State v. Delestre

Citation35 A.3d 886
Decision Date12 January 2012
Docket NumberNo. 2009–175–C.A.,2009–175–C.A.
PartiesSTATE v. Gilbert DELESTRE.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Providence Superior County, Netti C. Vogel, Associate Justice.Lauren S. Zurier, Department of Attorney General, for State.

Robert B. Mann, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Justice ROBINSON, for the Court.

On December 4, 2008, a Providence County Superior Court jury found the defendant, Gilbert Delestre, guilty of second-degree murder and of conspiracy to commit the offense of murder. He was thereafter sentenced to consecutive terms of (1) life imprisonment at the Adult Correctional Institutions as a result of the second-degree murder conviction and (2) ten years at the same institution as a result of the conspiracy conviction.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial justice erred in instructing the jury concerning the concept of aiding and abetting; he argues that certain language in the jury instructions “created a presumption which violated the defendant's right to due process of the law.”

The defendant also argues that the trial justice erred in declining to give a unanimity instruction to the jury with respect to the murder charge; he contends that the jury should have been told that, if it were to find defendant guilty, it must be unanimous as to the theory supporting such a finding of guilt— i.e., whether defendant was guilty either as a principal, or as an aider and abettor, or as a coconspirator.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel
AThe Events of October 29 and 30, 2004 1

The criminal prosecution that gave rise to the instant appeal was the result of the tragic death of three-year-old Thomas J. Wright 2 on October 31, 2004.

In October of 2004, defendant and Katherine Bunnell were living in an apartment in Woonsocket with their own two children (Daziya and Destiny) 3 and with Ms. Bunnell's three nephews (David, Mickey, and T.J. Wright).

On the evening of October 29, 2004, defendant and Ms. Bunnell hired a fifteen-year-old high school student, Kayla, to babysit for the five children so that the couple (accompanied by defendant's cousin) could go to a nightclub in nearby Milford, Massachusetts.

When defendant and Ms. Bunnell returned to their Woonsocket home in the early morning hours of October 30 after their night out, Ms. Bunnell exited the car in which they had traveled to and from the nightclub and went into the apartment, while defendant and his cousin remained in the car and continued the conversation in which they had been engaged. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Bunnell appeared at the doorway of the apartment and yelled to defendant to “get the f* * * back in here and clean the mess that the baby made.” The defendant then entered the apartment.

According to the trial testimony of Kayla (the babysitter), she was asleep when defendant and Ms. Bunnell returned from their night out and was awakened by the shouts of Ms. Bunnell and defendant in the apartment. The babysitter testified that Ms. Bunnell was yelling: “What happened to my f* * * house?” She added that defendant was repeating: “Look, the house is a mess again. Look at the f* * * floor, [it] is a mess again.” Kayla testified that she then noticed that T.J. was no longer on the couch where he had been sleeping; she also observed that some “milk and yogurt in a bowl” were on the floor and that “the bowl was tipped over a little bit.” Kayla advised Ms. Bunnell that T.J. may have been responsible for the “mess.”

Kayla testified that, after yelling about the mess, defendant went upstairs; the babysitter added that, from her position on the first floor, she heard the sound of “loud slaps” coming from upstairs. Kayla testified that, after hearing the slaps, she heard T.J. crying; she said that she then observed Ms. Bunnell going upstairs. The babysitter stated that she did not follow Ms. Bunnell upstairs; it was her testimony, however, that she could hear Ms. Bunnell asking: “What did you do to my house?”

Kayla testified that Ms. Bunnell then carried T.J. by his upper arms down the stairs. Kayla stated that, when Ms. Bunnell reached the bottom of the stairs, she let go of T.J., causing him to fall to the floor. It was the babysitter's further testimony that, at that point in time, as Ms. Bunnell “grabbed [T.J.] by his wrist and yanked him up off the floor,” defendant came downstairs. Kayla stated that Ms. Bunnell began yelling while asking T.J. “why he [had] made a mess on [the] f* * * floor.” According to Kayla, Ms. Bunnell repeatedly hit T.J. on his face, back, and chest. Kayla stated that, each time that T.J. was hit, he would fall to the ground—and that Ms. Bunnell would then pick him back up by his wrist.

Kayla further testified that Ms. Bunnell then “pulled [T.J.] over” to the closet by his wrist and poured milk on his head while defendant watched from three to four feet away. The babysitter testified that Ms. Bunnell was also yelling: “You want to waste my milk? This is what happens when you waste my f* * * milk.” The defendant did not do or say anything at that time.

