State v. Deputy

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Writing for the Court: QUILLEN; DUFFY
• Citation: State v. Deputy, 433 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1981)
• Decision Date: 26 January 1981
• Parties: The STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Andre Stanley DEPUTY, Defendant Below, Appellee.

Page 1040

433 A.2d 1040

The STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Andre Stanley DEPUTY, Defendant Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted Jan. 26, 1981. ^*

Decided July 21, 1981.

Dana C. Reed, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dover (Argued), for plaintiff-appellant.

Dean C. Johnson, Dover (Argued), for defendant-appellee.

Before DUFFY, McNEILLY and QUILLEN, JJ.

QUILLEN, Justice:

This is an appeal from a Superior Court order suppressing evidence in a murder prosecution. The appeal arises under our statute which permits the State to appeal in criminal cases under certain circumstances. ¹ The pertinent facts are as follows:

On February 7, 1979, the Delaware State Police began investigating the brutal murders of Bayard and Alberta Smith, an elderly couple found stabbed to death in their own home. The nature and severity of the crime indicated to the police that more than one killer may have been involved. Within hours the police obtained probable cause to arrest one William Henry Flamer. ² While processing Flamer's arrest warrant, the police received information concerning Flamer's immediate whereabouts. Acting on this information, the police found Flamer, defendant-appellee Andre Deputy, and a third adult male walking on the shoulder of a highway. All three were stopped, frisked, and given Miranda warnings. Flamer was arrested. When asked his name and where he was from, Deputy responded in what the police described as an "evasive" manner. While the police did not know it at the time, Deputy in fact lied about his identity. Because of his unsatisfactory responses to the questions, the nature of the crime, and his conceivable involvement with Flamer, the police took Deputy to the Troop 5 police station for further questioning. Flamer and the third person were also taken to Troop 5. The police specifically "detained" Deputy and the third person. As distinct from Flamer, the police did not purport to arrest them.

At Troop 5, the police placed the three men in separate offices for questioning. Detective Porter, after giving Deputy Miranda warnings, found on Deputy a wallet belonging to one of the victims, two watches (one of which was later identified as one of the victims'), and a sum of money. At this moment, if not before, in another room, Flamer implicated Deputy in the murder. Detective Callaway, who had been interrogating Flamer, then arrested Deputy for murder in the first degree. Later, Flamer told Detective Porter that Deputy was wanted for a prior murder in Wilmington. Detective Chaffinch confirmed this with the Wilmington police and arrested Deputy as a fugitive from the City of Wilmington.

The following day, February 8, 1979, after signing a waiver of rights, Deputy took a polygraph test, which indicated that he was not telling the truth with respect to his involvement in the murder. After the testing, the police questioned Deputy again, at which time he admitted that he was present in the victims' home when, according to Deputy, Flamer stabbed Mr. Smith. Sometime during the middle of the day, Deputy was taken before a magistrate and arraigned. At approximately 9:00 p. m. on the same day, after again receiving Miranda warnings, Deputy made a taped statement in which he admitted killing Alberta Smith.

Deputy was subsequently indicted for murder in the first degree, possession of a deadly weapon during commission of a felony, robbery in the first degree, and theft-felony. By letter opinion, the Superior Court suppressed, among other things, the wallet, watches, and cash found on Deputy, as well as the statements made by him on February 7th and 8th, determining that, among other things, he was wrongfully detained under 11 Del.C. § 1902 "because there was no reasonable basis to suspect that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime." The case was dismissed after the State certified that this evidence was essential for Deputy's prosecution. The State has appealed from that portion of the suppression order relating to the property found on Deputy and his statements. We confine our opinion to the lawfulness of the detention.

The State disputes the Superior Court's decision and contends that, under § 1902, the police had reasonable grounds to suspect Deputy's involvement in the murder, and that he was properly detained when his answers in response to questioning were unsatisfactory.

Deputy maintains that no reasonable basis to suspect existed for his initial stop and, accordingly, the subsequent evidence is inadmissible as "fruits of the poisonous tree". Deputy also argues that his detention was violative of the rule stated in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), which excludes evidence obtained from custodial questioning undertaken without probable cause.

