State v. Dinkins

• Decision Date: 18 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2009AP1643–CR.,2009AP1643–CR.
• Citation: 2010 WI App 163,330 Wis.2d 591,794 N.W.2d 236
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent,†v.William DINKINS, Sr., Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

330 Wis.2d 591

794 N.W.2d 236

2010 WI App 163

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent,†

v.William DINKINS, Sr., Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2009AP1643–CR.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Oral Argument April 20, 2010.Opinion Filed Nov. 18, 2010.

On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Steven D. Phillips, assistant state public defender. There was oral argument by Steven D. Phillips.On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, and J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. There was oral argument by James M. Freimuth.Before VERGERONT, P.J., LUNDSTEN and HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.HIGGINBOTHAM, J.

[330 Wis.2d 593] ¶ 1 William Dinkins was convicted of first-degree sexual assault of a child and is therefore subject to the requirements of Wisconsin's sex offender registration law. See Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1d)(b) and (1g)(a) (2007–08).¹ This appeal concerns his conviction for failing to provide the Department of Corrections (department) “the address at which [he] ... w[ould] be residing” at least ten days prior to his release from prison, pursuant to § 301.45(2)(a) 5 and (e)4.

[330 Wis.2d 594] ¶ 2 Dinkins' primary contention, as we construe it, is that he could not be convicted of failing to provide his post-release address as required under Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a) 5 because he could not locate post-release housing, and thus did not have an “address at which [he] ... w[ould] be residing” that he could provide to the department. In response, the State argues that Dinkins could have complied with the address reporting requirement by providing the nearest address of any place he planned to sleep, including, for example, a park bench.

¶ 3 We agree with Dinkins. Contrary to the State's position, the term “residing” in the address reporting requirement plainly does not encompass a park bench—or a heating grate, bush, highway underpass, or other similar on-the-street location, for that matter. Reading the address reporting requirement in conjunction with the requirement that prisoners nearing the expiration of their sentence provide this information prior to their release, we conclude that the statute contemplates the prisoner supplying the address of a location where the prisoner could reasonably predict he would actually be able to “resid[e].” We reject the State's argument that a park bench or similar on-the-street location is such a location. We therefore reverse the judgment of conviction and the order denying postconviction relief.

¶ 4 At the same time, we acknowledge that this case highlights an apparent unintended gap in the address reporting requirement of the sex offender registration law. As is apparent from our discussion below, the statute contains at least one questionable assumption. It seemingly assumes that all soon-to-be-released prisoners are able, in advance of leaving prison, to identify a location at which they may “resid[e].” Fixing or improving on this gap is beyond our limited authority, and we encourage the legislature to address it.

BACKGROUND

¶ 5 William Dinkins was convicted in February 1999 of first-degree sexual assault of a child and sentenced to a prison term of ten years. As noted, Dinkins' offense required him to register as a sex offender upon his release from prison, see Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1d)(b) and (1g)(a), and to provide required information for the sex offender registry, including the address at which he would be residing, pursuant to § 301.45(2)(a). Dinkins was scheduled to be released from prison on the expiration date of his sentence, July 20, 2008. Thus, he would not have been on supervision upon his release. Under § 301.45(2)(d), an offender scheduled for release from prison must report information required under § 301.45(2)(a) for the sex offender registry “no later than 10 days before being released from prison.”

¶ 6 On June 2, 2008, a prison social worker, Myra Smith, informed Dinkins that he was required under the sex offender registration statute to provide the address at which he would be residing upon his release. Later that day, parole agent Lisa Gallitz informed Dinkins that he could be charged with a crime if he failed to provide required information for the sex offender registry. Dinkins told Gallitz that he planned to live with his daughter, Brianna Dinkins, but he did not know her address and her phone had been disconnected. Dinkins told Smith that he had written to Brianna several times and had not received an answer from her. Gallitz made repeated efforts in June and July to locate Brianna using public directories, court records and family interviews. Finally, on July 18, Gallitz made contact with Brianna, who informed Gallitz that, while she wanted her father to live with her, her fiancé was opposed to it, she had a small child, and her landlord would not allow him to live there.

[330 Wis.2d 596] ¶ 7 In Smith's view, Dinkins made some continued effort between June 3 and the July 20 expiration date of his sentence to find a place to live. The circuit court later found that Dinkins had “attempted to comply with the [address reporting requirement of the] statute, but ha[d] been unable to find housing for himself upon release.” The State did not challenge this finding in briefs.²

¶ 8 On July 17, 2008, three days prior to his scheduled release date, a complaint was filed charging Dinkins with failing to provide required information to the sex offender registry. Dinkins was transferred the following day from Oshkosh Correctional Institution to Dodge County Jail, where he remained during the trial court proceedings. Dinkins filed three motions to dismiss the charge. Following a preliminary hearing held on July 31, the trial court denied Dinkins' motions to dismiss. A trial was held to the court based on the testimony and exhibits submitted at the preliminary hearing, and Dinkins was found guilty of the charged offense. The court withheld sentence and placed him on probation for thirty months on condition that he serve ninety days in jail.

¶ 9 Dinkins filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.02 and Wis. Stat. RuleE 809.30(2)(h). Dinkins contended that the offense of failure to report information to the sex offender registry under Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a) requires proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of the information that he was required to provide—knowledge Dinkins lacked because he did not know where he would be living upon his release. Dinkins further contended that failure to construe § 301.45(2)(a) to require proof of knowledge of the required information would violate his right to substantive due process, and render the statute impermissibly vague. Dinkins asked the court to vacate the judgment of conviction, or, in the alternative, to order a new trial on grounds that the real controversy had not been fully tried because neither the parties nor the court had addressed whether Dinkins had actual knowledge of the required information. The court denied the motion. Dinkins appeals.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Interpretation

¶ 10 This case requires us to interpret Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a), which mandates that persons subject to the sex offender registration law provide certain information, including the address where the offender is residing or will be residing. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶ 36, 328 Wis.2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144.

¶ 11 “Judicial deference to the policy choices enacted into law by the legislature requires that statutory interpretation focus primarily on the language of the statute.” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. If the meaning of the statute is plain from the statutory language, we ordinarily stop the inquiry and apply that meaning. Id., ¶ 45. Non-technical words and phrases not defined within the statutory scheme are usually given their common, ordinary, and accepted meaning. Id. “[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” Id., ¶ 46. When interpreting a statute, “the court is not at liberty to disregard [the statute's] plain, clear words.” Id.

¶ 12 “A statute's purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-related statutes—that is, from its context or the structure of the statute as a coherent whole.” Id., ¶ 49. “[A] plain-meaning interpretation cannot contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory purpose.” Id.

Information Reporting Requirement of the Sex Offender Registration Law

¶ 13 Wisconsin's sex offender registration law, Wis. Stat. § 301.45, is remedial in nature, not punitive, and its purposes are to protect the public and assist law enforcement by keeping updated information about registrants. State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶¶ 21–22, 232 Wis.2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199. The information all persons subject to the registration law must provide to the registry is set forth in § 301.45(2)(a), and includes “[t]he address at which the person is or will be residing.” ³ Section 301.45(2)(a)5.

[330 Wis.2d 599] ¶ 14 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(2)(e) specifies the time by which the required information must be provided.⁴ A person like Dinkins who is about to be released from prison at the expiration date of his sentence and will not be on supervision must provide the information “no later than 10 days before being released from prison.” Section 301.45(2)(e)4.⁵ Failure to comply with this requirement may result in criminal penalties. See § 301.45(6)(a).

[330 Wis.2d 602] ¶ 15 All sex offender law registrants must provide the required...