State v. Dial

Decision Date22 August 2013
Docket NumberAppellate Case No. 2011–190693.,No. 5157.,5157.
Citation405 S.C. 247,746 S.E.2d 495
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Lexie DIAL, III, Appellant.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

H. Wayne Floyd, of Wayne Floyd Law Office, of West Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

LOCKEMY, J.

Lexie Dial, III appeals his conviction of homicide by child abuse. Dial argues the trial court committed reversible error by: (1) ruling officer Henry Dukes had arrest authority as a United States Marshal under section 23–1–220 of the South Carolina Code (2007), or in the alternative, as a citizen pursuant to section 17–13–10 of the South Carolina Code (2003); (2) refusing to allow Dial to impeach the State's lead investigator; (3) denying his motion for a mistrial after Victim's mother brought an urn to the witness stand; (4) admitting autopsy photographs into evidence; (5) refusing to admit the pathologist's conflicting death certificates; and (6) sentencing him to the maximum sentence permitted under South Carolina law without properly considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We affirm.

FACTS

On January 10, 2010, Dial was at his home in Lexington County with his five-month-old son (Victim) when Victim sustained severe head injuries. Victim began suffering breathing problems and Dial tried CPR, which was unsuccessful. Dial then called his father, who came to the home and attempted CPR as well. All CPR attempts failed, and emergency personnel responded after Dial's father made a 911 call. At the scene, Dial claimed he fell while holding Victim, and when he fell, Victim's head hit a coffee table that was in the room.

Victim was initially transported to Lexington Medical Center but was transferred to Richland Memorial Hospital 1 in Richland County. Early the next afternoon, Victim passed away. Lexington County major crimes investigator Eric Russell was placed in charge of investigating Victim's death. Russell spoke with Victim's doctors and based on their diagnoses and explanations, he asked Officer Luis Rivera to obtain a warrant for Dial for great bodily injury to a child. The first warrant was issued prior to Victim's death, but once Victim passed away, it was withdrawn. A new warrant for homicide by child abuse was issued against Dial. Officer Dukes, a Lexington County officer with the U.S. Marshal's fugitive task force, arrested Dial at Richland Memorial.

Russell questioned Dial at the Lexington County Detention Center and obtained a statement from him. Dial first stated he was carrying Victim when he tripped over a steam cleaner in the living room and fell through a coffee table. Dial said that after the fall, Victim was gasping for breath so he shook Victim in a manner that would not have caused injury. Russell explained to Dial that he had spoken with the doctors, and Dial's version of the events did not match their description of Victim's symptoms and injuries. Dial then admitted to Russell in a second statement he had been frustrated at the Victim for failing to walk so he shook Victim. At trial, Russell stated he never mentioned anything about shaken baby syndrome to Dial. Dial claimed at trial he made the second statement out of fear and after being told cooperation would help him.

At trial, Dr. Shuler, with Lexington Medical Center, testified he was given a history stating Victim was dropped on a coffee table, and Victim's bilateral bleeding and subdural hematoma could have been caused by a drop on a coffee table. Further, Dr. Shuler stated the small 2–3 inch bruise found on the back of Victim's head could have been caused by Victim's head striking an object. Dr. Sarah Webb–Wood, a pediatric resident at Richland Memorial, stated Victim was brain dead when she saw him, and she ordered a skeletal survey to determine whether prior injuries existed. She found a large amount of blood in Victim's eye area and bleeding on both sides of his brain. Dr. Susan Luberoff, a pediatrician, was called in to assist Dr. Webb–Wood with Victim. Dr. Luberoff stated Victim had non-accidental blunt force trauma, with extensive retinal hemorrhaging. She did not believe the injuries could have been accidentally caused, but conceded the pathologist was best suited to determine the cause of death. Dr. Edward Cheeseman, an ophthalmologist, also examined Victim. He found numerous hemorrhages in Victim's eyes and found he suffered from retinaschisis, which could be caused by a back and forth acceleration or a fall, although falls are usually accompanied by crushing type injuries of the skull. Dr. Cheeseman opined it was unlikely Victim hit his head on a table because there were no crushing skull injuries. His diagnosis was shaken-baby syndrome. Dr. Greta Harper, a pediatric critical care specialist, also opined Victim died from shaken-baby syndrome.

