State v. District Court of Fifteenth Judicial Dist. In and For Golden Valley County
| Decision Date | 23 December 1925 |
| Docket Number | 5832. |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. v. DISTRICT COURT OF FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DIST. IN AND FOR GOLDEN VALLEY COUNTY et al. GOLDEN VALLEY COUNTY |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Prohibition by the State, on the relation of Golden Valley County against the District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District in and for Golden Valley County and Hon. Stanley E. Felt District Judge. Peremptory writ issued.
Henry C. Smith, of Helena, for relator.
Shea & Wiggenhorn, of Billings, for respondents.
On motion for a rehearing it has been thought best to make some changes in the original opinion so as to remove doubt as to the proper practice to be pursued in such cases as this. Therefore the original opinion is withdrawn, this one substituted, and the respondents' motion for a rehearing denied.
This is an original application for a writ of prohibition. An alternative writ was issued, made returnable October 28 1925. The respondents filed a motion to quash the writ, and the matter was regularly brought on for hearing and argument on the day set, pursuant to the order of this court. From the affidavit filed on behalf of the relator in application for the writ, and facts stipulated by counsel, the salient facts appear.
Judgment was entered therein on December 22, 1924, and a peremptory writ issued forthwith. An appeal was perfected to this court from the judgment, and on June 29, 1925, the judgment was affirmed. State ex rel. Case v. Bolles, County Treasurer, et al. (Mont.) 238 P. 586. On July 23, 1925, after remittitur was received from this court by the district court, the respondents therein fully satisfied the judgment by payment thereof in full. On the 6th day of February, 1925, pending a decision of the case on appeal, the relator filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of Golden Valley county, and duly served, an application for the allowance of damages alleged, comprising attorney's fees, traveling and other expenses incurred in the action, and also claim for accrued interest on the warrants, and for an attorney's fee for presentation of the cause on appeal to this court, which was entitled in the same proceeding. No demand for damages was made in the original application for the writ of mandate, nor during the course of the hearing, and the judgment was entered therein without reference to any damages suffered by the relator, save as above indicated. It appears that the respondents will proceed to hear the application and determine the right of Case to damages and the amount thereof, unless prohibited by this court from so doing.
The only question presented for determination is whether the district court now has jurisdiction to proceed with the assessment of such damages as may have been suffered by the relator in the mandamus action.
So far as pertinent, the statute governing the allowance of such damages provides:
Courts will give meaning to every word, phrase, clause, and sentence therein if it is possible to do so. Stange v. Esval, 67 Mont. 301, 215 P. 807; Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 65 Mont. 414, 211 P. 353; Daley v. Torrey, 71 Mont. 513, 230 P. 782.
"A statute must be given effect in its entirety if it is reasonably possible to do so." State ex rel. Koefod v. Board of County Com'rs, 56 Mont. 355, 185 P. 147.
Of two admissible constructions of statute, courts are never justified in adopting one which defeats manifest object of law (State ex rel. Boone v. Tullock [Mont.] 234 P. 277), and in every instance of statutory construction it is the fundamental duty of the courts to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. A. C. M. Co. v. Junod, 71 Mont. 132, 227 P. 1001. If reasonably possible, the statute must be so interpreted as to make it operative.
Applying these rules of construction, we are of opinion that the practice in legislative contemplation and by the statute intended to be prescribed, more clearly stated, is that, after the applicant for a writ of mandate shall have made prima facie showing of right to the issuance of such writ, should he claim damages consequent upon having been required to resort to mandamus proceedings, he shall assert right thereto and submit such proofs as he may have covering the several items of damage claimed. At the conclusion of the hearing, should the court determine that the writ shall issue, judgment thereupon shall be entered awarding the applicant a peremptory writ and such damages as he may be found to have sustained incident to the proceeding, together with his costs. Thereupon a peremptory writ will issue forthwith, and the applicant may secure the issuance of an execution for the amount of damages and costs awarded him in the judgment.
The statute is silent as to the proper course to be pursued in making claim for the damages authorized to be awarded, and with propriety some future legislative assembly may specifically outline the proper procedure. In the absence of definite direction as to the proper practice in such cases, we think the applicant for the writ may, with propriety, make claim in his original application for such damages as can then be reasonably anticipated; or the course pursued in the instant case, by filing in the action a bill of particulars, covering the several items of damages claimed, would be unobjectionable if adopted before conclusion of the hearing. Where the method of procedure is not definitely pointed out by a statute conferring a specific right, any suitable mode of procedure may be resorted to which may appear best to conform to the spirit of the law. Section 8882, R. C. 1921. Manifestly, however, the right to recover damages must be claimed and proof submitted in support thereof before the conclusion of the hearing; otherwise the court, after final judgment entered, is without jurisdiction to make award thereof. In this case the attempt made in the judgment to reserve the applicant's right to damages sustained on account of the proceeding was wholly gratuitous, and may be treated as surplusage.
Under the statute as we interpret it the demand is not segregable. This being so, all rights involved in the mandamus proceeding should have been adjudicated therein. Mandamus being an action at law rather than in equity, judgment therein is conclusive as to all of the relator's rights properly involved therein, whether asserted or not. Section 10561, R. C. 1921. One versed in the law cannot conceive of a court by its judgment finding the amount of the plaintiff's actual damages and in the same judgment making reservation to him of such prospective damages as he may thereafter suffer to be tried out in the same action. Were it to so do, it is manifest that such attempted reservation would be wholly disregarded as a nullity. An attempted reservation of such a right would be clearly unavailing, and so too in mandamus, under the construction we have given the statute. A reservation of rights involved may be and is frequently effectually made in a decree in equity, but not so in a judgment at law, as to matters properly embraced in the action.
An "adjudication is final and conclusive, not only as to the matter actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated and have had decided, as an incident to or essentially connected with the subject-matter of the litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect to matters of claim and of defense." Harris v. Harris, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 88; Gray v. Dougherty, 25 Cal. 266; Estate of Bell, 153 Cal. 331, 95 P. 372; Helpling v. Helpling, 50 Cal.App. 676, 195 P. 715; Southern Pacific v. Edmunds, 168 Cal. 415, 143 P. 597; Thompson v. Myrick, 24 Minn. 4.
Anything is barred which might and should have been presented as an inseparable part of the demand. Black on Judgments (2d Ed.) § 620; Thompson v. Myrick, supra.
From the record it would appear that the applicant for the writ waived his right to damages incident to the proceeding, as he neither asserted claim thereto nor submitted any proof upon which the court could base judgment as to the amount thereof. The language used in the statute is somewhat awkward, and not easily interpreted and applied. However, we think the legislative intent as to the proper practice in such cases is as stated above. It cannot be given other interpretation without violating the canons of construction and rendering inoperative the legislative...
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