State v. District Court

• Decision Date: 26 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 29203.,29203.
• Citation: 143 Idaho 695,152 P.3d 566
• Parties: In the Matter of the Verified Petition for Writ of Prohibition and/or to Exercise Appellate Jurisdiction Over Orders of the District Court. STATE of Idaho, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT COURT of the FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT and Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge, Respondents, and Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity (ISEEO); Twenty-Two (22) School Districts and 36 Patrons, Intervenors-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

152 P.3d 566

143 Idaho 695

In the Matter of the Verified Petition for Writ of Prohibition and/or to Exercise Appellate Jurisdiction Over Orders of the District Court.

STATE of Idaho, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT COURT of the FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT and Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge, Respondents, and Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity (ISEEO); Twenty-Two (22) School Districts and 36 Patrons, Intervenors-Respondents.

No. 29203.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, September 2006 Term.

January 26, 2007.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for petitioner. Michael S. Gilmore argued.

Robert E. Bakes, Special Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondents.

Huntley Park LLP, Boise, for intervenors-respondents. Robert C. Huntley, Jr. argued.

TROUT, Justice.

In the proceedings below, the district court appointed a special master to assist with the "remedial phase" of litigation related to the State's system of funding public schools. The district court charged the State with payment of the special master fees. In response, the State sought a writ from this Court enjoining the district court from assessing special master fees against it..

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The issues in this case stem from litigation that began in 1990, the background of which is summarized in Idaho Schs. For Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 142 Idaho 450, 129 P.3d 1199 (2005) (ISEEO V). The current matter before the Court in this case concerns specifically the district court's appointment of a special master and the allocation of the resulting costs.

The Court's earliest decisions in this matter clarified the State's duties under the Idaho Constitution to provide a "thorough system" of funding for safe schools conducive to learning; this Court ultimately remanded to the district court the inquiry into whether the system of funding established by the Legislature met those duties. See Idaho Schs. For Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 583, 850 P.2d 724, 734 (1993) (ISEEO I) (citing Idaho Cost. art. IX, § 1); Idaho Schs. For Equal Educ. Opportunity ex. rel. Eikum v. State Bd. of Educ. ex. rel. Mossman, 128 Idaho 276, 912 P.2d 644 (1996) (ISEEO II); Idaho Schs. For Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 132 Idaho 559, 976 P.2d 913 (1998) (ISEEO III). The district court held a bench trial and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in February 2001 (2001 Decision). The district court concluded that the State's system of school funding was unconstitutional because reliance on local property taxes alone to pay for repairs or replacement of unsafe school buildings was inadequate for poorer school districts. The district court bifurcated the proceeding and the "remedy phase" of the trial was deferred to give the Legislature time to address the school funding issue. After waiting for the Legislature to respond, the district judge concluded both that the Legislature had failed to take appropriate action and that she had been tasked with finding a remedy to the problem based on the Supreme Court's decision in ISEEO III.

To remedy the problem, the district judge decided it was necessary for her to evaluate the present condition of Idaho's school districts and to find a cost-effective method for addressing their deficiencies. In a December 2002 written order (Order), the district court confirmed its November 2002 referral of the matter to a special master. Over the State's objection, the district court hired Charles Hummel as a special master to conduct a survey of every school district in Idaho to determine the extent of the buildings needing repair as well as the most cost-effective method of addressing the hazards they presented. In addition, as a part of the Order, the district judge assessed all of the costs of the special master against the State, giving as a reason that "the only reason that the Court is appointing a special remedial master to assist in the remedy phase is that the Legislature has not yet established a system which would meet its responsibility to ensure that the schools had a `safe environment conducive to learning.'"

The special master began gathering information about problems with school buildings. Seeking to stop the special master from running up significant fees, the State in December 2002, filed a petition for writ of prohibition (Petition). In response, this Court issued a temporary stay of the special master's activities pending consideration of the activities by the Court. In April 2003, the district court issued a 54(b) certificate making the 2001 Decision final and appealable and also entered an order authorizing a writ of execution to issue against the State for payment to the special master. Shortly thereafter, the State filed a notice of appeal from the 2001 Decision.

