State v. Demerritt
| Decision Date | 30 December 1953 |
| Citation | 103 A.2d 106,149 Me. 380 |
| Parties | STATE v. DEMERRITT. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Henry H. Hastings, County Atty., Bethel, for plaintiff.
Berman & Berman, Lewiston, for defendant.
Before MERRILL, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, WILLIAMSON, and WEBBER, JJ.
This is an indictment in Oxford County Superior Court for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. It comes to the Law Court on respondent's exceptions to the sustaining of the State's demurrer to respondent's special plea in bar, and exceptions to the denial of the respondent's motion for a directed verdict.
The respondent, Carroll Demerritt, then Chief of Police of the town of Rumford, Maine, was indicted by the Grand Jury at the November Term, 1952 for operating a car on Waldo Street in Rumford, November 2, 1952, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The indictment was returned on November 13, 1952. The respondent was tried and the jury found a verdict of guilty.
The alleged act took place a few minutes after midnight on Saturday November 1, 1952 near '210 Club' so-called, where local police officers, a deputy sheriff and several State liquor inspectors were busily engaged in the investigation of alleged violations of the liquor law at the Club, and were making search of the premises. The County Attorney was in the neighborhood. The respondent drove his car to a point about the center of the street near the place where the officers were investigating, and where many civilian spectators had gathered.
Wilfred J. Bouffard, a local storekeeper, testified that when the respondent drove up On the Tuesday following this early Sunday morning episode, the respondent told Bouffard at his store,
After speaking to one or more of the officers who came into the street, and after a deputy sheriff had told him to 'take off,' the respondent drove away. No arrest of the respondent was made on this Sunday morning, November 2, 1952. State Police Officer Weeks, who was with the County Attorney from 1:30 A.M. until 4:15 A.M. on Sunday morning, stated that they 'cruised around' looking for the respondent, but did not call at his house, and did not find him. No warrant was applied for at the Municipal Court although the respondent (with other police officers of Rumford) was present in line of duty, when the Municipal Court was in session on Monday, November 3, 1952.
At the November Term of the Superior Court an indictment was found by the Grand Jury against the respondent, and returned eleven days after the alleged act.
Before the trial at the November, 1952 term, the respondent filed a special plea in bar, praying judgment for the respondent, and setting forth as grounds for the special plea in bar, a violation of the respondent's constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, and under Article I, §§ 1 and 6 of the Constitution of the State of Maine.
The respondent's claim of infringement of his constitutional rights was based upon the fact that the State permitted a period of eleven days to intervene between the alleged date of commission of the offense and the arrest of the respondent under the indictment. The respondent claims that such delay made it impossible for him to avail himself of his right to request a blood test under Section 121, Chapter 19 of Revised Statutes of Maine, 1944.
The Superior Court has original concurrent jurisdiction with Municipal Courts and trial justices over prosecutions for the offense of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor. R.S.1944, Chapter 19, §§ 121 and 134; State v. Boynton, 143 Me. 313, 322, 62 A.2d 182.
The only bar to prosecutions under this statute with regard to lapse of time is the statute of limitations. The limitation is six years. R.S.1944, Chapter 132, § 17; State v. Boynton, 143 Me. 313, 322, 62 A.2d 182; State v. Thompson, 143 Me. 326, 62 A.2d 190. There is no inherent or constitutional right to drive a dangerous automobile on the highway, and whether one shall be permitted to exercise the right and under what conditions and restrictions is a matter for the legislature. State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62, 75 A. 295, 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 502. It is only when the State's evidence is so weak or defective that a verdict of guilty cannot be sustained that a motion for a directed verdict should be allowed. State v. Cady, 82 Me. 426, 19 A. 908; State v. Sullivan, 146 Me. 381, 82 A.2d 629.
The respondent contends that both under the State and Federal Constitutions the verdict below should be set aside and that he should be discharged. The question presented to this Court is whether the State, through the fact that the County Attorney, several deputy sheriffs and several police officers had an opportunity to see the respondent, and did not then arrest him for the offense of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, deprived the respondent of his right to have a blood test. 'By lulling him into a feeling of security' the respondent claims, he was deprived of a right. In other words, whether or not an indication that an automobile driver, who may be under the influence of intoxicating liquor, will not now be arrested is a violation of constitutional rights to secure a blood test.
The pertinent part of the blood test statute in question, reads as follows:
Revised Statutes, 1944, Chapter 19, § 121.
The Constitution of the United States, which the respondent claims was violated, is the Fourteenth Amendment, the pertinent part of which is as follows:
'Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'
The sections of our State Constitution are Article I, § 1, which read as follows:
'All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.'
and parts of Section 6 of this same Article are as follows:
'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself and his counsel, or either, at his election;
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'To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
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The respondent's affirmative rights under the State and Federal Constitutions are not determined by the evidence against him. If there is a violation of a constitutional right the respondent is entitled to a discharge. State v. King, 123 Me. 256, 122 A. 578...
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