State v. Diggins, A08–1143.

Decision Date28 August 2013
Docket NumberNo. A08–1143.,A08–1143.
Citation836 N.W.2d 349
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Val Derick DIGGINS, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court

1. The district court did not err by overruling appellant's Batson objection to the State's peremptory challenge of an African–American prospective juror. The State articulated race-neutral explanations for exercising the peremptory challenge, and appellant failed to prove that the challenge constituted purposeful racial discrimination.

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that appellant assaulted and threatened a witness two days before trial to prove consciousness of guilt.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

Zachary A. Longsdorf, Longsdorf Law Firm, P.L.C., Lake Elmo, Minnesota, for appellant.

OPINION

DIETZEN, Justice.

Appellant Val Derick Diggins was found guilty by a Hennepin County jury of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and two counts of first-degree felony murder arising out of the shooting deaths of Charles Woods–Wilson and Ira Brown, and three counts of first-degree aggravated robbery involving three other victims. The district court entered judgment of conviction and imposed sentence. On appeal, Diggins argues that the court erred by: (1) overruling his Batson objection to the State's peremptory challenge of an African–American prospective juror, and (2) admitting evidence that he assaulted and threatened a witness two days before trial. Because we conclude that the court did not err, we affirm Diggins' convictions. We also deny Diggins' motion for supplemental briefing.

In the early morning hours of October 31, 2007, police responded to a 911 call of shots fired in a north Minneapolis residence. The first police officer at the scene spotted two women, K.C. and L.E., on the roof of the house screaming hysterically for help. When officers entered the house, they discovered the bodies of Charles Woods–Wilson, who had been shot in the head, and Ira Brown, who had been shot multiple times in the back. Both men died from their gunshot wounds.

K.C. and L.E. told investigators that they, along with A.A. and Woods–Wilson, met Brown at his house that evening. During the evening, numerous individuals stopped by the house to purchase crack cocaine, including a man known as “Pops.” Around 2:30 a.m., L.E. and Woods–Wilson had fallen asleep in the living room and Brown went upstairs. K.C. and A.A. were in the kitchen when they heard a knock at the back door. Pops entered, pulled out a handgun, and robbed them. Pops then headed into the living room and robbed L.E. and Woods–Wilson. After Pops took what they had, he walked up to Woods–Wilson and said: “You should have never f* * *ed with a ni* * *r like me, a stone ass ni* * *r like me.” Pops put the gun to Woods–Wilson's head and pulled the trigger.

Hearing the shot, Brown ran downstairs and struggled with Pops to get the gun. During the struggle, Brown was shot and ran into the bedroom. As he did so, Pops shot him three times in the back. A.A. heard the gunshots and fled to a friend's house to contact police. K.C. and L.E. fled upstairs and climbed onto the roof where they called 911. K.C., L.E., and A.A. described Pops to investigators as an African–American male, 40 to 50 years of age, with a gray beard, and wearing blue mechanic's coveralls.

S.H. told investigators that he witnessed two conversations that evening involving a man nicknamed “Mo.” Several hours before the shooting, S.H. was in an abandoned apartment building when he overheard a man offer Mo money and drugs if Mo would “take care of two people.” A few hours later, S.H. heard Mo threatening Woods–Wilson. When S.H. learned the next day that Woods–Wilson had been killed, he told police he thought Mo was responsible and gave them Mo's address. Investigators determined that the address was the residence of Diggins.

Investigators assembled a photographic lineup of six individuals, including Diggins, and showed it to S.H. S.H. identified Diggins as the man he knew as Mo. Investigators also showed the photo lineup to K.C., L.E., and A.A., all three of whom identified Diggins as Pops, the shooter. Diggins was later apprehended by police as he was trying to escape from a duplex in north Minneapolis. At the time of his arrest, Diggins was wearing mechanic's coveralls and carrying Woods–Wilson's driver's license in his pocket.

A Hennepin County grand jury indicted Diggins with two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2012); two counts of first-degree felony murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2012); and three counts of first-degree aggravated robbery, Minn.Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2012). Diggins pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial.

During jury selection, the State exercised a peremptory challenge against an African–American prospective juror, Juror 16. Diggins objected to the challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), arguing that the State sought to strike Juror 16 because of the juror's race. The district court overruled Diggins' objection, sustained the State's peremptory challenge, and excused Juror 16 from the jury panel.

At trial, the State presented evidence consistent with its investigation. Further, K.C., L.E., and A.A. testified that the mechanic's coveralls they saw the shooter wearing matched the coveralls Diggins wore when he was arrested. Additionally, S.H. testified over Diggins' objection that Diggins assaulted and threatened him in a jail holding cell two days before trial. S.H. was being held in the Hennepin County jail for trespass and assault charges and was mistakenly placed in the same holding cell as Diggins. Diggins confronted S.H. and assaulted him. One officer testified that Diggins punched S.H. and “slamm [ed] his head violently into the bench.” Another officer testified that as Diggins was led away, he threatened S.H., saying: [T]hat will teach you to snitch.” S.H. sustained a fractured eye socket and cheekbone, lost consciousness, and was taken to the hospital.

Diggins testified at trial and denied any involvement in the murders. Diggins admitted that he visited Brown's house three times on the night of the shooting to purchase crack cocaine. According to Diggins, he noticed Woods–Wilson's driver's license on the ground as he left the house the third time and decided to pick it up and return it at a later date. Diggins denied that he returned to the house a fourth time, that he shot and killed Woods–Wilson and Brown, and that he robbed the three others. Diggins also admitted that he struck S.H. in the holding cell two days before trial, but denied that he threatened him.

Following trial, the jury found Diggins guilty on all counts. The district court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Diggins to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole for first-degree premeditated murder and three concurrent terms of 111 months imprisonment for aggravated robbery. This direct appeal followed.1

I.

Diggins first argues that the district court erred by overruling his Batson objection to the State's peremptory challenge of Juror 16. According to Diggins, the State's peremptory challenge was racially motivated and its proffered explanations for exercising the challenge were pretextual.

Generally, each party has a limited number of peremptory challenges in a jury trial. SeeMinn. R.Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 6. Unlike a challenge for cause, a peremptory challenge allows a party to strike a prospective juror without having to explain the reason for the strike. Id. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, prohibits purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection, and in particular prohibits the State from using a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror on the basis of the juror's race. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Miller–El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005); Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The three-step Batson analysis determines whether the exercise of a peremptory challenge was motivated by racial discrimination. State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 101 (Minn.2009); see alsoMinn. R.Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7(3).

First, the defendant must make a “prima facie showing” that the State exercised its peremptory challenge against a prospective juror on the basis of race. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97, 106 S.Ct. 1712);see alsoMinn. R.Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7(3)(a). To make such a showing, the defendant must establish that “one or more members of a racial group have been peremptorily excluded from a jury” and that the “circumstances of the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race.” Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 101 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to “articulate a race-neutral explanation” for exercising the peremptory challenge. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358–59, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97–98, 106 S.Ct. 1712);see alsoMinn. R.Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7(3)(b). The explanation need not be “persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–68, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam). “Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered [is] deemed race neutral.” Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Third, if the State articulates a race-neutral explanation, the district court must determine whether the defendant has “carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (citing Ba...

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