Dr. Janice Ross, a forensic pathologist, testified she found subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhaging.2 She determined Victim's death was a homicide caused by subdural hemorrhaging due to blunt force trauma to the head but initially wrote on Victim's death certificate that Victim died from hitting his head on an object or surface. Thereafter, she edited the death certificate to omit the language regarding Victim hitting his head on an object because there was an ongoing investigation and she did not want to narrow the possibilities for the cause of death. Dr. Ross conceded she could not rule out more than one injury as leading to Victim's death.

The jury found Dial guilty of homicide by child abuse. The trial court sentenced Dial to life imprisonment, and this appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

‘In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only. We are bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.’ State v. Bonner, 400 S.C. 561, 564, 735 S.E.2d 525, 526 (Ct.App.2012) (quoting State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5–6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001)).

LAW/ANALYSISArrest Authority

Dial first argues Dukes was a Lexington County Sheriff's officer with no authority or jurisdiction to arrest in Richland County. Thus, Dial contends his arrest was unlawful. We disagree.

Prior to Dukes's testimony at trial, Dial made a motion to dismiss his charge because Dukes lacked authority to arrest him. As alternate relief, Dial requested exclusion of any evidence obtained subsequent to the arrest as being the fruit of the poisonous tree. In response, the State presented a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the LexingtonCounty Sheriff's Office and the United States Marshals Service. The trial court denied Dial's motion, finding the MOU and the warrant were valid and therefore the arrest was valid. In the alternative, it found under State v. Swilling, 249 S.C. 541, 155 S.E.2d 607 (1967), and pursuant to section 17–13–10, Dukes made a valid citizen's arrest, because the arrest was made upon certain information that a felony had been committed. During Dukes's testimony, Dial objected to his statement to Russell being placed into evidence, again arguing his arrest was unlawful. The trial court overruled the objection.

While Dial argues in his Statement of Issues the trial court erred in determining Dukes's authority arose from section 23–1–220, in the body of his argument he asserts the trial court erred in ruling that Dukes's authority arose from section 23–1–212 of the South Carolina Code (2007 & Supp.2012). Despite this discrepancy in statutes, Dial is inaccurate in his assertions that the trial court determined Dukes had authority pursuant to section 23–1–212 or section 23–1–220. After the State and Dial presented their arguments on the issue, the trial court ultimately found the agreement between Lexington County and the U.S. Marshals was valid because there was no testimony otherwise, and the warrant was valid. It ruled that as a result, Dukes had authority to arrest Dial in Richland County. It did not specify any statutory authority in its final decision, and neither party requested clarification regarding the statutory authority upon which the trial court based its decision.

The MOU stated the Lexington County Sheriff's Office entered into an agreement with the U.S. Marshals pursuant to the Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000. 28 U.S.C. § 566 (2006 & Supp.2012). The MOU's primary purpose was to create a task force that would “investigate and arrest, as part of joint law enforcement operations, persons who have active state and federal warrants for their arrest.” Further, the MOU explained [t]he authority of the United States Marshals and Deputy U.S. Marshals to, ‘in executing the laws of the United States within a State ... exercise the same powers which a sheriff of the State may exercise in executing the laws thereof’ is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 564.”

We find the MOU was valid pursuant to its cited federal authority. Because the MOU recites that U.S. Marshals and their deputies have “ the same powers which a sheriff of the State may exercise in executing the laws thereof,” Dukes, as a specially deputized member of the task force, had the same arrest authority as the Richland County Sheriff. A sheriff may arrest someone within his county pursuant to an arrest warrant, and, therefore, Dukes had authority under the MOU and § 564 to arrest Dial in Richland County. Consequently, we find the arrest was lawful, and we affirm the trial court. Because we affirm the trial court on the first independent ground, we need not reach the argument regarding a citizen's arrest. See Henry v. Lewis, 327 S.C. 336, 340 n. 1, 489 S.E.2d 639, 641 n. 1 (Ct.App.1997) (stating that because the appellate court affirmed the circuit court on one independent ground, it need not reach the alternative ground).

Cross–Examination Regarding Bias

Dial argues the trial court erred in not allowing...

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