State v. Dickerson

• Decision Date: 03 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 25164.,25164.
• Citation: 341 S.C. 391,535 S.E.2d 119
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. William Oliver DICKERSON, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

341 S.C. 391

535 S.E.2d 119

The STATE, Respondent, v. William Oliver DICKERSON, Appellant.

No. 25164.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard May 24, 2000.

Decided July 3, 2000.

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for appellant.

Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General G. Robert Deloach, III, all of Columbia; and Solicitor David P. Schwacke, of North Charleston, for respondent.

TOAL, Chief Justice:

William Oliver Dickerson ("defendant") was convicted of murdering Mary Middleton ("victim"). Defendant appeals. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Victim was last seen alive on the evening of May 31, 1996, in her Charleston home. She was 83 years old and lived by herself. Around 8:00 p.m. that evening, victim went next door to tell Chrisaundra Lockwood, her neighbor, that she had a telephone call at her house. Lockwood did not have a phone of her own so victim allowed her to take calls on her line. On the way back to her house, victim told Lockwood that she was talking in the backyard with a man who had gone to school with her son, but who she did not remember. While in the house, Lockwood observed victim talking in the backyard to a man in a green hospital shirt, which resembled a doctor's shirt. When Lockwood left the house after the call, victim was still talking to the man.

At this same time, another one of victim's neighbors, Quinnie Gailliard, observed victim in her backyard talking with an man she recognized as the defendant. She even asked her husband at the time if he thought it was defendant talking to victim. Husband disagreed with her at the time that the man was defendant. Gailliard testified the man was standing near victim's car in the backyard, looking at some damage to the vehicle.

Around 8:30 p.m. that evening, a few blocks away from victim's house, defendant approached Willie Gibbs, a friend defendant had grown up with, and asked him for a ride into the city. Once in the car, defendant asked Gibbs to take him to MUSC so he could get a key from his girlfriend, Sandra Jenkins, in order to change clothes. Gibbs refused and defendant told him that he needed to change clothes because he and a friend had just killed a man in Mt. Pleasant. Defendant showed Gibbs that he had turned his pants inside out to cover up the blood. In the car, Gibbs could see defendant's pants legs were covered in blood. Defendant and Gibbs got into an argument and defendant got out of the car.

Soon after 11:00 p.m. that night, defendant knocked on Sandra Jenkins' door. When she let him in the apartment, defendant was wearing a green hospital shirt and his pants on inside out. Even though the pants were reversed, Jenkins testified she could tell they were covered in blood. Defendant told Jenkins that he had been in a truck with a man and his girlfriend and the man had repeatedly stabbed the girlfriend and he did not know if she was alive or dead.

Jenkins was scared and asked defendant to leave. Defendant refused to leave and emptied his pockets onto her coffee table. In addition to a small amount of money, defendant also put a broach on the table that "somebody would wear to church." Defendant then showered and put on some clothes that belonged to Jenkins' son. He rolled up the green hospital scrub top and bloody pants and took them with him when he left.

The next morning, victim's neighbors became concerned when she did not get her morning paper or open up her windows. Eventually one of the neighbors entered the house. Victim was found dead on the floor with her body naked from the waist down. The house had been ransacked. The neighbors called the police who arrived at the scene around 2:30 p.m. on June 1, 1996. The police found no signs of forced entry into the house. Victim had suffered 25 separate stab wounds on her head and neck, causing her to bleed to death. Two of the stab wounds had pierced victim's carotid artery and jugular vein, both were fatal injuries. The medical examiner estimated the time of death at around 8:00 p.m. the previous evening.

The medical examiner characterized the victim's death as an "overkill" murder. According to the medical examiner, "overkill" occurs when the murderer inflicts injuries much more severe than necessary to cause death. The medical examiner testified that she had only encountered "overkill" murders as the result of a lovers' quarrel or when the killer had been high on drugs like cocaine. She also testified that expert literature on the subject of "overkill" murders reports that such killings often occur when the killer is high on drugs or motivated to kill by sexual passion.

