State v. Distefano
Decision Date | 30 November 1927 |
Docket Number | 4542 |
Citation | 262 P. 113,70 Utah 586 |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE v. DISTEFANO |
Appeal from District Court, Fourth District, Duchesne County; George P. Parker, Judge.
James Distefano was convicted of having carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 18 years and over the age of 13 years, and he appeals.
AFFIRMED.
Thomas O'Donnell, of Vernal, and Robert G. Porter, of Duchesne for appellant.
Harvey H. Cluff, Atty. Gen., and L. A. Miner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
OPINION
The defendant was convicted of the crime of having carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 18 years and over the age of 13 years. Motion for new trial was filed and denied, and defendant was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term in the state prison as provided by law. Defendant appealed.
At the time the cause was called for trial one of defendant's counsel announced that the defendant was ready. Other counsel objected to the entire panel and venire of jurors as drawn. The objection was based upon section 3610, Compiled Laws Utah 1917, which provides:
"At least fifteen days before any term of the court at which a petit jury shall be required by law, or a grand jury be ordered by the court, the clerk of the county where such court is to be held shall draw from the jury box such number of names to serve as petit jurors and such number to serve as grand jurors as the judge may verbally, by letter, or by telegram, direct."
The venire was drawn October 13, 1926, and this cause was called for trial on October 19, 1926. It appeared that seven of the jurors drawn had not reported at the time the objection to the venire was made. After some argument the following colloquy occurred between the court and one of counsel for defendant:
Thereupon the court denied the challenge of the venire of jurors, and defendant excepted. Thereupon the names of eight jurors were drawn by the clerk. Of the names of the jurors drawn, seven were present and one absent. The jurors who were present were examined by counsel and the court then adjourned until the following day, when all of the jurors except those excused for cause were present. The juror whose name was drawn on the first day was among those who reported on the second day when the court proceeded to select a jury to try this cause.
It would seem clear that the defendant, through his counsel, waived his objection to the venire of jurors as to those who were present on the first day. As all the other jurors constituting the venire who were not excused for cause reported before the jury was completed, it is difficult to see wherein the defendant could have been prejudiced because they were not present on the first day. It is quite generally held that statutory provisions regarding the drawing and summoning of juries is directory and not mandatory. 16 R. C. L. p. 230, § 48; Wharton's Criminal Procedure (10th Ed.) vol. 3, p. 2266, § 1827; 35 C. J. p. 269, § 226; State v. White, 40 Utah 342, 121 P. 579. We are therefore of the opinion that the defendant is not entitled to reversal of the judgment against him, in the absence of a showing that he was prejudiced because of the fact that the jury which tried him was drawn 6 days before his trial instead of at least 15 days before the opening of the term of court at which he was tried.
The district attorney, in his opening statement to the jury, stated in substance that the state relied for a conviction upon an act of sexual intercourse that the evidence would show took place on or about September 8, 1926, at Tabiona, Duchesne county, Utah; he further stated that he expected to offer evidence of two other acts of sexual intercourse between defendant and prosecutrix which occurred prior to the act relied upon; that the evidence of the prior acts would be presented for the sole purpose of showing circumstances which might tend to prove the act relied upon. While the district attorney was stating to the jury what the evidence would show as to time, place, and circumstances of the two prior acts of sexual intercourse, counsel for the defendant objected to the statement on the part of the district attorney of the details of any claimed prior acts of sexual intercourse. Thereupon, the trial court stated to the jury:
Defendant's counsel excepted to the court's ruling and assigns such ruling as error. No error was committed in this respect. The opening statement of the district attorney was eminently fair. In the opening statement to the jury counsel may properly fully state all of the material facts which the evidence will establish, but not facts which the party is not able to prove and none that cannot be supported by legal evidence. Bishop's Criminal Procedure (2d Ed.) vol. 2, p. 791, § 969.
The state offered evidence tending to show that the prosecutrix, at the time of the act of sexual intercourse charged in the information, was not quite 15 years of age; that she resided in Tabiona, Duchesne county, Utah; that she had been working at the home of defendant; that an act of sexual intercourse occurred between prosecutrix and defendant on or about August 9, 1926, in the seat of an automobile truck near the front gate of an inclosure some distance from where prosecutrix resided; that another such act occurred near a large gate a short distance from where the prosecutrix resided about a week after the first act testified to; that another act occurred near Stockmore on or about August 21, 1926, and another, the one relied upon by the state, by a big cottonwood tree near an irrigation ditch south of the home where the complaining witness resided. On cross-examination prosecutrix testified that the last time she had sexual intercourse with the defendant was on September 8, 1926, and that an act of sexual intercourse had occurred between her and defendant early in September down near a big cottonwood tree at about the same place as that of September 8, 1926; that the act of September 8, 1926, was after a Sunday school meeting had been held at the home of the defendant.
Defendant is a married man, with a wife and six children residing with him at Tabiona, Duchesne county, Utah. He denied ever having had sexual intercourse with prosecutrix. He offered evidence tending to show he was home on the night of September 8, 1926, when prosecutrix claims he had sexual intercourse with her, and that he did not see the prosecutrix on that day or night; he also offered evidence tending to show that the the Sunday school meeting that the state's witnesses placed as September 8th was held on September 15, 1926.
The trial court gave, among others, these instructions to the jury:
At the time the court first...
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