State v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist.

• Decision Date: 26 November 1900
• Citation: 62 P. 820,24 Mont. 494
• Parties: STATE ex rel. KING et al. v. DISTRICT COURT OF SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT et al.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

62 P. 820

24 Mont. 494

STATE ex rel. KING et al. v. DISTRICT COURT OF SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT et al.

Supreme Court of Montana

November 26, 1900

Certiorari by the state, on the relation of Silas F. King and others, to the district court of the Second judicial district and the judges thereof. Writ dismissed.

McHatton & Cotter and C. P. Drennan, for defendants.

PIGOTT J.

By the writ of certiorari the plaintiffs seek the judgment of this court annulling orders of the district court of the county of Silverbow county dissolving a restraining order, dismissing an order to show cause why an injunction pendente lite should not issue, and refusing to issue such injunction, and dismissing the action without prejudice. These orders were made on the 14th day of March, 1900, in the case of King et al. against Maloney et al., then pending in the district court, and numbered 8,418. The complaint in the action was filed on the 15th day of February, 1900. With the summons an order temporarily restraining the defendants from committing certain alleged wrongs was issued, and also an order to show cause why an injunction pending the suit should not be granted. On the 19th day of February, 1900, the defendants therein filed in the district court a motion to set that order aside, to vacate the restraining order, and to enter an order refusing to grant the injunction prayed for, upon the grounds, among other, that there was another action, numbered 8,059, pending in the same court, between the same parties with reference to the same subject-matter, and that in an action numbered 8,213 the plaintiffs had been adjudged not to be entitled, as against the defendants, to an injunction with respect to the subject-matter of action No. 8,418. The defendants had been ordered to show cause on February 21st why a temporary injunction should not be issued against them and upon that day the court received evidence, both written and oral, in support of and against the defendants' motion, but refused to hear evidence in respect of the allegations contained in the complaint. On the 14th day of March, 1900, the court ordered that the restraining order be dissolved, that the order to show cause be dismissed, denied the prayer for an injunction pendente lite, and dismissed the action without prejudice. In making these orders the court declared that it declined to entertain jurisdiction of the action, the learned judge assigning as the reason therefor that, under the evidence taken, the matters stated in the action should have been presented in action No. 8,059, or in action No. 8,213, which had been brought in the other department, presided over by another judge. These are the orders which the plaintiffs ask to have annulled on certiorari.

Counsel for the plaintiffs contend that in making the orders the district court exceeded its jurisdiction, and that the remedy by appeal is neither speedy nor adequate. Under the constitution and statutes of Montana, the district court has jurisdiction of the class of actions to which belongs the one wherein the orders assailed were made. It has jurisdiction of all actions of that kind. It had jurisdiction of the action,--that is to say, it possessed the power to hear and determine (or, it should seem, to hear without deciding, or to decide without a hearing) all questions presented in the cause,--and to make such orders and render such judgments therein as the law authorizes in the class of actions to which King et al. against Maloney et al. belongs; and this power necessarily included the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly, and to make an erroneous order or render an erroneous judgment as well as a correct one. It had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action and of the parties thereto. Now, the writ of certiorari may be granted only when there has been an excess of jurisdiction, and the review upon the writ cannot extend further than to determine whether the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions has regularly pursued its or his authority. The review must be confined to the inquiry whether the tribunal board, or officer has acted without jurisdiction. Such is the rule of the common law, the declaration of the statute, and the doctrine of this court. State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of Silverbow Co. (Mont.) 61 P. 309; Same v. Board of Com'rs of Ravalli Co., 21 Mont. 469, 54 P. 939; Same v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 22 Mont. 241, 56 P. 281; Same v. Judge of Second Judicial Dist. Court, 10 Mont. 401, 25 P. 1053; Same v. Ellis, 15 Mont. 224, 38 P. 1079.

The district court, in an action pending before it of which it had jurisdiction, dissolved a temporary restraining order dismissed an order to show cause why an injunction pendente lite should not issue, refused to issue an injunction, and dismissed the action without prejudice. Each order was one which the court had authority to make, notwithstanding it may have been erroneous. It is manifest that the determination of the court with reference to the restraining order, the injunction order, and the order to show cause was within the limits of its jurisdiction, and it is equally clear that in making the order dismissing the action the court did not exceed its jurisdiction. Buckley v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. 119, 31 P. 8. The question is not whether the orders were erroneous;...