State v. Dendurent, DUC-3776
Decision Date | 15 November 1983 |
Docket Number | No. DUC-3776,DUC-3776 |
Citation | 669 P.2d 361,64 Or.App. 575 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. William Dean DENDURENT, Appellant. ; CA A27002. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Roger Hennagin, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Thomas H. Denney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and William F. Gary, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Before GILLETTE, P.J., and WARDEN and YOUNG, JJ.
Defendant appeals his conviction for DUII. He contends that he should have been considered for diversion under ORS 484.445 et seq. He assigns as error the trial court ruling that he had the burden to prove his eligibility for diversion by showing that the present DUII offense did not involve "an accident required to be reported under ORS 483.606," the trial court's denial of his petition for diversion and the trial court's enforcement of ORS 484.450(4)(d). He contends that application of that statute violates his rights to equal protection of the law, guaranteed by Article I, Section 20 of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and his privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
On July 7, 1982, defendant was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 484.450, and with failure to leave his name and address at the scene of an accident that resulted in property damage. ORS 483.602. Defendant filed a petition for DUII diversion. ORS 484.450(1). The District Attorney contested the petition, ORS 484.450(3), on the ground that defendant had been involved in an accident that had to be reported and, therefore, under the terms of ORS 484.450(4)(d), was not qualified for diversion.
At the hearing on the petition for diversion, the trial court ruled that it was defendant's burden to prove that the accident did not have to be reported under ORS 483.606. Defendant refused to take the stand or present any evidence for the same reasons urged in this appeal. The trial court then denied defendant's diversion petition on the basis of its finding that he had been involved in a property damage accident and had failed to prove that he was not required to report it. ORS 484.450(4)(d). Defendant was convicted of DUII. The complaint charging defendant with failure to report a property damage accident was dismissed. This appeal followed.
ORS 484.450 provides (1) procedures for applying for DUII diversion, (2) the District Attorney's duties in receiving and objecting to petitions and (3) the exceptions to eligibility for diversion. Subsections (3) and (4) of the statute provide:
ORS 484.450(4) unambiguously confers discretion on the trial court to grant or deny a petition for diversion, unless the defendant is disqualified under one of the exceptions listed in the subsection. See State v. Wright, 63 Or.App. 482, 664 P.2d 1131 (1983). Defendant's argument that "all persons are entitled to an initial diversion" is therefore patently incorrect.
Equally spurious is defendant's argument that, because the District Attorney typically presents evidence under exceptions (a), (b), and (c), he must therefore present evidence to show that defendant is disqualified under exception (d). In most cases, the information at issue under exception (d) is more accessible to the DUII defendant seeking diversion than it is to the prosecutor. Neither the statutory scheme of ORS 484.455 et seq., nor any other particular statute, compels the conclusion that the district attorney must prove defendant disqualified under exception (d).
The trial court is required to exercise its discretion to grant or deny diversion in a principled manner. There was no error, however, in requiring defendant--who had to...
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Dyrdahl v. Dmv, CV03080087; A124857.
...and that, even then, successful completion of the program is not assured. Id. at 569 n. 4, 723 P.2d 338; see also State v. Dendurent, 64 Or.App. 575, 578, 669 P.2d 361 (1983) (stating that the argument that "`all persons are entitled to an initial diversion' is * * * patently incorrect"). A......
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State v. Thomas
...to diversion. We disagree. The decision to grant or deny diversion is within the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Dendurent, 64 Or.App. 575, 578, 669 P.2d 361, rev. den., 296 Or. 56, 672 P.2d 1192 (1983); State v. Wright, 63 Or.App. 482, 484, 664 P.2d 1131 (1983). 1 ORS 813.220 "......
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State v. Beebe
...bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. State v. Robinson, 217 Or. 612, 343 P.2d 886 (1959); State v. Dendurent, 64 Or.App. 575, 669 P.2d 361 rev. den. 296 Or. 56 (1983). State v. Elmore, 24 Or.App. 651, 546 P.2d 1117 (1976). The legislature may legitimately deter......
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State v. Maynard
...with or without counsel's advice. See Erickson v. Municipal Court Judge, 71 Or.App. 339, 343-44, 692 P.2d 628 (1984); State v. Dendurent, 64 Or.App. 575, 579, 669 P.2d 361, rev. den. 296 Or. 56, 672 P.2d 1192 (1983). The effect of defendant's previous participation in a diversion program is......