In 1951, Delaware enacted the Uniform Arrest Act which included the current 11 Del.C. § 1902. 48 Del.Laws, c. 304. This is a special provision of the Act, herein sometimes referred to as the detention statute, which deals with the questioning and detaining of suspects. It reads as follows:

" § 1902. Questioning and detaining suspects.

(a) A peace officer may stop any person abroad, or in a public place, who he has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his name, address, business abroad and where he is going.

(b) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.

(c) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed 2 hours. The detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record. At the end of the detention the person so detained shall be released or be arrested and charged with a crime."

It seems clear to us from the face of the statute alone that the standard of "reasonable ground to suspect" was intended as a lesser standard than "probable cause to arrest". Subsection (b) makes it clear that the seizure contemplated may be investigatory. Subsection (c) makes it clear that it was expressly contemplated that there may not be sufficient grounds to arrest the person detained. Moreover, the context of the whole Uniform Arrest Act emphasizes the lesser standard for detention, as an arrest is lawful when there is "reasonable ground to believe" the person has committed a crime. 11 Del.C. § 1904.

While the language of the statute is clear on its face, our conclusion as to the lesser standard is reinforced by a contemporaneous written expression by the reporter of the committee who drafted the Act. See Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va.L.Rev. 315 (1942). That article, which seems incredibly current and reflective of good common sense, makes it clear that the very purpose of the detention statute was to legalize, without probable cause, the questioning and detention of persons where the express criteria of the statute are met. See Warner, supra, 28 Va.L.Rev. at 320-24.

Unfortunately, isolated case law has not been as precise on this threshold point as seems clear to us today. In particular, this Court's opinion in De Salvatore v. State, Del.Supr., 163 A.2d 244, 248-49 (1960) has caused some confusion. It equated "reasonable ground to suspect" with "reasonable ground to believe". The passing comments in that case, totally unnecessary to the decision (because "reasonable grounds to believe" were found, 163 A.2d at 249), were made without detailed scrutiny of the statutory language or its history. For other confusing language, see Wilson v. State, Del.Supr., 109 A.2d 381, 390 (1954).

We do not think, however, that there has been any confusion as to the meaning of the statute in practice over the years. Our Court has repeatedly distinguished detention under the detention statute from a probable cause arrest. See Cannon v. State, Del.Supr., 168 A.2d 108, 109-10 (1961) where arrest and detention are distinguished; Jarvis v. State, Del.Supr., 224 A.2d 596, 598 (1966) where defendant, because not abroad, was arrested rather than detained; State v. Bowden, Del.Supr., 273 A.2d 481, 483 (1971) where detention and arrest, and the statutory standard attached to each, are distinguished as separate ways to apprehend without a warrant; Lewis v. State, Del.Supr., 305 A.2d 617, 618 (1973) where a pre-arrest protective search was made while suspects were detained under § 1902; Young v. State, Del.Supr., 339 A.2d 723, 724-25 (1975) where suspects were detained with "sufficient justification", but "released without arrest" at the end of the two-hour detention period, and where a television set seized when the suspects were detained was suppressed for want of probable cause; Cook v. State, Del.Supr., 374 A.2d 264, 266 (1977) where weapons frisks of defendants detained under the detention statute were upheld; Foraker v. State, Del.Supr., 394 A.2d 208, 213 (1978) where an apprehension, not a detention under § 1902 because the defendant was not "stopped while travelling abroad", was nevertheless upheld as an arrest since "reasonable grounds to believe defendant committed a felony" existed. See also State v. Smith, Del.Super., 91 A.2d 188, 190 (1952) where defendant was detained but not arrested; State v. Klinehoffer, Del.Super., 173 A.2d 478, 480 (1961) where defendant was arrested, not detained; State v. De Koenigswarter, Del.Super., 177 A.2d 344, 346* (1962) where "a person detained for questioning must be arrested or released at the end of two hours"; State v. Moore, Del.Super., 187 A.2d 807 (1963) where the concepts of "stops", "frisks", and "arrests" were examined at some length; State v. Lynch, Del.Super., 274 A.2d 443, 445 (1971) where it was noted, citing the statute, that our law recognizes situations where an "arrest is not required for a detention"; State v. Wrightson, Del.Super., 391 A.2d 227, 229 (1978) where detention and arrest...