Kayla testified that Ms. Bunnell then began to look for her car keys so that she could drive the babysitter home. The babysitter testified that at that moment she turned around and observed “T.J. * * * coming towards [Ms. Bunnell] like he was in the air and falling towards the floor * * *.” She added that the child ultimately fell in front of Ms. Bunnell. Kayla testified that, during the just-described incident, T.J. was at least three feet off the ground; she added that, as T.J. was “flying through the air,” defendant was near the closet door and his “arms were falling back down to his side” 4 Kayla stated that, when T.J. landed, his face hit the ground and he landed on his stomach with his leg twisted underneath him. Kayla further testified that Ms. Bunnell then picked the child up by his wrists and that defendant stated: “You better get him out of here before I f* * * drop him. 5 (Emphasis added.)

Ms. Bunnell then left the apartment in order to drive Kayla home. The defendant testified that, after the departure of Kayla and Ms. Bunnell, he “back-handed” T.J., which resulted in the boy falling down eight to ten stairs.

Subsequently, defendant's cousin, who had spent the evening with defendant and Ms. Bunnell, came into the apartment. When the cousin observed T.J.'s condition, he called for an ambulance.

Thereafter, emergency responders arrived at the apartment. T.J., who was unconscious and who, in the words of a fire department rescue responder, looked like “someone who had been in a boxing match,” was transported to the nearby Landmark Medical Center.

BThe Subsequent Events

T.J. was subsequently transferred from Landmark Medical Center to Hasbro Children's Hospital in Providence, where he died on October 31, 2004 “as a result of brain injuries and displaced fracture of the left femur due to blunt force trauma.” After conducting an autopsy, an assistant medical examiner in the Rhode Island Department of Health categorized T.J.'s manner of death as a homicide.

CThe Indictment, the Trial, and the Verdict

On January 21, 2005, a Providence County grand jury indicted defendant for the murder of T.J., in violation of G.L.1956 §§ 11–23–1 and 11–23–2; he was also indicted for conspiracy to commit murder, in violation of G.L.1956 §§ 11–1–6 and 11–23–1. On November 19, 2008, defendant's trial began in the Superior Court for Providence County; the trial lasted for approximately three weeks.

On December 4, 2008, the jury found defendant not guilty of the first-degree murder of T.J., but it found him guilty of the second-degree murder of the young boy and of conspiracy to commit the murder.

DThe Jury Instructions Challenged on Appeal

After the trial justice instructed the jury, defendant objected to several aspects of the instructions; on appeal, defendant focuses on two of the objections that he articulated at trial— viz., (1) his objection concerning the trial justice's aiding-and-abetting instruction and (2) his objection concerning the trial justice's declining to instruct the jury that, if it were to find defendant guilty, there needed to be unanimity as to the theory supporting that finding.

The defendant's first appellate issue concerns the last sentence of the trial justice's instruction on aiding and abetting. That sentence reads as follows:

“A person who aids or abets is held responsible for the natural or reasonable, or probably [ sic ] consequences of any act if he knowingly and intentionally aided or which he assisted or participated.”

The defendant's second appellate contention is that the trial justice erred in declining to give the following instruction that defense counsel had proposed:

“In order for you to convict the defendant of murder, you must unanimously agree on the theory upon which you base your decision. In other words, all twelve of you must agree that the defendant was guilty as a principal, or all twelve of you must agree that the defendant was guilty as an aider and abettor, or all twelve of you must agree that the defendant was guilty as a coconspirator.” (Emphasis added.)

IIStandard of Review

It is well established that we review challenged jury instructions in a de novo manner. State v. Adefusika, 989 A.2d 467, 475 (R.I.2010); see also State v. Cipriano, 21 A.3d 408, 423 (R.I.2011); State v. Palmer, 962 A.2d 758, 764 (R.I.2009); State v. Graham, 941 A.2d 848, 855 (R.I.2008). In conducting that review, “it is our role to examine the instructions in their entirety to ascertain the manner in which a jury of ordinary intelligent lay people would have understood them * * *.” State v. John, 881 A.2d 920, 929 (R.I.2005) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Adefusika, 989 A.2d at 475; State v. Cardin, 987 A.2d 248, 250 (R.I.2010); State v. Ventre, 910 A.2d 190, 197 (R.I...

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