State v. DiLorenzo

• Decision Date: 07 August 1951
• Citation: 138 Conn. 281,83 A.2d 479
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. DI LORENZO. STATE v. GUICCIONE. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 479

83 A.2d 479

138 Conn. 281

STATE v. DI LORENZO.

STATE v. GUICCIONE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Aug. 7, 1951.

Sigmund L. Miller, Bridgeport, with whom were George A. Saden and George C. Cravatas, Bridgeport, for the appellants (defendants).

Lorin W. Willis, State's Atty., Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Otto J. Saur, Asst. State's Atty., Bridgeport, for the appellee (State).

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN and INGLIS, JJ.

O'SULLIVAN, Judge.

These cases were tried together. They involved the same set of facts and raised identical questions of law. Our discussion will be directed to the appeal taken by DiLorenzo. The outcome of his case will necessarily dispose of the other.

DiLorenzo, hereinafter called the defendant, was presented on an information charging him with the crime of manslaughter in that on April 1, 1950, he 'did aid, assist and abet one Steven Pribula and George Guiccione in the unlawful installation and operation of a still for the manufacture of alcohol, located upon premises known and designated as #44 Bridgeport Avenue, in the Town of Shelton, which unlawful acts resulted in the burning of the building located upon said premises, and thereby causing the deaths of Jacqueline Reilly and John M. Kieley.' The case was tried to the court. The defendant was found guilty as charged. He has appealed from the judgment.

The facts are not in dispute. On March 20, 1950, the defendant leased the basement and first floor of a wooden building on Bridgeport Avenue, Shelton. Two families were then occupying a tenement on the second floor. After entering into possession of the leased premises, the defendant, together with Steven Pribula and George Guiccion, the other accused, caused a still to be erected in the basement by inexpert workmen. It was constructed crudely and without any supervision by the municipal authorities. The still was equipped with a firebox above which was a 275-gallon tank used for cooking the mash. The still was a dangerous instrumentality to operate in a wooden tenement building and constituted a hazard to life and limb. Pribula was put in active charge of operations. The defendant's subsequent participation in the venture consisted in visiting the premises from time to time and in supplying molasses and other ingredients of the mash. Shortly after midnight on April 1, 1950, fire broke out in the basement and spread rapidly throughout the building. The fire was caused by the ignition of alcohol and vapors leaking from the still. As the result of the conflagration, two young children, Jacqueline Reilly and John M. Kieley, were burned to death while in their beds on the second floor. The defendant was not on the premises at the time. No permit to manufacture alcohol has been issued to him.

The first claim of the defendant is that it was legally impossible for the court to find him guilty of manslaughter. His argument is this: The unlawful act alleged to have occasioned the deaths of the children was the installation and operation of a still; this act, being unlawful only because he had not obtained a permit to manufacture alcohol, was malum prohibitum, involuntary manslaughter cannot follow from the commission of an act of that nature, at least when, as here, the prohibiting statute was not designed to protect life and limb; and, in any event, the violation of the statute as to the obtaining of a permit was not the proximate cause of the homicides.

The defendant has overlooked the breadth of the allegation of unlawfulness. The information referred to no specific statute; it made no mention of the word 'permit'; and it cannot be construed as limiting proof of unlawfulness to the failure to obtain a permit. The allegation was far more comprehensive than the defendant appears to realize. The act was described as 'the unlawful installation and operation of a still.' This was broad enough to allow proof of any unlawful act performed in connection with the installation and operation, whether it consisted of the violation of the statute requiring the defendant to get a permit before engaging in his proposed venture or the mode or manner in which the still was constructed or operated. If the defendant had so desired, he could have sought, before trial, a clarification of the act or acts forming the basis of the charge. Practice Book, § 302. And had the state, in complying with an order passed upon a motion, set forth a violation of the statute and nothing more, its proof would have been limited to the specific act of unlawfulness charged. State v. Scott, 80 Conn. 317, 321, 68 A. 258. This, however, was not the case. The defendant proceeded to trial without requesting a bill of particulars and, so far as the record discloses, raised no objection to evidence calculated to establish, in addition to a violation of the permit statute, acts of recklessness in the construction and operation of the still. His attempt upon appeal to limit the effect of the allegations in the information cannot...