State v. Detter

• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: COPELAND; BROCK
• Citation: State v. Detter, 260 S.E.2d 567, 298 N.C. 604 (N.C. 1979)
• Decision Date: 04 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. 2,2
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Rebecca Case DETTER.

Page 567

260 S.E.2d 567

298 N.C. 604

STATE of North Carolina v. Rebecca Case DETTER.

No. 2.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 4, 1979.

John J. Schramm, Jr., and David B. Hough, Winston Salem, for defendant.

Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen. Isaac T. Avery, III, and Asst. Atty. Gen. Joan H. Byers, Raleigh, for the State.

COPELAND, Justice.

Defendant has properly presented twenty-three assignments of error to this Court.

By her first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial judge erred in denying her two motions for a bill of particulars pursuant to G.S. 15A-925.

G.S. 15A-925 provides in relevant part that:

"(b) A motion for a bill of particulars must request and specify items of factual information desired by the defendant which pertain to the charge and which are not recited in the pleading, and must allege that the defendant cannot adequately prepare or conduct his defense without such information.

(c) If any or all of the items of information requested are necessary to enable the defendant adequately to prepare or conduct his defense, the court must order the State to file and serve a bill of particulars. Nothing contained in this section authorizes an order for a bill of particulars which requires the State to recite matters of evidence."

With respect to a motion for a bill of particulars, we have stated that under G.S. 15A-925:

"The function of such a bill of particulars is (1) to inform the defense of the specific occurrences intended to be investigated on the trial and (2) to limit the course of the evidence to the particular scope of inquiry. (Citations omitted.)

The granting or denial of motions for a bill of particulars is within the discretion of the court and is not subject to review except for palpable and gross abuse thereof. " State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 391, 226 S.E.2d 652, 660 (1976), Quoting State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 603, 213 S.E.2d 238, 242 (1975), Death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 903, 96 S.Ct. 3206, 49 L.Ed.2d 1208 (1976).

In her first motion for a bill of particulars defendant sought disclosure of the date of her husband's death; the cause of death; the method and manner in which the State alleges the murder occurred; the identity of the murder weapon; the time and place of any overt acts of the defendant alleged to have resulted in her husband's death; the time, location and parties involved in the acts which were the proximate cause of his death; the source and brand name of any poisons administered to him; how such poison was administered; whether the poison was administered in one dose or several doses; and what particular doses the State alleges the defendant administered.

Defendant's contention that it was erroneous for the trial judge to deny this motion has no merit whatsoever. The record discloses that on 17 March 1978 the trial judge granted in part defendant's discovery motion and ordered the State to disclose the following: All statements, written or oral, made by defendant to police officers and any other persons; a transcript of recorded statements made by defendant; tangible physical evidence in the State's possession which it intended to introduce into evidence; results of all tests conducted on the deceased's body samples and on any other physical or tangible evidence the State intended to introduce into evidence; and the complete autopsy report. The order also required the State to make available to defendant, and any medical experts retained by her, the deceased's body samples for testing at the State Toxicology Laboratory. All the information requested by defendant in her first motion for a bill of particulars was contained in the above material that she received during pretrial discovery.

For example, the date and cause of death are listed in the autopsy report. The murder weapon (arsenic), the method and manner in which the killing occurred, the brand name and source of arsenic (Terro Ant Killer), the parties involved, and the fact that the arsenic was administered by defendant by placing it in his food and in his ice tea were all discussed in the tape recorded conversations defendant had with witness Brooks and witness Christy. Information on the levels of arsenic detected in the deceased's body samples are contained in the autopsy report and the laboratory test results. Defendant obtained this wealth of information during discovery and certainly she was fully aware of the "specific occurrences intended to be investigated on the trial." State v. Swift, supra at 391, 226 S.E.2d at 660, Quoting State v. McLaughlin, supra at 603, 213 S.E.2d at 242. She had the information she needed to adequately prepare and conduct her defense as required by G.S. 15A-925. See, State v. Porth, 269 N.C. 329, 153 S.E.2d 10 (1967), in which we held that since defendant was given copies of the autopsy report and other documents which adequately disclosed the basis of the State's case it was not error for the trial judge to deny the motion for a bill of particulars.

