State v. Division 1287 of Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry., and Motor Coach Emp. of America

Decision Date08 October 1962
Docket NumberNo. 49377,49377
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. DIVISION 1287 OF the AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY, AND MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA et al., Appellants.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

John Manning, Kansas City, Bernard Cushman, Washington, D. C., Bernard Dunau, Washington, D. C., for appellants.

Thomas F. Eagleton, Atty. Gen. of Missouri, J. Gordon Siddens, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Missouri, Jefferson City, for respondent.

John B. Gage, John H. Kreamer, Laird P. Bowman, of Gage, Hodges, Moore, Park & Kreamer, Kansas City, Irvin Fane, Harry L. Browne, Howard F. Sachs, Kansas City, amici curiae.

DALTON, Judge.

Division 1287 of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, an unincorporated, voluntary association of persons with headquarters at 1913 Tracy Avenue in the City of Kansas City, Missouri, defendants in the above entitled cause in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, have appealed from a decree and permanent injunction entered in said cause on February 12, 1962, in favor of the State of Missouri. The judgment in said cause concluded, as follows: 'NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendants, and all of the persons to whom notice of this order of injunction may come, be and they are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from continuing, inciting, supporting and participating in the work stoppage, refusal to work and strike against the State of Missouri.' (Italics ours.) See Section 295.200, subsections (1) and (6) RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. Appellants seek to reverse the judgment and obtain a declaration that the King-Thompson Act, Chapter 295 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., under which the action was instituted, is unconstitutional and void in its entirety under the Federal Constitution, although only portions of the mentioned Act are before the Court for construction on this appeal.

The cause was in equity and it was tried by the court without the aid of a jury. Under Supreme Court Rule 73.01(b), V.A.M.R., applicable in such cases, it is provided that 'all fact issues upon which no specific findings are made shall be deemed found in accordance with the result reached.'

The case presents the issue as to whether the police power of the State may be exercised in an emergency and pursuant to state statutes to take over and maintain the operation of the public transportation system of a great city when the public interest, health and welfare of the State is jeopardized as the result of the sudden interruption and discontinuance of such service by reason of a strike by the employees of the transportation company against their employer. Appellants concede this is the issue in that they say: 'Appellants basic position is that, irrespective of the existence or non-existence of jeopardy by state standards, the state procedure itself is beyond the power of the State to impose, and appellants' fundamental objective is to be free from its applicability at all. * * * In this posture, where the question goes to the validity of fastening the state procedure onto the litigant at all, existence of the power to act must first be decided.' (Italics ours.)

The transportation company is not a party to this action. This suit was instituted by the State of Missouri against the defendants after the State had taken possession and control of the transportation facilities of the transportation company. The basis of the proceeding is that the employees of the Company by a concerted refusal to work for and under the supervision of the State, after the Company's equipment and transportation facilities had been taken over by the State, have violated the law of the State. The State obtained a temporary restraining order, which was subsequently followed, after hearing, submission and argument, by a permanent injunction, and from this judgment the defendants, as stated, have appealed.

The petition was filed on November 15, 1961, pursuant to the provisions of certain state statutes referred to as the King-Thompson Act, Chapter 295 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. This Act is entitled 'An Act to provide for the mediation of labor disputes in public utilities; to create a board of mediation and to provide for the qualifications, powers duties, compensation of the members of such board; to provide for the seizure and operation of public utilities by the state in order to insure continuous operation, to provide for the enforcement of this act and to prescribe penalties for any violation of this act.' The mentioned Act has been before this Court for consideration on several previous occasions. See State ex rel. State Board of Mediation v. Pigg, 362 Mo. 798, 244 S.W.2d 75; State v. Local No. 8-6, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, Mo., 317 S.W.2d 309, vacated by the United States Supreme Court on the ground that the controversy had become moot, 361 U.S. 363, 80 S.Ct. 391 (4 L.Ed.2d 373); Rider v. Julian, 365 Mo. 313, 282 S.W.2d 484. In this connection also see 29 U.S.C.A., Chapter 7, Sec. 152(2) defining the term 'employer' under the Federal Act as not applying to a state. Of course, there is no question that the Federal labor legislation, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 141 et seq., in question here, encompassing as it does all industries and utilities 'affecting commerce,' applies to a privately owned public utility whose business and activities are carried on wholly within a single state, as well as it does to those that operate interstate. Consolidated Edison Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126.

The essential provisions of the King-Thompson Act, here in controversy, are Secs. 295.010, 295.180 and 295.200(1) and (6) RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. These sections are, in part, as follows: Section 295.010 'Labor relations affecting public utilities--state policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state that heat, light, power, sanitation, transportation, communication, and water are life essentials of the people; that the possibility of labor strife in utilities operating under governmental franchise or permit or under governmental ownership and control is a threat to the welfare and health of the people; that utilities so operating are clothed with public interest, * * *.' (Italics ours.) A similar declaration of the public policy of this State is announced in the Public Service Commission Act by Sections 386.310, 386.570 and 386.580 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. Also see State v. Local No. 8-6, etc., supra, Mo., 317, S.W.2d 309, 316(7, 8).

Section 295.180 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., in part, provides that 'Should either the utility or its employees refuse to accept and abide by the recommendations made pursuant to the provisions of this chapter * * * or in the event that neither side has given notice to the other of an intention to seek a change in working conditions, and there occurs a lockout, strike or work stoppage which, in the opinion of the governor, threatens to impair the operation of the utility so as to interfere with the public interest, health and welfare, then and in that case he is authorized to take immediate possession of the plant, equipment or facility for the use and operation by the state of Missouri in the public interest.' (Italics ours.) (As we shall subsequently see, the Governor of the State acted under this provision of the statutes and took possession of that portion of the plant, equipment and transportation facilities of the Kansas City Transit, Inc., located exclusively in the State of Missouri.)

Section 295.200(1) RSMo 1959 V.A.M.S., provides: 'It shall be unlawful for any person, employee, or representative as defined in this chapter to call, incite, support or participate in any strike or concerted refusal to work for * * * the state after any plant, equipment or facility has been taken over by the state under this chapter, as means of enforcing any demands against the utility or against the state.' (Italics ours.) This particular statute must be read and construed together with Section 295.210 of the same chapter, as follows: 'No employee shall be required to render labor or service without his consent; nor shall anything in this chapter be construed to make the quitting of his labor or services by an individual employee an illegal act; nor shall any court issue any process to compel the performance by an individual employee of such labor or service without his consent.'

Section 295.200(6) RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., further provides: 'The courts of this state shall have power to enforce by injunction or other legal or equitable remedies any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation prescribed by the governor hereunder.'

As stated, the cause being in equity and having been tried before the court without the aid of a jury, we review the cause de novo and pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 73.01(d) providing, in part, that 'The appellate court shall review the case upon both the law and the evidence as in suits of an equitable nature. The judgment shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.'

Briefly, some of the facts shown by the record are that the Kansas City Transit, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the Company), operates a transportation system for passengers by bus in the States of Kansas and Missouri. It operates under a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity issued by the Public Service Commission of Missouri and a like certificate issued by the Kansas State Corporation. The Company's annual revenue received from bus transportation is approximately $8,600,000. Of this sum 77 per cent is derived from transporting passengers wholly within the State of Missouri, 7 per cent from transporting passengers wholly within the State of Kansas and 15 per cent for transporting passengers between Missouri and...

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