State v. Denny
Decision Date | 25 August 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 2-876A287,2-876A287 |
Citation | 409 N.E.2d 652 |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant, v. Forest L. DENNY and Roberta Denny (H&W), Appellees. |
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., John P. Avery, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellant.
Norman E. Brennan, Indianapolis, for appellees.
1
This cause was remanded to this court by the decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana, State v. Denny, (1980) Ind., 406 N.E.2d 240. In conformity with the instruction on remand, the opinion of this court rendered June 27, 1978 2 is ordered vacated and we readdress the sole issue raised by the State of Indiana in its appeal from the judgment entered in an eminent domain action: Whether the interest awarded the appellees, landowners, was correctly computed. We affirm.
The record shows the following sequence of events:
Jan. 11,1960 Complaint filed Feb. 15,1960 Appraisers' report filed (damages $19,314.00) Feb. 15,1960 State's expections to appraisers' report filed Mar. 4,1960 State deposits the sum of $19,314.00 with court; gains right to enter upon property. Jan. 29,1970 Landowner posts sufficient security, withdraws funds on deposit. Oct. 16,1975 Trial commenced. Oct. 17,1975 Jury awards landowners damages in the amount of $8,000.00. Oct. 18,1975 State files notice that it had offered landowners damages in the amount of $7,597.00. Oct. 18,1975- Parties and court have informal April 20,1976 discussions on interest to be awarded. April 20,1976 Court enters judgment with 4% simple interest on the verdict from March 4, 1960 until January 29, 1970 ($3,226.00).
The State argues that interest should be paid only on the sum of $403.00, the difference between its final offer and the jury's verdict, since at the time of judgment Section 8 of Acts of 1905, ch. 48, the Eminent Domain Act of 1905, had been amended by Acts of 1975, P.L. 301, § 1, to provide in part:
The State contends, without citation of authority, that since the above statute was in effect at the time of judgment interest on the award must be computed as provided therein. Thus, it concludes, interest should not be paid on that amount of the verdict that represents the State's final offer to the landowners prior to initiation of the condemnation proceedings.
We need not delve too deeply into the history of the eminent domain act to decide this appeal. We might note that because this action was tried on the State's exceptions to the appraisers' award the landowners were unable to withdraw any of the deposit prior to July 6, 1961, the effective date of Acts of 1961, ch. 317, § 1, but they were entitled to interest on the verdict. Schnull v. Indianapolis Union Railway Company, (1921) 190 Ind. 572, 581, 131 N.E. 51, 53. We might also note that the aforementioned 1961 Act amended IC 1971, 32-11-1-8, to empower a property owner either to withdraw the deposit by posting surety and forfeiting his right to interest on that portion of the verdict or to not withdraw the deposit and collect interest on the entire verdict. State v. Young, (1964) 246 Ind. 52, 199 N.E.2d 694, 698. In short, under the operative law during the period for which the judgment in this case awards interest (1960-1970) the landowners either could not withdraw the deposit at all or could do so only by posting surety. No interest was awarded for any time after the effective date of the 1975 amendment.
The State contends, without citation of authority, that interest on the judgment should be allowed in conformity with IC 1971, § 32-11-1-8, as it existed on the date judgment was entered. The further contention is that since the statute now both permits a landowner to withdraw the amount of the State's final purchase order without posting surety and prohibits an award of interest on any amount that can be withdrawn without posting surety,...
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