State v. Ditton

• Citation: 499 P.3d 1174 (Table)
• Decision Date: 07 December 2021
• Docket Number: DA 21-0206
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Michael Henry DITTON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

499 P.3d 1174 (Table)

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Michael Henry DITTON, Defendant and Appellant.

DA 21-0206

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: October 27, 2021

Decided: December 7, 2021

For Appellant: Michael Henry Ditton, Self-Represented, Bozeman, Montana

For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Damon Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Greg Sullivan, Bozeman City Attorney, Ed Hirsch, Assistant City Attorney, Bozeman, Montana

Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Appellant Michael Henry Ditton (Ditton) appeals a March 8, 2021 Opinion and Order from the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, affirming the Bozeman Municipal Court's denial of Ditton's motion to dismiss his charge of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI). We affirm.

¶3 On February 21, 2020, Bozeman Police arrived at the scene of an automobile accident after Ditton had driven his vehicle "the wrong way through [a fast-food restaurant] drive-thru and driven off an embankment." Police conducted a preliminary breath test of Ditton, which revealed Ditton's blood-alcohol-concentration (BAC) to be 0.151—almost twice the legal limit in Montana. Police took Ditton into custody at the scene, at which point, Ditton informed Police he was diabetic and that his blood sugar had spiked. Police transported Ditton from the scene to Bozeman Deaconess Hospital for monitoring and for a blood draw. Ditton was charged with two misdemeanor offenses: Careless Driving under § 36.03.260 of the Bozeman Municipal Code and DUI (third offense) under § 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA. Ditton had previously been convicted of two other DUI offenses in the State of Montana, stemming from two separate incidents occurring in 2002 and 2006.¹

¶4 Before releasing Ditton from custody at the hospital, Police provided Ditton with two one-page documents: a "Notice to Appear and Complaint" for Ditton's careless driving charge and a "Notice to Appear and Complaint" for Ditton's DUI charge. Each of the two documents stated Ditton's name and address, the specific offense that Ditton was charged with, the time and date of the offense, the location of the offense, Ditton's BAC of 0.151 at the scene, and requested Ditton's appearance in Municipal Court for arraignment on a date not later than March 5, 2020. Additionally, in a section titled "Description," each Notice to Appear and Complaint read "See APC"—referring to an Affidavit of Probable Cause. Ditton was not provided a copy of this APC at the time of his release from custody, as it had not yet been prepared by Bozeman Police. Later that day, Bozeman Police Officer Ian Anderson (Officer Anderson) completed the APC for the charges levied against Ditton. On this same day, the State filed its careless driving and DUI charges against Ditton with the Bozeman Municipal Court. The State included Officer Anderson's APC as an attachment to its filing before the court.

¶5 Amongst other details, Officer Anderson's APC stated that he observed the following at the scene of Ditton's arrest: Ditton's vehicle was "high-centered on curbing"; Ditton took "a drink of a Coors Light beer" while talking to Police; Ditton "admitted to consuming martinis at two separate bars prior to driving"; Ditton's eyes appeared "bloodshot and watery"; there was a "very strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from [Ditton]"; Ditton was "swaying and had difficulty balancing"; and Ditton provided a "voluntary breath sample," which indicated a "BAC of 0.151." Although Ditton was not physically served a copy of Officer Anderson's APC prior to his eventual arraignment on March 5, 2020, the record demonstrates that Ditton's case file was an "open file to the public," meaning the APC document was freely available for Ditton to review after its filing with the court on February 21, 2020.

¶6 At his Municipal Court arraignment on March 5, 2020, Ditton pled not guilty to both careless driving and DUI. On June 17, 2020, Ditton received a copy of Officer Anderson's APC in response to a discovery request. On June 25, 2020, Ditton filed a Verified Motion to Dismiss and for Sanctions (Ditton's motion to dismiss), which argued that the two "Notice[s] to Appear and Complaint[s]" that Ditton received were deficient for failing to "state an offense" and for failing to provide Ditton with "adequate notice" of the charges offered against him. Ditton's arguments relied on the fact that the State had not provided him with a physical copy of Officer Anderson's APC along with its two "Notice[s] to Appear and Complaint[s]" on February 21, 2020. Ditton's motion to dismiss also alleged the Municipal Court did not make a proper "probable cause determination to allow [for] filing of the complaints, in violation of § 46-11-110, MCA[.]" On July 6, 2020, the Municipal Court issued a written, three-sentence order stating that "the Court finds probable cause to believe the offenses alleged were committed by Defendant."

