitute House Bill No. 5271 by the proponent of the bill and the chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary ⁵ make it clear that the amendment was intended only to impose the same liability for a prisoner's escape from the designated facilities as for the prisoner's escape from the correctional institution from which he had been transferred. Cf. United States v. Wood, 628 F.2d 554, 560 (D.C.Cir.1979); United States v. Powell, 503 F.2d 195, 196 (D.C.Cir.1974).

A 1980 amendment to General Statutes § 53a-169 entitled "An Act Concerning Escape from a Correctional Institution," further clarified the legislative intent that a person is guilty of escape "from any public or private nonprofit half-way house, group home or mental health facility" only if "he is in the custody of the commissioner of correction or is required to be returned to the custody of said commissioner upon his release." Public Acts 1980, No. 80-216 § 2; 23 S.Proc., Pt. 8, 1980 Sess., p. 2475. For example, a person committed to the commissioner of mental health pursuant to a conviction for a crime involving dependency-producing drugs ⁶ is "deemed to have been committed to a correctional institution during any period of hospitalization ... and an unauthorized departure from the hospital shall be an escape within the terms of section 53a-169." General Statutes § 19-485(e).

The defendant was not in a "correctional institution" within the meaning of General Statutes §§ 1-1(w) and 53a-169 at the time of his escape. Furthermore, the legislative history of § 53a-169 ⁷ indicates that, in order to be guilty of an escape under § 53a-169 as amended to 1979, an individual who escapes from "any public or private, nonprofit...