State v. Diego
| Decision Date | 09 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 21S-CR-285 |
| Citation | 169 N.E.3d 113 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant, v. Axel Domingo DIEGO, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 20A-CR-227
Police may not interrogate a person in custody without proper Miranda warnings or else the State risks having those custodial statements suppressed in a criminal trial. But not every station house interview implicates Miranda . Miranda warnings are only required when a person is in custody—i.e. when his or her freedom of movement is curtailed to a level associated with formal arrest and when he or she is under the same inherently coercive pressures in the police station as those at issue in Miranda v. Arizona .
Two years ago in State v. E.R. , 123 N.E.3d 675, 683 (Ind. 2019), we determined a defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation at a police station house because, based on the totality of objective circumstances, the curtailment of his freedom of movement was akin to formal arrest and he was subjected to overt coercive pressures throughout the interrogation. In the present case, which incidentally involves the same detective and the same police department as in E.R. , the trial court found the circumstances amounted to custodial interrogation and suppressed statements made by the defendant during a police interview.
Today, we call on E.R. to answer a similar question: Was defendant Axel Domingo Diego's freedom of movement in this case curtailed to a level akin to formal arrest when he had a free-flowing exchange in a detective's personal office? We find it was not. We therefore reverse the trial court's suppression order and remand this matter for further proceedings.
During the investigation of a possible incident involving child molestation, the Logansport Police Department ("LPD") contacted Detective Sergeant Troy Munson of the Seymour Police Department ("SPD") because LPD believed a suspect was located in SPD's community. After reviewing LPD's interview of the alleged victim, Detective Munson searched SPD's database to locate the home address of the suspect, Axel Domingo Diego. A uniformed officer went to the residence and spoke to Domingo Diego's English-speaking girlfriend, Andrea Martin, who prompted Domingo Diego to come speak with the officer.1
Martin translated the conversation with the officer because Chuj was Domingo Diego's primary language. Domingo Diego also spoke some Spanish and English. The officer gave the couple Detective Munson's business card and told Domingo Diego that he needed to go to the police department to find "Mr. Troy." Tr. Vol. 2 p. 45.
Domingo Diego and Martin arrived at SPD a few days later—perhaps by appointment. Upon entry into SPD's front lobby, an officer opened a door from the lobby to the rest of the police station and, after the couple moved through the open door, it was shut behind them. The door was secure from the lobby, meaning a person would have to be buzzed through to enter the rest of the police station. A person could freely exit the door to the lobby without assistance, but nobody explained this to Domingo Diego or Martin.
The couple boarded an elevator to the second floor. At some point, Detective Munson met the couple. Detective Munson wore his police badge and carried a gun on his person. Despite Martin's warning that Domingo Diego didn't speak Spanish clearly, Detective Munson told Martin to have a seat outside the room because he had the assistance of a Spanish/English translator.
The interview took place inside Detective Munson's personal office which had two exterior windows and was adorned with family pictures. Munson shut the door and closed the blinds on a window overlooking the rest of the detective division at SPD. The door was unlocked, but Domingo Diego was seemingly unaware of this. Through the translator, Domingo Diego was advised that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave anytime. Domingo Diego indicated that he understood and later testified he felt that he could have left in the middle of the interview but chose not to because he was with a police officer. Munson did not read Domingo Diego any Miranda warnings.
During the course of the approximately forty to forty-five minute interview, Detective Munson asked Domingo Diego questions about the incident in Logansport. Detective Munson told Domingo Diego he had listened to a recording of the victim's father confronting him about an alleged sexual interaction with the victim and that lying to the detective would make things worse. Though he had only reviewed LPD's interview, the detective also implied to Domingo Diego he had spoken directly with the victim. Thereafter, the detective pressed Domingo Diego on what exactly occurred with the victim and Domingo Diego made several potentially incriminating statements. At the end of the interview, Detective Munson asked if Domingo Diego wanted to write an apology letter to the victim but did not require him to do so. After the interview, Detective Munson wished Domingo Diego and Martin a good day and the couple left the building unaccompanied.
Domingo Diego was charged with Count I, Child Molesting, a Class A Felony, Count II, Child Molesting, a Class A Felony, and Count III, Child Molesting, a Class C Felony. Thereafter, Domingo Diego moved to suppress the statements he made during his interview at SPD on the basis that the interview amounted to a custodial interrogation and the statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution. Finding the facts of this case similar to those considered by this Court in E.R. , the trial court granted Domingo Diego's motion to suppress.
The State filed a motion for a discretionary interlocutory appeal under Indiana Appellate Rule 14. The trial court granted the State's motion, denied Domingo Diego's motion to reconsider, and certified the matter for interlocutory appeal.2
The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Domingo Diego , 150 N.E.3d 715, 717 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), aff'd on reh'g. After considering our Court's opinion in E.R. , the court found, "Domingo Diego's freedom of movement was curtailed to the degree associated with an arrest, and he was subjected to inherently coercive pressures such as those at issue in Miranda ." Id. at 720. Therefore, the court affirmed suppression of the statements because, "[Domingo Diego's] statements were obtained during custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings." Id. at 721.
On rehearing, the Court of Appeals clarified footnote twelve of its opinion and construed the State's Appellate Rule 14 interlocutory appeal as a discretionary appeal brought pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-4-2(6). State v. Domingo Diego , 159 N.E.3d 629, 633 (Ind.App. 2020), on reh'g.
The State sought transfer, which we now grant. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
As the party appealing from a negative judgment, the State "must show that the trial court's decision was contrary to law—meaning that the evidence was without conflict and all reasonable inferences led to a conclusion opposite that of the trial court." E.R. , 123 N.E.3d at 678-79 (citation omitted). Whether a defendant is in custody is a mixed question of fact and law. Id. at 679. The circumstances surrounding the interrogation are matters of fact and "we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the suppression ruling." Id. (citing State v. Quirk , 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006) ). "Whether those facts add up to Miranda custody is a question of law" which we review de novo. Id. (citing State v. Brown , 70 N.E.3d 331, 335 (Ind. 2017) ).
The question before us today is whether Domingo Diego was "in custody" such that Detective Munson should have read him Miranda warnings prior to the interview. E.R. , 123 N.E.3d at 680 (quotations and citations omitted).
Custody, therefore, is "a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion." Howes v. Fields , 565 U.S. 499, 508, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012) (emphasis added). There is no bright line rule requiring Miranda warnings be given prior to an interview simply because a particular defendant is questioned in a police station. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has advised:
Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him "in custody."
Oregon v. Mathiason , 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d. 714 (1977) (per curiam); accord California v. Beheler , 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam).
With this focus, we dispose of today's question under the first of E.R. ’s two-factor test: the freedom-of-movement inquiry. See Howes , 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S.Ct. at 1190 (). "Under Miranda , freedom of movement is curtailed when a reasonable person...
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