State v. Dinsmore
Decision Date | 24 November 2006 |
Docket Number | (CC 9909234CR; CA A122052; SC S53033). |
Citation | 342 Or. 1,147 P.3d 1146 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review, v. Karen Ruth DINSMORE, Respondent on Review. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, Salem.
Robert M. McCrea, McCrea, PC, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review.
Before DE MUNIZ, Chief Justice, and CARSON, GILLETTE, DURHAM, and BALMER, Justices.**
DE MUNIZ, C.J.
This criminal case requires that we resolve two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in reinstating charges that it previously had dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement between defendant and the state; and (2) whether breath test evidence that is inadmissible in a prosecution for driving under the influence is also inadmissible in a homicide prosecution arising from the same incident. Under the circumstances of this case, we answer both of those questions in the affirmative.
We take the facts from the record and the Court of Appeals' prior opinions in this case. In June 1999, defendant was driving her vehicle late at night on Highway 20 in Harney County when she collided with two other vehicles that were stopped on the highway waiting to turn left at an intersection. That collision killed the driver of one vehicle and severely injured the occupants of the other vehicle. At the on-scene investigation that followed, a police officer approached defendant to ask her about the collision and noticed a faint odor of alcohol on her breath. The officer began questioning defendant without first advising her of her Miranda rights, and defendant told the officer that she had consumed one beer approximately nine hours earlier. She also said that she had been using medications for high blood pressure and allergies. Shortly thereafter, the officer arrested defendant for reckless driving and driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). He then informed defendant of her Miranda rights. Defendant subsequently agreed to perform some field sobriety tests at the crash site and answered additional questions about the collision. The officer then drove defendant to the police station where she agreed to take a Breathalyzer test to establish the alcohol content of her blood. Although defendant asked to speak to an attorney and did so by telephone before taking the test, a police officer nevertheless remained within defendant's sight and hearing while that conversation took place. The Breathalyzer test showed, approximately four hours after the accident, that defendant had a blood alcohol content of .06.
The state charged defendant with second-degree manslaughter, ORS 163.125, third-degree assault, ORS 163.165, fourth-degree assault, ORS 163.160, DUII, ORS 813.010, and reckless driving, ORS 811.140. In response, defendant moved to suppress (1) the officer's observation that he had smelled alcohol on defendant's breath at the crash site; (2) defendant's statements to police authorities made during interviews at the crash site; (3) the results of defendant's field sobriety tests; and (4) the result of defendant's Breathalyzer test. Those pretrial motions were denied.
Before trial, however, the state and defendant negotiated a plea agreement. See ORS 135.405 ( ). The written agreement, authored by the prosecution, provided, in part:
(Emphasis added.) Defendant agreed to the prosecutor's terms and, in exchange, the state dismissed the remaining charges against her. The prosecutor later stated in an affidavit submitted to the trial court that "the issue of proceedings on remand did not arise except as addressed in ORS 135.335(3), to wit: That the defendant could withdraw her conditional no contest plea if she prevailed in the Court of Appeals."
After entering her plea, defendant pursued an appeal and was partially successful in that endeavor. Although the Court of Appeals rejected most of defendant's arguments, it did conclude that the trial court should have suppressed the statements that defendant had made during the police interview at the crash site before being given her Miranda warnings. State v. Dinsmore, 182 Or.App. 505, 49 P.3d 830 (2002). Consequently, defendant sought, on remand, to withdraw her prior no contest plea to the criminally negligent homicide charge.
Consistently with that ruling, the trial court reinstated the original charges against defendant and she pleaded not guilty to all of them.
Prior to trial, defendant once again moved to suppress evidence from the Breathalyzer test that she had taken while in police custody. The state conceded that the police officer's presence during defendant's telephone call to her lawyer before the test had violated defendant's right to a private consultation with counsel, see State v. Durbin, 335 Or. 183, 63 P.3d 576 (2003) (discussing right), and agreed that the result of the breath test could not be admitted to support the DUII charge. The state argued, however, that the result nevertheless could be used in conjunction with the other counts against defendant, such as the manslaughter charge. The trial court agreed with the state and held that the Breathalyzer test result was admissible for that purpose. At trial, a jury convicted defendant on all charges, including second-degree manslaughter.
Defendant once again appealed. She first argued that the state could not reinstate charges other than the criminally negligent homicide charge once the trial court had dismissed them pursuant to the plea agreement. She then argued that, in light of the state's concession that the result of her breath test was inadmissible with regard to the DUII charge, the trial court had erred in refusing to suppress that evidence with respect to the homicide charge as well. The Court of Appeals agreed with both arguments and remanded for a new trial. State v. Dinsmore, 200 Or.App. 432, 116 P.3d 226 (2005). We subsequently allowed the state's petition for review to examine both of those issues.
On review, the state first contends that the trial court did not err in reinstating the state's original roster of charges against defendant. The specifics of that argument focus on what the state perceives to be the trial court's inherent authority to now proceed on defendant's original indictment and the Court of Appeals' impropriety in examining that authority on its own motion. There is, however, a more fundamental issue at play here, the resolution of which makes it unnecessary to address those particular arguments. As it has maintained throughout this case, the state again asserts on review that (1) defendant repudiated the plea agreement when she withdrew her "no contest" plea; and (2) reinstating the charges against defendant simply restored the status quo ante following defendant's breach of that agreement. As we explain below, however, the state is wrong in both respects, largely because it erroneously has conflated the statutory plea provisions of ORS 135.335(3) with the provisions of the plea agreement reached by the parties.
ORS 135.335(3) permits a defendant to plead guilty or no contest to a criminal charge while retaining the right to appeal adverse rulings on issues raised before trial. Should a defendant prevail on such an appeal, the statute expressly allows the defendant to withdraw the plea. The statute provides:
(Emphasis added.) Before the addition of ORS 135.335(3) to Oregon's statutes in 1999, a criminal defendant who pleaded guilty or no contest to a criminal charge had a limited right of review on appeal. At that time, the only bases for appellate review following a guilty plea were that a sentence either (1) exceeded the maximum allowed by law; or (2) was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. See ORS 138.050(1) (1997), amended by Or. Laws 1999, ch. 134, § 3 (so stating). Consequently, a defendant who, for example, was unsuccessful in pretrial efforts to suppress evidence, was required to enter a plea of not guilty and proceed to trial — often a trial on stipulated facts — to preserve the ability to contest the adverse pretrial ruling.
Today, however, under ORS 135.335(3), a criminal defendant — with the consent of the trial court and the state — may enter a conditional plea of guilty or no contest, litigate pretrial issues on appeal and then, if successful, later...
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