In defendant's second motion for a bill of particulars, she sought disclosure of a list of witnesses that the State intended to call at trial. Defendant is not entitled, under G.S. 15A-903 or any former statute or the common law, to a list of State's witnesses. State v. Sledge, 297 N.C. 227, 254 S.E.2d 579 (1979); State v. Abernathy, 295 N.C. 147, 244 S.E.2d 373 (1978); State v. Carter, 289 N.C. 35, 220 S.E.2d 313 (1975), Death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 3212, 49 L.Ed.2d 1211 (1976); State v. Spaulding, 288 N.C. 397, 219 S.E.2d 178 [298 N.C. 613] (1975), Death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 3212, 49 L.Ed.2d 1211 (1976). This assignment of error is overruled.

By her third assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in limiting the discovery of the statements made by defendant. Witnesses Brooks, Holly, Christy and Boyd gave statements to Officer Grindstaff. The trial judge, presumably pursuant to G.S. 15A-903(a) (2), ordered that those witnesses' statements be disclosed to defendant to the extent they contained remarks made by defendant to those witnesses. Defendant obtained a list of remarks she had allegedly made to those witnesses concerning her desire to kill her husband but she did not obtain any information regarding the time of or place where the statements were made nor was there any indication as to whom each statement was allegedly made. Defendant contends that it was error to so limit this discovery of statements made by defendant.

G.S. 15A-903(a)(2) requires disclosure of "any oral statement made by the defendant which the State intends to offer in evidence at the trial." G.S. 15A-904(a) states that, "Except as provided in G.S. 15A-903(a), (b), (c) and (e), this Article does not require the production of . . . statements made by witnesses or prospective witnesses of the State to anyone acting on behalf of the State." This statute is an express restriction on pretrial discovery of witnesses' statements that a trial judge has no authority to exceed in his discovery order. State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 235 S.E.2d 828 (1977).

Of course, if a witness' statement is discoverable under G.S. 15A-903(a), (b), (c) or (e), then it is discoverable under G.S. 15A-904(a) due to the qualifying clause expressly contained in G.S. 15A-904(a). Here, the trial judge ordered that the State disclose to the defendant, "A written copy of any and all statements, written or oral, Made by the defendant to investigating officers or Any other person or persons." Thus, the question presented is whether these witnesses' statements are discoverable under G.S. 15A-903(a)(2), and thus are taken out of the express restriction on discovery of witnesses' statements contained in G.S. 15A-904(a) to the extent that the witnesses' statements contain remarks made to that witness by the defendant.

In a recent decision we addressed this very question and there held with respect to G.S. 15A-903(a)(2) that, "the intent of the Legislature was to restrict a defendant's discovery of his oral statements to those Made by him to persons acting on behalf of the State." State v. Crews, 296 N.C. 607, 620, 252 S.E.2d 745, 754 (1979). (Emphasis added.) See, State v. Stevens, 295 N.C. 21, 243 S.E.2d 771 (1978). Therefore, in the instant case, the able trial judge exceeded his authority to the extent that he ordered disclosure by the state of "any and all statements, written or oral, made by the defendant to . . . any other person or persons." We expressly interpreted G.S. 15A-903(a) (2) not to include discovery of such statements in State v. Crews, supra. Therefore, these witnesses' statements are expressly shielded from discovery by G.S. 15A-904(a). Finally we note that G.S. 15A-904(a) shields these statements only from Pretrial discovery. G.S. 15A-904(a) does not bar the discovery of prosecution witnesses' statements At trial. State v. Hardy, supra.

Here, the trial judge's error was in favor of the defendant. She certainly suffered no prejudice in having these statements disclosed to her during pretrial discovery. Since defendant was not entitled to have received them, she cannot now be heard to complain that it was error for the trial judge to refuse to order disclosure by the State of the time and place where and to whom they were made. Indeed, disclosure of the statements alone without this additional information is one of the factors that led us to the conclusion in State v. Crews, supra that disclosure of witnesses' statements (even to the extent they contain statements made by the defendant to the witness) is not required by G.S. 15A-903(a)(2).

" '(I)t would be illogical to assume the Act intended to require discovery of remarks of the defendant to bystander witnesses but not disclosure of the witnesses' names.' 45 N.C.A.G. 60 (1975) 'Where possible, the language of a statute will be interpreted so as to avoid an absurd...