State v. Demus
Decision Date | 19 June 1996 |
Citation | 141 Or.App. 509,919 P.2d 1182 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Appellant, v. Marian DEMUS, Respondent. TC94-12455; CA A86918. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Jonathan H. Fussner, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General.
John Henry Hingson III, Oregon City, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.
Before RIGGS, P.J., and LANDAU and LEESON, JJ.
The state appeals from a pretrial order granting defendant's motion to suppress field sobriety tests and all derivative evidence. We affirm.
We recite the facts as presented by testimony at the suppression hearing and as found by the trial court. Shortly before 2:30 a.m. on May 21, 1994, Officer Shellans saw defendant's car as it turned onto State Highway 26, a four-lane divided highway, and accelerated to highway speed going west in an eastbound lane. Shellans followed, driving his patrol car in a westbound lane. After about six-tenths of a mile, defendant stopped his car, drove across the grass median strip onto a westbound lane and again accelerated to highway speed. Shellans turned on the overhead lights of his patrol car, and defendant promptly and safely pulled off the road and stopped.
When Shellans approached defendant's car, defendant said, "I know I shouldn't be driving, I made a mistake." Shellans immediately smelled a moderate odor of alcohol on defendant's breath and noted that defendant's eyes were bloodshot and watery and that his speech was slightly slurred. In response to Shellans' inquiry about whether he had been drinking, defendant said that he had consumed seven or eight pints of beer between 5:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. Defendant did not have a driver's license and informed Shellans that he was visiting from another state. Shellans also observed that, in attempting to produce his automobile registration, defendant passed over it three times even though it was clearly visible to Shellans from outside the car. Shellans "asked [defendant] if he would step from his vehicle to submit to a series of field sobriety tests and he agreed." Shellans did not, however, advise defendant of the consequences of refusing to perform those tests. See ORS 813.135 to ORS 813.136 ( ).
After conducting several field sobriety tests, Shellans arrested defendant for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010, and read him Miranda warnings. Shellans then took defendant to the Sandy Police Department, where defendant registered a blood alcohol level of .069 percent on an Intoxilyzer test.
On appeal, the state offers alternative theories for why the trial court's ruling was error. First, it argues that State v. Nagel, 320 Or. 24, 880 P.2d 451 (1994), does not require that an officer have probable cause before conducting field sobriety tests where, as here, the officer does not advise the driver of the adverse consequences of refusal and the driver voluntarily performs those tests. Alternatively, it argues that Shellans had probable cause to conduct a search by means of field sobriety tests. See id. at 31-32, 36-37, 880 P.2d 451 ( ).
We have carefully reviewed the trial court record, including the audio tape of the suppression hearing, and conclude that the state's first theory is presented for the first time on appeal. 1 See State v. Hickmann, 273 Or. 358, 360, 540 P.2d 1406 (1975), cited in State v. Fish, 321 Or. 48, 59, 893 P.2d 1023 (1995) ( ). Consequently, we address only the issue of whether Shellans had probable cause to require defendant to perform field sobriety tests.
In Nagel, the Supreme Court held that the state had not run afoul of the prohibitions against unreasonable searches contained in the state and federal constitutions, because the officer had conducted field sobriety tests "with probable cause and under exigent circumstances," which is one of the recognized exceptions to the search warrant requirement. 320 Or. at 31-32, 36-37, 880 P.2d 451. Under that exception, an officer must subjectively believe that the defendant was driving under the influence of intoxicants, and that belief must be objectively reasonable, before the officer may administer field sobriety tests. Id. at 32, 880 P.2d 451.
In this case, there is no disagreement about whether exigent circumstances existed. See id. at 33, 880...
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...the field sobriety tests the officer did, indeed, have such a subjective belief." Defendant relies on our holding in State v. Demus, 141 Or.App. 509, 919 P.2d 1182 (1996), to support her argument. In that case, we held that the trial court's finding that the officer did not have subjective ......
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