Investigators at the crime scene found defendant's fingerprints all over the inside of victim's house and on her belongings. Fingerprints were on a magazine in the living room, on one of victim's purses, on victim's dresser, on a plastic bag, and on a jewelry box in victim's bedroom. The purse and jewelry box covered with defendant's fingerprints had been emptied onto victim's bed. The police also found defendant's fingerprints on the car in victim's backyard where Gailliard had testified that victim and the man were standing shortly before the murder.

Two days after the murder the police arrested defendant. On the day of the murder, defendant had been living with his brother in a house located on the street directly behind victim's house. Defendant had grown up in the neighborhood and attended school with victim's son. He also told the police that he had never been inside victim's house before. When arrested, defendant voluntarily gave the following sworn statement to the police:

On Friday, which is May 31st, 1996, about 9:00 a.m. I went and picked up Lee in Ashleyville. We went to Mimi's house in Shadowmoss to clean the garage. I came back to the area of the Hess Gas Station on Highway 61 about 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. and caught a rid [sic] to the North Area.

In the North Area, I got a bag of cocaine and a bag of heroin. I got high on Arbutus Street in the Height. I caught a ride back into Charleston and went to the same Hess Station and bought a quart of Old English Beer. This was about 1:00 a.m. I then walked back to Armstrong Avenue and crawled through the window of my brother's house and went to sleep.

I got up around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. Saturday morning. I caught a ride to Tony's Auto Repair on Highway 61 to check on my car and then to Shadowmoss. I then left Shadowmoss, and I went to the North Area again and got high. I came back to Armstrong Avenue again about 1:00 a.m. Sunday. Gopher took me to Tony's and then to Shadowmoss.¹

At trial, defendant did not challenge the voluntariness of the statement, but moved to redact the references to his drug use. The judge allowed the entire statement to be read to the jury without any redactions. The jury convicted defendant and he has appealed. The issue before the Court is:

Did the trial judge err in allowing evidence of defendant's drug use during the time frame in which the murder took place to be presented to the jury?

LAW/ANALYSIS

Defendant argues the trial court erred by not redacting, as improper evidence of prior bad acts, admissions of drug use contained in his statement to the police. We disagree.

Defendant's admitted drug use during the time period of the murder is not improper character evidence because it was not being used to show a criminal propensity. It was introduced to identify defendant as the murderer. South Carolina law precludes evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts to prove the defendant's guilt for the crime charged except to establish: (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan; or (5) the identity of the perpetrator. Rule 404(b), SCRE; see also State v. King, 334 S.C. 504, 514 S.E.2d 578 (1999); State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923). In the current case, the State argues defendant's confessed cocaine use during the time in which the murder occurred serves to establish his identity as the killer because the medical expert testified that cocaine use is one of the two main causes of "overkill" murders such as victim's.²

This Court has addressed several times the admissibility of evidence of a defendant's drug use under State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923) during the trial of another crime. See State v. King, 334 S.C. 504, 514 S.E.2d 578 (1999); State v. Hough, 325 S.C. 88, 480 S.E.2d 77 (1997); State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 470 S.E.2d 366 (1996); State v. Smith, 309 S.C. 442, 424 S.E.2d 496 (1992); State v. Bolden, 303 S.C. 41, 398 S.E.2d 494 (1990); State v. Coleman, 301 S.C. 57, 389 S.E.2d 659 (1990). These cases stand for the general proposition that, in order to be admissible, the drug use must have some relevant connection to the crime charged. See State v. King, 334 S.C. 504, 514 S.E.2d 578 (1999)("The record must support a logical relevance between the prior bad act and the crime for which the defendant is accused."). In the current matter, defendant's drug use is admissible because the testimony of the medical examiner connects it to the violent "overkill" nature of the murder. Thus it serves to identify defendant as the "overkill" murderer.

In State v. Smith, 309 S.C. 442, 424 S.E.2d 496 (1992), this Court held the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the defendant's use of cocaine. At trial, one of the State's witnesses testified that at some time in the past, he and the defendant had obtained cocaine by trading stolen goods and that the defendant had in the past left the witness waiting beside the road while she went to get cocaine. Id. at 445, 424 S.E.2d at 498. On appeal, the State argued the defendant's prior cocaine use was relevant to establish a motive for murder. Id. at 446, 424 S.E.2d at 498. The Court found that "evidence...