In its direct appeal, the State not only challenged the district court's decision regarding the constitutionality of the Legislature's method of funding school facilities, but also presented the same challenge regarding assessment of the costs of the special master as had been raised in the Petition. Because the issues were identical to those raised in the Petition and because the issue was pending, this Court directed proceedings relating to the State's Petition be suspended until an opinion in the latest appeal, ISEEO V, was issued, at which time the Court would determine what action, if any, would be appropriate. In December 2005, we affirmed the district court's conclusion the State's method of funding as it related to school facilities was unconstitutional. See Idaho Schs. For Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 142 Idaho 450, 129 P.3d 1199 (2005) (ISEEO V). The Court noted that issues related to the special master would be resolved when the suspended appeal was properly before the Court.

In the current proceedings, the Court now turns to the questions raised by the district court's assessment of over $11,000 in special master fees against the State.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Article 5, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution grants this Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition. Clark v. Ada County Bd. of Com'rs, 98 Idaho 749, 752, 572 P.2d 501, 504 (1977); Idaho Const. art. V, § 9 ("The Supreme Court shall also have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus, and all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction."). A writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandate and "arrests the proceedings of any tribunal ... when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal...." I.C. § 7-401; I.C. § 7-302 (writ of mandate); Rim View Trout Co. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 119 Idaho 676, 677, 809 P.2d 1155, 1156 (1991). "[F]or the writ of prohibition to issue, it is necessary that two contingencies must be shown[:] that the tribunal, corporation, board or person is proceeding without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal corporation, board, or person, and that there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Clearwater Timber Protective Ass'n v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist. In and For Clearwater County, 84 Idaho 129, 369 P.2d 571, 574 (1962) (emphasis added); I.C. § 7-402. "A right of appeal is regarded as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law in the absence of a showing of exceptional circumstances or of the inadequacy of an appeal to protect existing rights." Rufener v. Shaud, 98 Idaho 823, 825, 573 P.2d 142, 144 (1977). Prohibition is primarily concerned with jurisdiction and is not available to review errors committed in the exercise of jurisdiction. Freiburghaus v. Freiburghaus, 100 Idaho 730, 731, 604 P.2d 1209, 1210 (1980). A writ of prohibition, like a writ of mandate, will not lie to control discretionary acts of courts acting within their jurisdiction. See Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567, 575, 107 P. 493, 495 (1910) ("It is obvious that if the contemplated action of the Board ... involves the exercise of a judgment or discretion vested in them by law, then this Court cannot and will not attempt to control that discretion, or in any manner interfere with or direct the action of the Board."); Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 455, 457, 660 P.2d 67, 69 (1983) ("Mandamus proceeds upon the assumption that the applicant has an immediate and complete legal right to the thing demanded, and will not lie to coerce or control discretion of the district court.") (internal citations omitted); Bower v. Morden, 126 Idaho 215, 218, 880 P.2d 245, 248 (1994) ("This Court has consistently held that `writs of mandate (and their counterpart, prohibition) will not issue to compel the performance of a purely discretionary function.'") (quoting Bopp v. City of Sandpoint, 110 Idaho 488, 490, 716 P.2d 1260, 1262 (1986)).

"The writ of prohibition is a discretionary remedy, granted only when the court is satisfied that the remedy is appropriate." Clark, 98 Idaho at 752, 572 P.2d at 504. An applicant bears the burden of showing that the lower court is acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Id. Jurisdiction is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Obendorff, 131 Idaho 473, 474, 959 P.2d 454, 455 (1998).

III. DISCUSSION

A. WRIT OF PROHIBITION

"A writ of prohibition serves a fundamental but narrow purpose: Its office is to determine if the body whose action is challenged was attempting to act without or in excess of its jurisdiction." Clark v. Meehl, 98 Idaho 641, 642, 570 P.2d 1331, 1332 (1977). The State's claim that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding costs against the State is phrased in terms of statutory authority rather than personal or subject matter jurisdiction. The State is asking this Court to issue a writ of prohibition because, the State claims, the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the...