¶7 On July 23, 2020, the Municipal Court held a hearing on Ditton's motion to dismiss and issued a ruling from the bench denying Ditton's motion. At the hearing, the Municipal Court stated that—despite its July 6, 2020 written finding of probable cause—it had still reviewed each Notice to Appear and Complaint and Officer Anderson's APC prior to Ditton's initial arraignment, and it determined "that there was sufficient probable cause at the time" that the State's complaint against Ditton was filed.

¶8 On August 24, 2020, Ditton entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he reserved the right to appeal the Municipal Court's denial of his motion to dismiss. Under the plea agreement, Ditton's careless driving charge was dismissed, and Ditton pled guilty to the modified DUI charge of "Operation of [a] Noncommercial Vehicle by Person with Alcohol Concentration of 0.08 or more, 3rd offense," under § 61-8-406(1)(a), MCA (DUI per se). On September 8, 2020, the Municipal Court sentenced Ditton for DUI per se. On this same date, Ditton filed his notice of appeal with the District Court, and the Municipal Court stayed imposition of his sentence.

¶9 In his appeal before the District Court, Ditton claimed the Municipal Court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. Ditton asserted two arguments similar to those contained in his motion to dismiss. First, Ditton alleged that the State's Notice to Appear and Complaint for his initial DUI charge was defective, both statutorily and under constitutional due process. Specifically, Ditton argued that he should have been provided Officer Anderson's APC along with this Notice to Appear and Complaint and that the Notice to Appear and Complaint's "Description" section—which read "See APC"—did not adequately establish probable cause or inform him of the charge against him. Second, Ditton argued that—under § 46-11-110, MCA —the Municipal Court was required to make a written probable cause determination prior to his arraignment.

¶10 On March 8, 2021, the District Court issued a detailed, nine-page Memorandum Opinion and Order (March 2021 order) upholding the Municipal Court's denial of Ditton's motion to dismiss and affirming Ditton's conviction and sentence for DUI per se. In response to Ditton's first argument, the District Court's March 2021 order concluded that "there is no requirement that a defendant must be presented with the same factual basis to support a charge at the time he is issued a notice to appear" and that "prior to entering a plea in court, a defendant must only be presented with a copy of the charging document." Furthermore, applying the "common understanding" rule, as articulated in State v. Hardaway , the District Court determined that the Municipal Court did not err in holding the Notice to Appear and Complaint document presented to Ditton met the relevant legal requirements. 2001 MT 252, ¶ 67, 307 Mont. 139, 36 P.3d 900. The District Court also found Ditton's contention "that the finding of probable cause must be in writing [under § 46-11-110, MCA ] lack[ed] legal support"; instead, the District Court, citing Ditton I , ¶ 24, held that "§ 46-11-110, MCA, only requires that a [probable cause] finding be made, not that it be made in writing."

¶11 Ditton's current appeal raises three issues, which we restate as follows: (1) did the Notice to Appear and Complaint initially provided to Ditton sufficiently inform him of the nature of the DUI charge against him such that his statutory and due process rights were not violated² ; (2) did the Municipal Court make a proper probable cause determination under § 46-11-110, MCA ; and (3) did the District Court's order adequately address Ditton's constitutional claims?

¶12 "Pursuant to § 3-6-110, MCA, a district court's review of a municipal court's orders and judgments is limited to a review of the record and questions of law." Ditton II , ¶ 14 (quoting City of Billings v. Mouat , 2008 MT 66, ¶ 9, 342 Mont. 79, 180 P.3d 1121 ); see also Ditton I , ¶ 18. "We review a district court's findings of fact in this context to determine if they are clearly erroneous, and its conclusions of law [are reviewed] for correctness." Ditton II , ¶ 14 (citations omitted). "Questions of constitutional law are subject to plenary review." Ditton I , ¶ 18 (citing State v. Webb , 2005 MT 5, ¶ 9, 325 Mont. 317, 106 P.3d 521 ).

¶13 Ditton's appeal contains three main arguments, the first of which argues that the Notice to Appear and Complaint provided to Ditton for his DUI charge was "defective"—both statutorily and under constitutional due process. Ditton makes three sub-arguments in support of...