State v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 26 July 1973 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 43521,43460,43478 and 43473,s. 43521 |
| Citation | 283 So.2d 1 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Carl DIXON et al., Appellees. STATE of Florida, Plaintiff, v. Samuel D. SETSER, Defendant. STATE of Florida, Plaintiff, v. Fred Elson HUNTER and James Calvin Moore, Defendant. STATE of Florida, Plaintiff, v. Richard L. SHEPPARD, Defendant. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Raymond L. Marky and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gens., for appellant and plaintiff.
Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, Lewis S. Kimler and Bennett H. Brummer, Asst. Public Defenders, for appellee-Dixon.
Leonard R. McMillen, of Stephens & McMillen, Miami, for appellee-Lester.
Ronald S. Guralnick, of Guralnick & Gellman, Miami, for appellee-Sawyer.
Louis R. Bowen, Jr. and Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defenders, Warren H. Horton, Lewis S. Kimler and Bennett H. Brummer, Asst. Public Defenders, for defendant-Setser.
Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and Charles C. Adams, Asst. Public Defender, for defendant-Hunter.
Elliot Zisser, of Zisser & Zisser, Jacksonville, for defendant-Moore.
Philip Carlton, Jr., Miami, for defendant-Sheppard.
Tobias Simon, Miami, Jack Greenberg, Jack H. Himmelstein, Elaine R. Jones, Lynn Walker, New York City, Anthony G. Amsterdam, Stanford, Cal., for amicus curiae N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
James T. Russell, Clearwater, and David H. Bludworth, West Palm Beach, for amicus curiae, Florida Pros. Attys. Ass'n, Inc.
These cases pose several questions arising from the possibility of the imposition of the penalty of death pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., which became effective December 8, 1972.
Four cases are here consolidated on the issue of the constitutionality of the capital punishment statutes of the State of Florida. The case of State v. Setser is before this Court on the basis of a certified question from the Circuit Court of Dade County. The case of State v. Hunter and Moore is before this Court on the certified question of the Circuit Court for Duval County. The case of State v. Sheppard is before this Court on the certified question of the Circuit Court for Orange County. We have jurisdiction to determine the questions certified pursuant to Fla.Const art. V, § 3(b)(3), F.S.A. The case of State v. Dixon, Lester and Sawyer is before this Court on appeal from a decision of the Circuit Court for Dade County that Fla.Stat. §§ 775.082, 921.141, F.S.A., are unconstitutional. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.Const., art. V, § 3(b)(1), F.S.A.
The question certified in the case of State v. Setser is:
'Whether the provisions of Chapter 72--724, Laws of Florida, 1972, prescribing the method and means of determining the penalty to be imposed in a capital case violates the Constitution of the State of Florida and the Constitution of the United States in light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 32 (33) L.Ed.2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972), and the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Donaldson v. Sack, (Florida 1972), 265 So.2d 499.'
In the case of State v. Hunter and Moore, the questions certified are:
'1. Whether the new Florida Murder Statute, Ch. 72--724, Laws of Florida (1972) Florida Statute sections 782.04 and 921.141, is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process and equal protection guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Florida because a grand jury when called upon to consider bringing an indictment would be unable to distinguish the language between Murder in the First Degree and Murder in the Second Degree.
In the case of State v. Sheppard, the questions certified are:
'Whether the provisions of Florida Statutes 782.04, 775.082 and 921.141 prescribing the penalties for felonies and misdemeanors, the definitions of the degrees of murder and the methods and means of determining the penalty to be imposed upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony:
'A. Is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States?
'B. Is an arbitrary infliction of punishment as to deprive the defendant of life, liberty or property without due process of law?
'C. Is guided by insufficient and arbitrary standards which are vague, indefinite and uncertain as to be contrary to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida?
'D. Is vague, ambiguous and indefinite as to deprive the defendant of his right to know the nature of the charges, the differentiation between the degrees of homicide and to be able to prepare a defense accordingly?
The statutes involved in the questions before this Court are Fla.Stat. §§ 775.082, 782.04, and 921.141, F.S.A. Fla.Stat. § 775.082, F.S.A., deals with penalties for criminal convictions and provides, in pertinent part:
'(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than twenty-five (25) calendar years before becoming eligible for parole unless the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in section 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, and in the latter event such person shall be punished by death.'
Fla.Stat. § 782.04, F.S.A., the statute under which all the accuseds before this Court are charged, deals with the crime of murder and provides:
'(1) (a) The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any human being, or when Committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnaping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a distructive device or bomb, or which resulted from the unlawful distribution of heroin by a person over the age of seventeen (17) years when such drug is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user shall be murder in the first degree and shall constitute a capital felony, punishable as provided in § 775.082.
'(b) In all cases under this section the procedure set forth in section 921.141 shall be followed in order to determine sentence of death or life imprisonment.
'(2) When perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another, and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual or when Committed in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnaping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb, except as provided in subsection (1), it shall be murder in the second degree and shall constitute a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life, or for such term of years as may be determined by the court.
'(3) When perpetrated without any design to effect death, by a person engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate any felony, other than arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnaping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb, it shall be murder in the third degree and shall constitute a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in section 775.082, section 775.083, or section 775.084.' (Emphasis supplied)
Fla.Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., provides the procedure to be followed in determining what penalty should be assessed following a conviction for a crime designated as a capital felony. It provides:
'(1) Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment as authorized by section 775.082. The proceeding shall be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable. If the trial jury has been waived or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury empaneled for that purpose unless waived by the defendant. In the proceeding, Evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (6) and (7) of this section. Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements; and further provided that this subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Florida. The state and the...
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