State v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 06 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. W2017-01051-COA-R3-CV,W2017-01051-COA-R3-CV |
| Parties | STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROSCOE DIXON |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
STATE OF TENNESSEE
v.
ROSCOE DIXON
No. W2017-01051-COA-R3-CV
COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON
February 20, 2018 Session1
March 6, 2018
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
No. CT-000947-16
Rhynette N. Hurd, Judge
Former state senator convicted of bribery appeals the trial court's denial of the restoration of his voting rights based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-204. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, and BRANDON O. GIBSON, JJ., joined.
Kyle Mothershead, David W. Garrison, and Scott P. Tift, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Roscoe Dixon.
Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andreé S. Blumstein, Solicitor General; Sarah K. Campbell, Special Assistant to the Solicitor General and the Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee - Civil.
OPINION
In 2005, Petitioner/Appellant Roscoe Dixon ("Petitioner") was investigated and prosecuted in federal court as part of the Tennessee Waltz corruption sting.2 On June 8,
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2006, the jury returned a verdict finding Petitioner guilty of several crimes: (1) four counts of interference with commerce by threat; and (2) one count of bribery involving federal programs. An order on judgment and sentence was entered on October 13, 2006; Petitioner was sentenced to a total of sixty-three months' incarceration and three years of supervised release.
On March 7, 2016, following the completion of his incarceration and probation, Petitioner filed a petition to restore his citizenship and voting rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-202. Although the State of Tennessee ("the State") opposed the petition, the trial court entered an order on November 21, 2016, granting Petitioner restoration of his citizenship rights, other than his right to hold public office or possess firearms.
On December 7, 2016, the State filed a motion to alter or amend the trial court judgment, arguing that Petitioner's voting rights could not be restored due to the operation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-204(3), which provides that for certain types of crimes, voting rights may not be restored. Petitioner thereafter responded in opposition. Petitioner did not deny that he had been convicted of a crime specified by section 40-29-204(3). Petitioner argued, however, that the statute could not apply because his conviction occurred prior to July 1, 2006, the effective date of the statute and the date the statute specified for its terms to apply. Instead, Petitioner asserted that his conviction occurred on June 8, 2006, the day the jury verdict was returned. The State argued, however, that Petitioner's conviction occurred on the date the judgment was entered, well after the effective date of the statute. The trial court ruled that section 40-29-204(3) was applicable to Petitioner's conviction and that he was therefore forever ineligible to vote. The trial court therefore entered an amended order granting Petitioner's petition for restoration of civil rights, excluding the right to vote, the right to possess firearms, and the right to hold public office. From this order, Petitioner now appeals.
Petitioner raises three issues in this appeal, which are taken from his brief and slightly restated:
1. Whether Petitioner was convicted of his offense before or after the effective date of section 40-29-204(3).
2. Whether the ex post facto clause of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits application of section 40-29-204(3) to Petitioner, where Petitioner's offense was committed prior to the enactment of section 40-29-204(3).
3. Whether Petitioner's right to vote is permanently forfeited under section 40-29-204(3)?
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This appeal involves the interpretation of various statutes. As such, our review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. McFarland v. Pemberton, 530 S.W.3d 76, 91 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting Martin v. Powers, 505 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tenn. 2016)). As explained by our supreme court:
When determining the meaning of statutes, our primary goal "is to carry out legislative intent without broadening or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope." Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tenn. 2011)). We presume that every word in a statute [or rule] has meaning and purpose and that each word's meaning should be given full effect as long as doing so does not frustrate the [drafter's] obvious intention. Id. Words "'must be given their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they appear and in light of the statute's general purpose.'" Id. (quoting Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012)). When a statute's meaning is clear, we "'apply the plain meaning without complicating the task' and enforce the statute as written." Id. (quoting Lind, 356 S.W.3d at 895).
Ellithorpe v. Weismark, 479 S.W.3d 818, 827 (Tenn. 2015).
A brief review of the statutes surrounding the deprivation and restoration of voting rights is helpful to our analysis. As an initial matter, the Tennessee Constitution provides that "[l]aws may be passed excluding from the right of suffrage persons who may be convicted of infamous crimes." Tenn. Const., art. IV, § 21. To that end, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-112, which states: "Upon conviction for any felony, it shall be the judgment of the court that the defendant be infamous and be immediately disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage." See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143 (providing that those convicted of infamous crimes in this state or under federal law shall not be permitted to vote unless such person has been pardoned by the appropriate authority or "the person's full rights of citizenship have otherwise been restored"), recognized as unconstitutional when applied retroactively by May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Gaskin v. Collins, 661 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tenn. 1983) (holding that statute expanding the definition of infamous crimes for which felons are disenfranchised and applying that definition to disenfranchise felons regardless of when they were convicted violated constitutional provision
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prohibiting retroactive disenfranchisement under Tennessee constitutional provisions related to suffrage)).3 The Tennessee Constitution further provides, however, that "the right of suffrage, as hereinafter declared, shall never be denied to any person entitled thereto, except upon conviction by a jury of some infamous crime, previously ascertained and declared by law, and judgment thereon by court of competent jurisdiction." Tenn. Const., art. I, § 5. As such, those rendered infamous by the conviction of a crime are not permitted to vote following a judgment to that effect unless and until a pardon occurs or voting rights are restored.
Petitioner does not dispute that upon his conviction in federal court, he was rendered infamous and thereby disqualified from voting. Petitioner asserts, however, that under Tennessee law applicable at the time, he was entitled to restoration of his voting rights. Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-101(a), "[p]ersons rendered infamous or deprived of the rights of citizenship by the judgment of any state or federal court may have their full rights of citizenship restored by the circuit court." As such, "[t]hose convicted of an infamous crime may petition for restoration upon the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed for the infamous crime." Id. § 40-29-101(c). With regard to restoration of civil rights, however, the Tennessee Supreme Court has previously noted that "a person who is adjudged infamous or deprived of rights of citizenship does not have an absolute right to the restoration of the full rights of citizenship even upon satisfying the requirements [of Tennessee's restoration statutes]." State v. Johnson, 79 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tenn. 2002). Thus, "the restoration of citizenship process is subject to the requirements and restrictions imposed by the legislature." Id.
Pursuant to this authority, in 2006, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-204, which became effective on July 1, 2006.4 This statute provides that certain crimes are permanently ineligible for restoration of voting rights, including crimes involving bribery and official misconduct. As is relevant to this appeal, section 40-29-204 stated:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this part, the following persons shall
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never be eligible to register and vote in this state:* * *
(3) Those convicted on or after July 1, 2006, of:
* * *
(B) Any other violation of Title 39, Chapter 16, Parts 1, 4 or 5 designated as a felony; . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-204 (effective July 1, 2006); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-104 ("A public servant commits an offense who requests a pecuniary benefit for the performance of an official action knowing that the public servant was required to perform that action without compensation or at a level of compensation lower than that requested."); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-402 (providing the offense of official misconduct). The statute was later amended to provide that the subsection (3) would apply to "any violation containing the same elements and designated as a felony in any other state or federal court[.]" Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-204, enacted by 2011 Tennessee Laws Pub. Ch. 184 (H.B. 1117), eff. July 1, 2011 (adding the above language).5 Petitioner does not dispute that this law encompasses the crimes he was convicted of in federal court.6
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Instead, Petitioner argues that section 40-29-204(3) does not apply to him because he was not "convicted on or after July 1, 2006[.]" Rather, Petitioner asserts that he was "convicted" on June 8, 2006, the date the...
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